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This thesis seeks to explain the development of an ‘imperial intelligence system’ connecting 
Whitehall and the colonies. The system had two roles; to collect information and process it 
into intelligence for policy and decision making and to provide machinery to coordinate and 
implement covert action in support of policy.  The ‘system’ consisted of parallel information 
channels; interconnected, coordinated, and directed by committees at various levels. Analysis 
was mainly conducted in Whitehall departments. The system reflected the split between 
‘security’ and ‘foreign’ intelligence and the ‘information gathering’ and ‘covert action’ roles 
in the British machinery. The system paralleled the British professional intelligence 
machinery headed by the JIC and this division prevented information from being fully 
integrated with other consumers in Whitehall. 
 
The system was shaped by four major factors: threats; experience; the nature of the 
administrative system; and the development of professional agenda in both the administration 
and security organisation (the Security Service and Colonial Police Service) which dictated 
the points of reform and development over time. Before the Second World War information 
gathered by ‘police’ and ‘administrators’ was used to manage a colony’s internal politics. The 
end of ‘colonial isolation’ during the 1930s and 1940s meant colonial problems affected the 
British state’s international prestige and later its ability to fight the Cold War. To counter this, 
Whitehall departments sought information to increase their control over colonial affairs, 
despite the opposition of the Colonial Office which was used to a degree of autonomy. The 
Colonial Office was more closely coordinated into Whitehall.  Colonial and metropolitan 
intelligence systems were connected and common practices and product formats adopted. 
Whitehall tried to use ‘counter subversion’ to shape colonial politics. Security intelligence 
became increasingly important in the last stages of decolonization because, it was the last 
source of information handed over and consequently it shaped Whitehall’s reactions to 
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Intelligence and British decolonisation: the development of an imperial intelligence 
system in the late colonial period 1944-1966. 
This thesis seeks to examine the development of ‘imperial’ intelligence machinery within the 
Colonial Office (CO) and empire in the context of the development of the British government 
and intelligence machinery during the period of decolonisation which ran concurrently with 




Herman argued that the British definition of ‘intelligence’ was secret information collected 
by secret organisations; however intelligence was defined more widely by the American 
intelligence community as machinery for the assessment of ‘all source’ information.1 Davies 
also followed this approach.
2
 The term can describe ‘information’ collated with other 
information or analysis of information to create a ‘product’ for particular consumers. It can 
also refer to the machinery for collecting, assessing or co-ordinating ‘information’ or 
‘intelligence’. 
  
These definitions have specific implications for the study of the ‘imperial’ intelligence 
machinery in the British Empire. Scholarly analysis of the ‘imperial’ intelligence process has 
tended to concentrate on the collecting and co-ordinating machinery in the colonies or 
Britain.
3
  The ‘interface’s between the collecting and co-ordinating machinery and between 
the secret intelligence machinery and the departmental consumers: the areas most prone to 
                                                 
1
 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.1-
5. 
2
 P.H.J. Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States A Comparative Perspective, 
Volume 1, The Evolution of the US Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara; Oxford: Praeger, 2012) pp.1-7; P 
H.J. Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States A Comparative Perspective, Volume 
2, The Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara; Oxford: Praeger, 2012) pp.1-5 
3
 For example Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire 
(London: Harper Press, 2013), concentrated on the role of the ‘collecting agency’ MI5 and Rory Cormac, 
Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013) concentrated on 
the co-ordinating machinery of the Joint Intelligence Committee although he referred to the conflicts between 
the JIC and the Colonial Office.  
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intelligence failure are little explored.
4
 The process by which information was absorbed, 
processed, consumed, and incorporated into colonial policy inside Whitehall is consequently 
little understood. This thesis consequently widens Herman’s definition of intelligence 5 to 
include the ‘assessing’ and ‘consuming’ departments of state because the culture and 
practices of the machinery had their greatest effect on policy formulation during the 
assessment and consumption phases. Analysis is further complicated by developments during 
the 19
th
 century The older administrative intelligence machinery, which consisted of the 
‘departments of state’, was supplemented and partly superseded by new, ‘professional’, 
intelligence machinery. Each had different internal practices for processing information and 
the application of information to policy making. 
   
Some definitions of intelligence are related to the function. The terms ‘political intelligence’ 
and ‘security intelligence’ were used in Whitehall to describe both products and the 
machinery to deal with them. Unfortunately these terms were not clearly defined and were 
inherently misleading because in fact the products normally consisted of collated 
‘information’ rather than assessed and analysed ‘intelligence’. Both information and 
intelligence had been processed but this was not always clear to consumers. ‘Political 
intelligence’ was information; much of it gathered overtly, which underpinned administrative 
action by the departments of state and colonial governments. It included information about 
political developments, including the development of ideas, parties, and movements, tribal 
politics, economic conditions, weather, and agricultural results. ‘Security intelligence’ was 
more limited. It included both overtly and covertly obtained information, gathered by police 
and security organisations, on subversion, counter espionage, and crime. Unfortunately the 
two definitions overlapped; security information always had a political context. This was 
particularly true in the case of the colonies where political and security intelligence 
overlapped, but was gathered by different parts of the intelligence machinery. To add to the 
complications in Indian government practice the term ‘Political Intelligence’ was used at an 





                                                 
4
 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, pp.227-239. 
5
 Ibid. pp.1-2. 
6
 Martin Wynne, ed., On Honourable Terms: The Memoirs of Some Indian Police Officers 1915-1948 (Putney: 
BACSA, 1985), pp.129-131.  
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Yet ‘political’ and ‘security’ intelligence were also frequently defined in opposition to one 
another. These opposing concepts came to be used by departments with different functions. 
‘Political’ intelligence for example was associated with the ‘administrative’ information 
gathering machinery in the departments of state, whilst increasingly ‘security’ intelligence 
(along with military, strategic, and other forms) was associated with the ‘professional’ 
intelligence machinery such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS), Security Service, and the police. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was in a 
category of its own since it collected material which could be defined in a number of ways.
7
  
There were also departmental variations on the definitions.  As a soldier Templer, saw 
intelligence as a secret activity providing ‘forewarning’ of attack and did not fully understand 
the complexities of the CO’s uses of the term. The differences are important because the 
thesis will argue that the CO fitted into an older ‘administrative’ form of intelligence activity 
and tended to place importance on ‘political’ intelligence partly because its role meant that 
security intelligence was predominantly a local activity. This placed the CO in ‘functional’ 
opposition to the British machinery which was becoming more professional and was 
interested in a technical form of intelligence which crossed the boundary between  political  
and security  intelligence.  
 
There were also a number of definitions of intelligence which related specifically to the 
technical characteristics and means of collection of information. Most ‘political’ and 
‘security’ intelligence was based on a mixture of human intelligence (humint) and signals 
intelligence (sigint). The latter was used to intercept communications between anti-colonial 
groups. These definitions slip easily between one another in the historical record. 
Consequently it is essential to be clear in the thesis which particular meanings are being used 




The ‘British intelligence machinery’ and ‘British professional intelligence machinery’ can be 
distinguished from the imperial machinery. A key analogy is the ‘domestic’ and ‘imperial’ 
capacities of Parliament in constitutional and legal matters. The British intelligence 
                                                 
7
 Rory Cormac, ‘Organising Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security’ Intelligence 
and National Security 25:6 (2010), 800-822 (pp. 804-05); Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security 
Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2008), pp.295, 
298, 300; TNA, CAB21/2952 Templer Report 1955, pp.14-15. 
12 
 
machinery consisted of the departments of state (in their role of target setting and 
assessment), cabinet committees and the British professional intelligence machinery. The 
British professional intelligence machinery consisted of the co-ordinating machinery in the 
JIC and the Joint Intelligence organisation (JIO) and the collecting machinery including, the 
Security Service, the SIS, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the 
service intelligence organisations. Both can be differentiated from the imperial machinery 
because of their narrower focus on British rather than British and imperial interests. 
  
The term ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ is used rather than the term ‘colonial intelligence 
machinery’ because of the way in which the British intelligence machinery interacted with 
different ‘local’ intelligence systems. Six departments of state in Whitehall had intelligence 
relationships with the empire: the CO, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), Foreign 
Office (FO), India (and Burma) Offices, the Central Africa Office (CAO) and the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD).
8
 The administrative divisions of empire split the intelligence machinery and 
its records into discrete parts. The FO dealt with Sudan, the India Office with the Indian 
empire and the CRO with the dominions. The CO headed the imperial intelligence hierarchy 
in Whitehall in opposition to the JIC dominated British professional machinery. The 
‘imperial intelligence machinery’ can be distinguished from the ‘British’ machinery because 
it also had responsibilities to ‘colonial governments’. It was not a hierarchy reporting to, and 
controlled by the British intelligence machinery, although this eventually happened in the 
final stages of empire, but rather a series of institutions which could intercommunicate with 
each other. 
  
The imperial system was a series of parallel but interlinked information channels between the 
‘territorial’ governments and their administering departments. Territories had varying degrees 
of autonomy. Constitutionally they ranged from self governing dominions, and ‘semi’ 
dominions like Southern Rhodesia, through the Indian empire to the crown colonies, and to 
protectorates with both direct and indirect rule. The degree of autonomy affected the 
relationship between each territory and its administering department and the forms of 
intelligence used. Each channel had a series of internal ‘hubs’, which communicated locally 
and regionally. The CO was the main hub for the transmission of colonial information into 
Whitehall, although there was a ‘technical’ route through the Security Service and service 
                                                 
8
 MOD had existed since 1945 but 1964 it unified the service departments and their intelligence machinery and 
their role in empire. 
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intelligence. The CO had some responsibility for managing intelligence although most 
responsibility lay with colonial governments which gathered information for internal 
governance.
9
  The CRO was the hub for the dominions. It only managed intelligence from the 
High Commission Territories and progressively became more of a ‘diplomatic’ service. The 
structure of the colonial government determined the shape of the local intelligence 
machinery. Self governing territories communicated with Whitehall through their viceroy and 
later through direct links between security intelligence agencies. 
  
There were also regional hubs at ‘territorial’ level. The Government of India and some other 
large territories built up their own collection and assessment machinery and became the 
‘lead’ intelligence service in a region. They absorbed British and local ideas and good 
practice and formulated their own model which was shared outwards to other services in the 
region. This sometimes caused the creation of a local pattern of machinery and practice, 
which might reflect the time at which the greater colonial intelligence model was absorbed. 
 
The time scale of 1944-1966 was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly the pressures which 
led to decolonisation built up significantly during the Second World War and the CO 
focussed on the process of development in the same period. Secondly the start of the Cold 
War can be dated to1944.The problems posed by the Cold War and decolonisation interacted 
with each other and affected the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. The end 
of the period was determined by the closure of the CO in 1966 although elements of it 
continued as the Dependent Territories Division of the Commonwealth Office until 1968. 
The year 1968 saw the end of a separate intelligence hierarchy dealing with colonial affairs 
and the treatment of all intelligence activity as the province of the professional intelligence 
machinery under the control of the Cabinet Office. The period was divided by a series of 
information panics at both colonial and Whitehall levels which resulted in periods of 
development of the intelligence machinery. Panics in 1948, 1953, and 1955/6 were 





                                                 
9





The thesis considers new subject matter, the CO’s intelligence machinery, and adopts new 
approaches to examine it. It is the first attempt to examine the CO’s intelligence machinery, 
dealing with both its ‘information gathering’ and ‘covert action’ aspects and to compare the 
differences between the CO’s and the British intelligence machinery. The thesis takes a new 
approach. Rather than examining the ‘secret’ machinery, it explores the interface between the 
administrative and secret machinery. The administrative machinery functioned as the first 
intelligence machinery, and after the separation of intelligence and administrative functions 
as they became more specialised, it remained the consumer of intelligence products and 
information. The administration set the ‘targets’ for intelligence activity. It incorporated 
information and intelligence into wider policy and decision making. The thesis consequently 
widens the definition of ‘intelligence machinery’ to include the administrative machinery in 
Whitehall and at colonial level. The thesis goes further and argues that the police and the 
intelligence machinery were a specialised and developed form of the administrative 
machinery. As police and intelligence functions broke away from the mainstream of the 
‘normal’ administrative development they developed their own professional agenda which 
helped to create professional identity and to spread good practice. The ‘ordinary’ 
administrative machinery developed its own professional agenda. The various professional 
agenda interacted with each other, causing both individual and collective chains of 
development. This was complicated by the links between the police and intelligence 
machinery and between their professional agenda in Whitehall and the colonies. In particular 
developments in the Whitehall intelligence machinery were passed down to the colonial 
machinery and colonial experience was passed up. These longer term developments need to 
be seen in the context crises in both foreign countries and the empire which had the effect of 
advancing and retarding the pace and nature of the process of development.  
 
There were general tendencies which formed the context for the development of the 
intelligence machinery. Domestic, imperial, and foreign problems events caused ‘information 
panics’ and led to the need to reform and develop the machinery. In the colonies the panics 
were related to emergencies, whilst in Whitehall the panics were related to both Cold War 
problems and colonial emergencies.  Changes in the administrative machinery drove changes 
and development in the intelligence machinery. There was a general tendency towards the 
centralisation of organisation and policy making activity in the British government under the 
15 
 
aegis of the Cabinet Office machinery.  A professional agenda developed within the British 
intelligence machinery, led by the JIC and the Security Service, which was transmitted to and 
shaped the development of the colonial machinery. Finally the system absorbed local 
experience and incorporated it in different ways and shared it. These factors shaped and were 
shaped by institutional cultures. 
 
Conversion of the Colonial Office’s imperial intelligence machinery: 
   
During decolonisation between 1944 and 1966 the British and colonial governments sought 
to obtain greater quantities of both ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’ from their intelligence 
machinery in order to inform their decision and policy making processes.  Yet this proved 
hard to obtain. The system was designed to maintain security in individual colonies, and to 
keep the CO informed of such activity, not a system designed to allow the Cabinet and 
Whitehall to manage the colonies. The process of conversion was affected by events and 
professionalization and interdepartmental conflicts over the right to control the machinery. 
  
The CO headed a semi autonomous, intelligence system different to that used by the rest of 
Whitehall. Its machinery and practices had evolved prior to the advent of the professional 
intelligence machinery. The CO focussed on its own variant definition of intelligence i.e. it 
sought ‘political’ intelligence, indeed political knowledge, rather than ‘security’ intelligence 
in order to maintain its constitutional relationship with both colonies and parliament. 
It was less inclined to centralise information collecting because of its constitutional and 
administrative relationships with the colonies. As a result the colonial governments possessed 
a wide variety of forms of intelligence machinery. The CO had had a formal relationship 
since 1931, with the Security Service, an element of the British professional machinery with 
imperial duties. It did not have direct control over elements of the professional intelligence 
machinery including representation on the JIC or its own intelligence service.  
 
The differences were crucial in the development of the British and imperial machinery 
because, as the British machinery was absorbed into a professional coordinating system under 
the JIC and eventually into the Cabinet Office committee hierarchy, conflict developed 
between the CO and the professional intelligence machinery in Britain which lasted at least 
until the CO was fully coordinated into the British machinery in 1956-7. During this time the 
CO’s lost much of its policy making autonomy and was absorbed into a much more 
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centralised system and its intelligence machinery had to adapt to this change. The CO resisted 
assimilation. The CO’s internal machinery was affected by a combination of external 
pressures from other parts of Whitehall, internal debate and pressures, and experience gained 
from below. The periodisation of the process of development can be linked to the issue of CO 
circulars on intelligence but also linked to the process of development of the British 
machinery.  
 
The problems of writing intelligence history: 
  
Writing intelligence history poses a number of problems. The first is the nature and number 
of the sources. The second is the best way of establishing the limitations of the source and 
applying the appropriate techniques for extracting the maximum information. The third is the 
difficulty of establishing the context of intelligence evidence. The process of analysis is 
complicated because of the way in which government controls the releases of information 
and the extensive vetting of material before it is released. In Britain the government seeks to 
control the interpretation of the evidence and positively suggest narratives which suit their 
own political and professional agenda. As Richard Aldrich shows there was a deliberate 
central policy of controlling information about British intelligence activity from the end of 
the Second World War until the 1990s.
10
 Whilst much greater numbers of documents have 
been progressively released: the case of the Hanslope Park ‘Migrated Archives’ demonstrates 




The field of ‘intelligence studies’ is multi disciplinary. The purposes of the activity range 
from professional objectives related to developing intelligence practice and theory, and 
critiquing intelligence practices to the academic interest of establishing an understanding of 
intelligence history and its effects on the understanding of other histories. The different 
disciplines involved have developed different methodologies for interpreting and using the 
material.
12
 P.H.J Davies for example, argues that any scholar working in the field should 
                                                 
10
 R.J. Aldrich, ‘Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy, and British Intelligence since 1945’ English 
Historical Review 119:483 (2004) 922-953. 
11
 A. Badger, ‘Historians, a legacy of suspicion and the migrated archives’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 23:4-
5(2012),799-807; Cahal Milmo ‘A new excuse for burying bad news? Cambridge professor seeks assurance 
from Foreign Office over declassification of its archives’ The Independent 9 February 2014. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/a-new-excuse-for-burying-bad-news-cambridge-professor-
seeks-assurances-from-foreign-office-over-declassification-of-its-archives-9117073.html accessed 22 July 2014. 
12
 R.G. Hughes, ‘Of Revelatory History and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method in Intelligence History 
Intelligence and National Security 23:6 (2008) 842-877 (pp). 
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triangulate a triad of, official sources, secondary material and oral testimony in order to 
achieve the most effective results.
13
 Some non historical methodologies are potentially useful 
for historical investigation.  Even within historical methodologies there are a number of 
different approaches which can help the historian to read source material against the grain in 
order to extract as much as possible from the available material. Davies for example, uses a 
sophisticated analytical approach derived from business studies to analyse the organisational 




These problems affect this thesis. The sources were, and are, subject to direct political 
intervention and to redaction by professional intelligence officers seeking to maintain 
security, and conceal errors made by the intelligence services and government.
15
 The other 
files series used were subject to the same kind of treatment. The thesis has sought to 
triangulate different sources both published and primary and it has sought to examine 
evidence of organisational development to understand the processes and personnel involved. 
It has also sought to explore the institutional and personal cultures of the officials involved 
where evidence of these exists.   
  
 The intention of this thesis is limited to establishing the chronology of development, an 
outline of the organisation and the definition of the channels through which information 
flowed in order to determine the cultural lenses which affected the government’s view. The 
thesis does not seek to apply these insights to analyse individual intelligence products to 
show how they shaped policy and decision making. It will provide a basis for future attempts 
to achieve this aim and thus to illuminate the management of decolonisation and the 
understanding of the outlines of the ‘missing dimension’ of policy making.16 
 
Whilst the thesis does not seek to draw lessons on the strategic use of intelligence in 
contemporary world there are aspects of it which might have this potential use. In particular 
the material on counter-subversion offers historical insights which might affect current 
                                                 
13
 P.H.J. Davies, quoted in W. Wark ‘Introduction: The Study of Intelligence, Past, Present, Future?’ in 
Espionage Past Present and Future?  ed by W. Wark (Ilford: Routledge,1994), p.1. 
14
 P.H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, op. cit. 
15
 Michael Warner, ‘Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence’, in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 
ed. by Loch K. Johnson, (Abingdon Routledge, 2007),pp.17-27(pp.22-25). 
16
 Christopher R. Moran, The pursuit of Intelligence History, Sources, Methods, Sources, and Trajectories in the 
United Kingdom,  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55 No.2 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-2/pdfs-vol.-55-no.-2/Moran-
HistoriographyofIntelinUK-7%20June2011.pdf Accessed 22 July 2014. 
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consideration of ‘upstream intervention’ in order to maximise British influence embodied in 
the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) July 2011.
17
 This has resulted in a special 
edition of Small Wars and Insurgencies and an article on the subject by the author.
18
 These 




This thesis is based on information drawn primarily from official sources in the National 
Archives; notably the Colonial Office (CO) files on the CO 1035, CO 1037, CO 537, and CO 
968 file series and the Security Service’s KV series. The research was undertaken prior to the 
release of the Hanslope Park/Colonial Administrations Migrated Archives and takes no 
account of material revealed in them. The documents in the CO 1035 file series were released 
at the author’s request under Freedom of Information legislation but in a more closely 
regulated environment than the FCO 141 series which were released after government 
secrecy had been undermined in the courts so the levels of redaction are likely to have been 
higher. 
 
 The files in the National Archives present a number of problems. The author focussed on the 
CO and Cabinet Office files, rather than the files of the colonial administrations held in their 
respective national archives, or of other departments in Whitehall, because he obtained 
significant new file releases from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The 
research consequently concentrates on the perspective of the CO and internal debates which 
shaped the relationship between the CO and other departments in Whitehall, without fully 
investigating the perspectives on intelligence held by other departments in Whitehall. The 
conclusions must therefore remain tentative. The source of the ideas behind the reforms and 
developments were sometimes found in Security Service files, particularly those relative to 
organisation and training. The thesis however, also relies upon new secondary studies, 
                                                 
17
 William Hague/British Government, ‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’ July 2011 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32960/bsos-july-11.pdf Accessed 
22 July 2014 
18
 Gregor W. Davey, ‘Conflicting Worldviews, Mutual Incomprehension: the production of intelligence across 
Whitehall and the management of subversion during decolonisation 1944-1968, Special Edition, Influence 
without Power? Reframing British concepts of military intervention after 10 Years of counter-insurgency, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 25:3 (2014), 539-559; Matthew Ford, ‘Influence without power? Reframing British 








 to understand wider developments in the 




 Not all of the files created by the CO have survived. Only relatively short ‘runs’ of material 
on particular colonies exist and this factor affects the understanding of the relationship 
between the CO and colonial governments particularly during ‘controversial periods’. It was 
necessary to make certain assumptions about the connections between the CO and the 
colonial governments. It was necessary to assume that that the CO was following standard 
approaches on intelligence matters towards all of the colonies. This assumption enabled gaps 
in the record to be filled by assuming a similar process of development in the relationship 
with other colonies where evidence for missing periods does exist. There is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that this is a valid approach but it has weaknesses.  
 
The official record contained in Whitehall files records the production of ideas within a 
relatively closed environment and thus does not represent ‘reality’ but rather the perception 
of reality at a particular point in time, by a particular group of people possessing a strong 
corporate culture.
22
 Understanding of the process is further skewed by limited number of files 
released out of the original numbers created. It has a tendency to ascribe events a neat 
development although occasionally there are files which contain useful information 
demonstrating the officials trying to interpret the ideas demands and needs of their political 
superiors. It has a tendency to see the development of imperial affairs from the ‘top down’. 
The documents reflect the concerns of the department in Whitehall rather than the colonial 
institutions, although the unique role of CO means they can provide insight into the latter’s 
views.  
 
The CO files were dominated by the work of a few senior civil servants from Principal to 
Permanent Under Secretary. Much of it was produced by Assistant Under Secretaries. There 
were some strong personalities involved in intelligence production, notably Juxon Barton, 
N.D. Watson, and C.Y. Carstairs. The thesis is in consequence dominated by the views of 
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senior personnel and by the more vocal voices within that group.  This raises real questions of 
bias. The collective civil service mentalité included a distaste for spying but there were more 
‘intelligence and security’ minded staff.  It also raises the issue of how far the intelligence 
machinery in the CO was integrated into the activity of the CO as a whole or whether it was a 
peripheral activity to the CO’s administrative activity. On the other hand the material is a 
record of the behaviour of senior officers who made decisions and to some extent illuminates 
the considerations which affected the development of the process. The mechanisms by which 
colonial government and local practice informed the development of Security Service’s ideas 
and the role played by the CO is much less clear. Local experience was absorbed and 
transmitted although it did not always lead to greater efficiency. This is the kind of 
information which may lie in the migrated archives. 
 
The thesis examined Cabinet Office and Prime Minister’s Department files which were 
mentioned in CO discussions, or dealt with issues which caused pressure to be placed upon 
the CO, in order to determine the wider implications of issues considered important by the 
CO. The examination of Cabinet Office papers may have led to greater significance being 
given toward the importance of ‘top down’ reforms in the development of the imperial 
intelligence machinery. This might be a risky assumption. Previous work on the colonial 
police, for example has suggested that colonial police were not always directly conscious of 
the Whitehall agenda and used their own pragmatic approach to solve local problems. This 




Using peripheral information in the form of files from other Whitehall departments, private 
papers, and oral accounts provide ‘adjacent records’ which can help to define the general 
outline of the ‘missing dimension’ and provide a general check on the conclusions.23 The 
thesis uses material obtained from the Oxford Development Project and private papers held in 
the Rhodes House Library at the University of Oxford. The personal papers of colonial police 
officers including senior officers, like Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, reveal vital evidence about the 
culture of the colonial police and administrative service officers, their attitude to espionage, 
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and the divisions between them which help to contextualise the evidence in official papers. 
The Head of Special Branch or Commissioner of Police was normally a member of the Local 
Defence (LDC) and later of the Local Intelligence Committee (LIC) and had a role in 
intelligence co-ordination and assessment.  Colonial police officers were involved in Special 
Branch (SB) work collecting information and undertaking covert action. Their testimony 
provides evidence about how reforms enforced from Whitehall and local modifications to the 
intelligence machinery were implemented in colonial settings. The thesis argues that the 
colonial police developed a professional agenda which affected the development of the police 
as a whole including the Special Branch.  
   
Oral Testimony: 
 
It was originally intended to use colonial police material to cross check official records. A 
number of oral accounts were obtained from ex-colonial police officers who subsequently 
withdrew them because they feared prosecution as a result of precedents set by the ‘Mau 




In order to check the British account of the motivation and practice of covert action, 
particularly counter-subversion, some American documents from the State Department 
archive have been used.
24
 They demonstrate the differences between British and American 
concepts of counter-subversion. State Department files demonstrate how the British and 
imperial intelligence machinery had to adapt to American pressure in both Singapore and 
British Guiana. American intelligence directly intervened in colonial affairs at Whitehall and 
at colonial level. The intervention caused modification of the British professional and 
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As previously mentioned, this thesis makes no pretence to trying to achieve any wider 
approach than an historical one. It takes a qualitative approach predominantly based upon 
official sources. The qualitative approach makes it difficult to assess the relative importance 
of particular factors in causing specific developments in the machinery despite the attempt to 
triangulate the sources.
25
   
 
In this thesis there has been a conscious attempt to look at information from the perspective 
of both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ explanations of development. This is complicated 
because of the process of administrative centralisation which lessened the degree of 
autonomy held by colonial governments. This has probably tended to reinforce the 
impression that the process was ‘top down’  particularly  given that it has not provided 
possible to ascertain the degree of autonomy of the colonial intelligence machinery  and 
specialist local approaches  because of the withdrawal of colonial police testimonies. It has 
proven possible to compare the British material on counter-subversion with American 
documentation.  
 
Initially there appeared to be a relatively neat periodisation to the development of the 
intelligence machinery which suggests that a series of crises resulted in a series of circulars. 
Each circular modified the intelligence machinery from the ‘top down’. Deeper research has 
shown a much more complex process with circulars being issued well after crises and 
codifying reforms initiated at both colonial Whitehall levels. Each circular represented a 
complex and long winded process of compromise between the CO, colonial governments, the 




The thesis concentrates on documents drawn from the Defence, Intelligence and Security, and 
Police departments in the CO which may cause the thesis to over emphasise the degree of CO 
resistance to the rest of Whitehall. There is for example, material indicating close co-
operation between the CO and other departments on matters other than intelligence. The 
thesis attempts to overcome these methodological issues by consciously trying to examine the 
evidence from a number of perspectives simultaneously, in particular it compares the way in 
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which combinations of the same evidence could support the top down and bottom up 
perspectives simultaneously.  
 




People, organisations, and their cultures had a major effect on the shape and approach taken 
by intelligence institutions both in the centre and at the periphery. At the periphery the use of 
‘information’ was used as a means of acquiring power over an indigenous society. The 
intelligence machinery contributed to the creation of ‘lenses’, affecting communication 
between metropole and periphery, which shaped the British perception of colonial societies. 
These questions have been explored in relation to India 
27
 and the Middle East after the First 
World War 
28
 and more recently to the Sudan.
29
 The insight has not however been applied to 
the intelligence machinery elsewhere in the empire. The importance of cultural spectacles in 
the information gathering system is intrinsic to understanding all colonial situations where the 
British interacted with ‘subordinate’ and different societies. 
  
Useful intelligence might be defined as information which enabled officials to ‘know’ 
colonial people and societies most effectively and therefore understand and anticipate how 
they were likely to behave. To be successful intelligence officers required the ability to 
access and understand the society they were seeking to penetrate and an awareness of the 
features of their own society likely to inhibit their ability to achieve this. Such knowledge and 
self awareness was difficult to achieve in organisations which: were trying to deal with global 
problems; held strong preconceptions about the importance of a single factor, communism; 
whose personnel wore ‘cultural spectacles’; were handicapped by a lack of language skills; 
relatively short term exposure to societies they were seeking to ‘know’; and had limited 
knowledge of influential people in the target societies. 
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The origins of personnel in the British machinery (and consequently their personal beliefs 





 They reveal changes in the type of people recruited before and 
after the Second World War and link the changes to the issue of professionalization of the 
services. There are a number of works on the Colonial Service 
32
 and studies of groups and 
individuals,
33
 which also reveal similar issues. 
  
Organisational culture and practice were important because they explained the considerable 
friction between administrative and intelligence personnel.
34
 There are a few investigations of 
the effect of personal and corporate culture on the development of intelligence machinery in 
the empire which are useful for highlighting the cultural causes of inefficiency.
35
 The thesis 
will contribute to understanding of this area by investigating the internal conflicts between: 
members of the British central intelligence machinery and departments; administrators and 
police in the colonies; between security advisers and civil servants assigned to security 
related departments; and between the geographical and technical departments within the CO. 
These conflicts reveal cultural divisions which affected development of the British and 
colonial machinery.  
 
The effect of the British machinery on the colonial machinery from the ‘top down’: 
    
Other relevant literatures may be divided into those which described ‘top down’ and ‘bottom 
up’ influences on the imperial intelligence machinery. The majority of the work focussing on 
the British intelligence machinery tends to concentrate on the Cold War, actions against the 
Russians and the effects of intelligence products on British policy making and the 
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development of British intelligence organisation.
 36
 Only a few studies explore the colonial 
dimension in detail. Little work has been carried out on the ‘interface’ consisting of the CO, 
other Whitehall departments with colonial interests and the channels through which colonial 
and British intelligence communicated. Rory Cormac deals with the divisions between the 
CO and the JIC but in a very limited timescale. The CO is seen as a Whitehall department 
able to ‘task’ British collecting machinery/organisations but having a reputation for being 





The Colonial Office: 
 
There is no single history of the CO covering its whole period of existence. There is work on 
the development of its policies during the Second World War
38
 and a large body of work on 
the CO’s role in decolonisation. In discussion of intelligence matters, however, the CO often 
appears peripheral in relation to other departments, such as the FO.
39
 The CO’s role in the 
British and colonial intelligence machinery remains little explored although scholars have 
considered the role of intelligence in the process of colonial control and handover.
40
 The 
thesis will therefore contribute to the understanding of the organisation and role of the CO 
during decolonisation, on how it fitted into Whitehall more generally, and provide a basis for 
future comparison of the influence of the ‘civil’ and ‘security’ sides when making colonial 
policy. The thesis will also argue that the CO formed a distinct element of the British 
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Until recently the system of imperial information gathering was a lacuna in British 
intelligence history. This lacuna has now been filled by studies by Cormac, Walton, Andrew 
and Jeffries. All of these deal with different aspects of the development or role of the British 
machinery in the empire, particularly Security Service which had a formal role consequently 
they demonstrate the ‘top down’ influence of the British machinery. 
 
Rory Cormac examines the role of the JIC in decolonisation including the JIC’s relationship 
with the CO.
41
 He points out that the CO and the JIC were in different intelligence hierarchies 
which were in competition with one another.  The conflict was reflected in interdepartmental 
turf wars between the CO and the JIC. Gradually, over time, the JIC became the predominant 
professional co-ordinating and management body and the CO was forced to conform. Cormac 
argued that CO resistance in 1954-55 was responsible for the decision to move the JIC from 
the COS organisation into the Cabinet Office.
42
 Cormac charted the development of the 
intelligence machinery within the CO from 1948 until the 1960s as part of his argument. His 
focus, however, is on the way in which the JIC participated in this process rather than on the 
approaches taken in the CO and the historical precedents which shaped them. Cormac 
demonstrated that professional intelligence machinery was becoming progressively more 
important as a source of information and intelligence for the British government.  
   
Calder Walton considers the role of the intelligence machinery in decolonisation but in 
practice he concentrates on the role of the Security Service. He was interested in the ‘missing 
dimension’, the role of the British intelligence machinery in the formation and application of 
colonial policy in the period.
43
 He has a fundamentally metropolitan view of the machinery 
which implicitly accepted the notion that colonial machinery developed as a result of ‘top 
down’ intervention by the Security Service. The approach plays down the long tradition of 
political policing and security work in empire which included the export of Indian 
intelligence practices to other colonies and to Whitehall and the sharing  of ‘practice’ as a 
result of other emergencies. Walton approaches the Indian experience through the way in 
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which the Security Service absorbed Indian officers at various points rather than examining it 
in its own right.
44
 Like Andrew, Walton looks at the way in which the Security Service dealt 
with local affairs, in particular the role of the Security Liaison Officer (SLO). More emphasis 
could have been placed on the way in which the Security Service influenced higher 
organisations and specific policy decisions. Importantly Walton does not deal with the 
implications of split command of the intelligence machinery for empire or the detail of how 
the Security Service, as an interdepartmental organisation, acted as a distribution point for 
colonial information passing into Whitehall in the period before the JIC took over this duty. 
On the other hand he does point to the importance of the service as a technical advisor to the 
CO and an important element in spreading standardised intelligence models approved by the 
CO. 
  
Christopher Andrew and Calder Walton worked together on the official history of the 
Security Service and the two works are closely connected in the general line of approach – in 
particular the emphasis on the ‘missing dimension’ the way in which the British metropolitan 
intelligence machinery was left out of explanations of decolonisation.
45
 Andrew however did 
not examine the position of the Security Service within the JIO or the minutiae of the manner 
in which the service liaised with the CO like Davies or Cormac. Defending the Realm 
however does have a large quantity of background information about the service’s role in the 
colonies and the mentalité of its members consequently it provides a great deal of useful 
information which provides a context to Davies’ and Cormac’s work.  
  
Philip Davies by contrast, wrote a comparative analysis of the development of the American 
and British intelligence machinery which deals with some aspects of its relationship with the 
CO.
46
 More widely he argued that there was a ‘cultural’ difference between British and 
American concepts of intelligence which caused the two sets of machinery to develop in 
different ways; the Americans towards competition and the British towards consensus. He 
emphasises the American concentration on ‘all source’ intelligence organisations. He argued 
that the British machinery underwent a process of centralisation under the JIC/JIO under the 
aegis of the Cabinet Office and examined the development of the coordinating machinery in 
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detail. Importantly he provided a periodisation for the development of the British machinery 
which can be correlated with development of the imperial intelligence machinery.  
 
Davies excludes the CO from the intelligence machinery because he agreed with Herman that 
the intelligence machinery in Britain is secret machinery dealing with secret information. His 
argument about cultural differences between national approaches however can be used to 
help to examine the CO as an intelligence machine. If the CO is seen as being an organisation 
for assessing ‘all source information’, effectively operating like an American organisation, it 
may help, amongst other factors, to explain the depth of the division between the CO and the 
British professional intelligence machinery. The competition between the CO and other 
Whitehall departments and the British professional intelligence machinery seems to have 
some similarity to the American experience in a way which is interesting in a set of 
machinery otherwise geared to achieve consensus. This thesis will suggest that the CO was 
part of the intelligence machinery and in fact had, in a diluted form, a role similar to that 
which came to be held by the JIC for other British intelligence machinery. 
  
Davies, Cormac, and Walton are all focussed on the British end; all comment on the 
closeness of the Whitehall village, the importance of consensus, and the conflicts within that 
village. This is useful because there is evidence that the CO consistently defended its ‘turf’ 
when external reforms of the intelligence machinery were proposed. It also opposed 
Whitehall on other security related issues, such as the importance of the definition of 
communist terrorism.
47
 None of these historians has really engaged with the CO as an 
individual institution in the longer term. 
  
Whilst the SIS had no official role in the empire it had long links with it. SIS shared the anti-
communist focus of the Security Service which made it aware of communism in the empire. 
During the Second World War SIS had gathered some information in the empire. There was 
also some cross fertilisation between the two services. Keith Jeffrey’s official history of SIS 
is a major study although it is peripheral to the question of the imperial intelligence 
machinery because of SIS lack of jurisdiction within empire.
48
 The study only deals with the 
period up to 1949 and consequently does not deal directly with the activity of the service 
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during the later stages of decolonisation. What it does suggest however was that during the 
Palestine Crisis a more centralised method of dealing with colonial crises was starting to 
emerge in Whitehall and this included the strategic use of covert action by SIS to deal with 




Like Jeffrey’s work on SIS, the scholarship about the signals intelligence (sigint) organisation 
has also expanded to cover certain aspects of the work with colonial implications. Although 
sigint is not directly germane to this thesis, the importance of sigint and electronic 
intelligence (elint) in the Cold War and the necessity for listening stations in colonial 
territories provided a useful lever for the British government when it sought to defend the 




Collectively therefore the scholarship  about the British and colonial intelligence machinery 
has now evolved to show what organisations existed and how they were organised but the 
detail of the relationships between them  still needs further development. The CO and CRO 
are almost absent in Davies analysis of the development of the JIO and this thesis will play a 
role in helping to fill the gap. Cormac’s’ work concentrates on the JIC and does not set it 
clearly in the context of the development of the Cabinet Office machinery  or consider the 
development of the machinery in the CO in the longer terms. This thesis will support some of 
his conclusions about the imperial machinery based on analysis of the JIC documentation but 
question others suggesting they need modification in the light of longer term analysis of CO 
practice. 
 
British intelligence and imperial failure: 
 
Most historians have argued that the intelligence machinery at the centre and periphery 









 amongst others have pointed out that 
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various governments failed to obtain the information they needed to manage the process of 
‘decolonisation in the wider context of the Cold War and British ‘decline’. Walton55 
demonstrated that the Security Service had successes and Cormac
56
 showed that particular 
counter-insurgency campaigns did feed in to the development of the JIC. This thesis will 
argue that different parts of the machinery had different roles and consequently the picture of 
failure is a complex one. Machinery was being converted from one use to another. Problems 
were exacerbated by an attempt to build a global counter-subversion system, which required 
excellent personnel and substantial financial resources and diverted effort away from 
information collection. 
 
Coordinating Covert Action in Empire:  
   
There has been little scholarship on the coordination of counter-subversion in the empire. 
There is some material on attempts to ‘export’ counter-subversion through regional defence 
pacts.
57
 Philip Murphy suggested that the negotiations in Whitehall which accompanied the 
formation of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and Foreign 
Office Counter Subversion Committee in 1956 were connected with the start of SIS 
operations in areas which were normally considered the preserve of the Security Service.
58
 
South Arabia has received attention.
59
 Rory Cormac examined the development of co-
ordinating machinery in Whitehall as a result of experience in South Arabia in the early 
1960s.
60
 He argued a Joint Action Committee had to be set up in order to take ‘active 
measures’, which suggests that the Counter Subversion Committee was concerned with co-
ordinating and financing propaganda programmes created by the Information Research 
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Department of the Foreign Office (IRD). The weakness of his analysis is that he doesn’t 
examine the origins of the co-ordinating machinery before the early 1960s. This thesis 
argues, despite limited evidence, that it may be possible to discern continuity in the counter-
subversion co-ordinating machinery from 1948 through to the 1960s and that the machinery 
had deeper roots in the imperial intelligence system. There were continuities of approach 
between the Anti Communism (Overseas) (AC (O)) and Official Committee on Counter 
Subversion in the Colonies and the Counter Subversion Committee. 
  
The effect of experience at the periphery; ‘Bottom up’ influences: 
 
It is now necessary to turn to literature which deals with the imperial intelligence machinery 
seen from below. Martin Thomas argues that intelligence activity was an essential element of 
the nature of the colonial state. He explored the nature of the relationship between 
information gathering, the application of violence, and colonial rule within colonies.
61
 His 
analogy of the colony as a playing field on which competing interests fought for influence 
and the government used intelligence to manipulate affairs was important for understanding 
the relationship between the colonial authorities, their collaborators, and anti-colonial groups. 
It is also important for understanding the purpose of the colonial intelligence machinery. 
Thomas also developed insightful ideas about the relationship between colonial governments 
and metropolitan powers. In later work he emphasised the connections between violence, 






An important strand in the development of the ‘bottom up’ literature has been the creation of 
a distinct, professional, literature about ‘counter-insurgency’ for the guidance of the armed 
forces, much of it based on the Anglo-Malayan experience. This professional literature has 
attracted analysis from historians using two approaches. Some have contributed by providing 
analysis of particular campaigns and offering insight into the basic operational principles; 
others have taken a more historical approach examining the development of policy and the 
activity of states involved in conducting it. Some historians have argued that the British 
                                                 
61
 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, pp. 1-32.  
62
 Martin Thomas, Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in European Colonial Empires 
1918-1940, Critical Perspectives on Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
32 
 
government used counter-insurgency campaigns as part of a strategic policy to retain British 
international influence by holding ex-colonies in the Commonwealth.
63
 The second, wide, 
approach was important because it placed campaigns within a strategic context. It focused on 
central control and intervention from the centre in the colonies rather than simply analysing 
actions at the periphery. A recent debate is concerned with the question of how far the British 
state, was committed to ‘hearts and minds’ or to violence as a general policy of 
management.
64
 Many studies were geographically specific and did not consider how 
information from the colonies fed into any higher formation than military commands.  The 
CO was seen merely as a political institution operating ‘somewhere’ above the campaign.  
 
The literature of counter-insurgency has developed a debate about the importance of a 
counter-insurgency model based on the Malayan experience promulgated throughout the 
empire. Intelligence was identified as one of the key factors to be managed in the ‘idealised’ 
British model of counter-insurgency.
65
 The experience was transferred to inform the 
development of intelligence machinery in other colonies. Recent scholarship has, however, 
suggested that there was in fact no learning curve and no developed Malayan model. 
Commentators have pointed to intelligence failures and their effect on the well known 
campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and South Arabia.
66





 and the disturbances in India
69
 has followed a similar line. The case of British 
Guiana has not yet been fully explored. The criticisms of the performance of the machinery 
include the failure to pick up on warning signs of problems and threats and to respond by 
creating intelligence machinery rapidly. The machinery failed to learn from mistakes, un-
preparedness; and insufficient allocation of resources. In these works scholars have 
commented on the transfer of ideas, techniques, and persons from crisis to crisis. Indeed 
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some have argued that a ‘counter-insurgency model’ evolved70 but others have argued that 
the process was inefficient and ideas and lessons were not transferred, leading to an 




 In this thesis it will be argued that the development of a Malayan counter-insurgency model 
was accepted at the time and is consequently a valid tool for analysis even if it tended to be a 
set of organisational precedents and practices used in an uncritical way. This collection of 
precedents was closely linked to the development of a ‘colonial intelligence model’. The 
Malayan experience was ‘mined’ for precedent, not always to the best advantage. Karl 
Hack
72
 and Leon Comber
73
 provided accounts of the development of the intelligence 
development in Malaya which provide a basis for understanding the historical development 
of intelligence organisation and practice over time which provide a basis for understanding 
when they became transferable to other colonies in particular forms. As the precedents were 
spread to other colonies with problems the model evolved. Precedent was then re-transmitted 
to other colonies in the region; experience from Kenya for example, was sent to Central and 
East Africa.  
 
Colonial police and the intelligence machinery:  
  
Scholars of intelligence have tended to ignore long term trends in the development of 
policing which had influenced the CO and which tended to push colonial police forces into a 
more ‘British’ approach. These were important because the police provided an important 
element of the information collecting machinery. The impetus for this set of changes came 
from officers on the ground and the CO rather than elsewhere in Whitehall.
74
 Recent 
literature on the development of the colonial police needs to be considered because the 
‘professional element’ of the colonial intelligence machinery operated within the police 
machinery. Much of the discussion of the colonial police has concentrated on the 
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development of models and their relative influence. There is a dispute for example, about 
whether the Metropolitan Police/English civil model or the so called RIC model (now 
generally regarded as a set of precedents rather than as a model as such)
 75
 were more 
influential; a debate raised in Sir Charles Jeffries seminal work. The debate considers the 
importance of ‘sub nodes’ such as India, Ceylon, Palestine and Kenya in promulgating 
particular models.
76
 Georgina Sinclair has considered the effect of the nature of the 
settlements also affected policing.
77
 The police forces which generated the models of 
development discussed in discussion of the colonial police are important because each of 
these forces had information gathering machinery.  It is, consequently, possible to directly 
apply some of the discussion of police models to the development of intelligence machinery. 
This is not an area which has been considered by other historians and is new to this thesis. 
Indeed the thesis will argue that eventually a colonial intelligence model emerged in Circular 
458/56 which was enforced by a system of inspection and was based largely on English 
practice (although the origins of Special Branch lay in Ireland) and was advocated as part of a 
professional agenda by the Security Service. These ideas are supported by a limited number 
of ‘single service’ intelligence histories especially about the Far East and Malaya,78 which 
deepen understanding of developments in specific places. 
 
Change of role in the imperial intelligence machinery: 
   
The weakness of the existing literature is that it does not engage with the CO as an institution 
with its own information needs over a long period. In consequence it does not see the CO’s 
machinery as conceptually and organisationally separate from, although connected to, the 
British machinery.
79
 The ‘imperial’ system was initially merely a way of the colonial 
machinery corresponding with the British machinery in its colonial role on matters of mutual 
interest not a system to support direct management. The different roles affected the nature of 
the products. When the colonial machinery had to be converted to support direct management 
it was necessary to create new co-ordinating machinery at all levels and change the purpose 
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and content of the products. The changes occurred in the context of inter-departmental ‘turf 
wars’ in Whitehall in which the CO was forced to become a conduit for information to feed 
collegiate decision making in the Cabinet and Cabinet Office. The CO was in competition not 
only with the FO and CRO but with the MOD and Chiefs of Staff (COS). Rory Cormac picks 
up the story from 1948 arguing that the CO resisted integration into the intelligence 
machinery, failed to co-operate fully with JIC, and resisted some aspects of the Security and 
Secret Intelligence Service’s ideas about the empire.80 Cormac however does not examine the 
longer term development of and practices of the CO and consequently does not fully 
appreciate the motivations of the CO or the degree and nature of the CO’s resistance to 
intervention from the rest of Whitehall. 
 
Without professional intelligence machinery the CO had to use its own and the colonial 
administrative machinery, to collect information. The machinery was staffed by men with 
largely similar attitudes. The imperial system produced the kind of information the CO 
thought it needed. In theory it could absorb ‘security information’ from the colonial police 
and transmit it in a useful form to London but this was not done consistently. The CO’s 
intelligence machinery consequently had a different world view to that in the rest of 
Whitehall which tended to concentrate on security matters.  There were a number of other 
contexts to these changes which complicate the picture further. Change took place in the 
context of a centralisation of the British government policy making. This was accompanied 




Peaceful v. violent decolonisation: 
   
There has been little scholarly comparison of development of intelligence machinery in 
colonies with insurgencies and the developments in ‘peaceful’ colonies. This is an important 
omission because the existence of ‘peaceful’ colonies and transitions to self government 
might be explained in terms of successful intelligence activity, opening an interesting point of 
comparison with violent ‘decolonisations’. The development of a global counter-subversion 
programme and the machinery for implementing it might be seen as a means of avoiding 
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colonial conflict by dealing with problems in advance. The failure to differentiate between 
violent and peaceful ‘decolonisations’ tend to obscure the British government’s response to 
anti colonial challenges across the empire as a whole and the part played by intelligence 
machinery within that response. 
 
India and Palestine: 
 
Until recently the effects of the Palestine and Indian experience on the development of the 
intelligence machinery have been largely left out of discussion of the colonial intelligence 





 and colonial experiences are generally dealt with in 
separate studies despite the cross fertilisation which had occurred during the period. This 
tendency may be due to academic boundaries and the separation of archives. This thesis will 
point to the importance of Indian personnel and experience in determining colonial 
intelligence practice. 
 
The role of the Secretary of State for the Colonies: 
 
The evidence used in this thesis does not provide very much evidence about the role of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in the development of the intelligence machinery.  A 
certain amount can be ascertained. Some elements in the Labour party had a long term 
suspicion of the intelligence machinery, despite a more pragmatic approach being taken by 
labour cabinet ministers including Bevin the Foreign Secretary as a result of increasing 
concerns about communism.
83
 George Hall (1945-46)
84
, Arthur Creech Jones (1946-50)
 85
 
and Jim Griffiths (1950-51)
 86
  had not had military or intelligence experience. Jones had 
been a conscientious objector. All were ‘idealistic’. Given this background it is 
understandable how they supported the officials in the CO’s bid to retain its autonomy and 
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not to create new intelligence machinery in the period 1945-51. The Conservatives who 
followed mostly had military experience; some had also worked in departments such as the 
War and Foreign Offices or had been associated with the intelligence machinery. Others had 
directly worked in intelligence during the war.  There were splits between the liberal and 
more right wings of the party. Oliver Lyttlelton (1951-1954),
87
 Alan Lennox Boyd (1954-
59),
88
 and Duncan Sandys (1962-64)
 89
  were more conservative than Ian Macleod (1959-
61)
90
 and Reginald Maudling (1961-62)
 91
  and intelligence development during their periods 
of office seems to have had a slightly higher priority although Lennox Boyd did seek to exert 
his department’s autonomy during negotiations over the Official Committee on Counter 
Subversion in the Colonies. Calder Walton demonstrates that Lennox-Boyd was well aware 
of intelligence activity. He visited a Security Service course for senior colonial service 
personnel for example, and he was kept aware of the ruthless treatment of nationalists in 
various colonies.
92
 Secretaries of State were aware of colonial emergencies and atrocities 
associated with them. They saw intelligence material and they were involved in the 
interdepartmental rivalries in Whitehall so it is likely they played a greater part in the process 




Intelligence development in a context of police development and administrative 
centralisation: 
  
This thesis seeks to understand the development of the imperial machinery in the context of 
more general trends toward: administrative centralisation in Whitehall and the colonies and 
the professionalization of the intelligence machinery and police, both British and imperial. 
The development of the imperial intelligence machinery therefore needs to be placed in the 
context of historical models which seek to describe the development of administration, 
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policing, and bureaucratic practice in Whitehall. ‘A model in this context is a standardised set 
of organisational patterns, practices, and a system of record keeping which have set, rational, 
relationships or connections with one another. It may evolve over time. The model may or 
may not be affected by local inputs when it is moved from place to place, such inputs might 
be important to its effectiveness in different contexts. A model can be difficult to distinguish 
from a ‘selection’ of accumulated precedent. Accumulated precedent by contrast is not a set 
combination of factors connected on a rational basis but rather a selection of a wider group of 
precedents for dealing with a local problem.
93
 It may be argued that it is possible to see the 
evolution of models relating to the development of administrative structures, police 
structures, the co-ordinating machinery and the structure of the specialist intelligence 
machinery.  All of the models affecting the development of the imperial intelligence 
machinery can be seen as being either ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’. This section therefore will 
examine firstly how the contextual factors of administrative structure and professional 
administrative and professional agenda affected the development of the intelligence 
machinery. These are discernible although they have not generated their own literature. 
     
Administration and information collection in the colonies: 
   
In most colonies the most important role of information collecting was to enable small 
numbers of Europeans to manage the colonies with minimal resources by exploiting internal 
social and ethnic groups. There were differing systems models of colonial administration 
which formed the context for the specific relationships between the intelligence machinery 
and the structures of government. There were two basic models of administration. Older 
‘plantation’ colonies used a variation of the English ‘county system’ based on Justices of the 
Peace (JP). These generally had representative institutions for Europeans and the magistracies 
were held by local European landowners. These systems were able to rely upon local 
knowledge held by the European ‘planters’ who had local control over land and people. This 
kind of colony, notably those in America and in the West Indies, were frequently resistant to 
reforms developed in Whitehall and difficult to ‘keep in line’ because of the influence of 
local elites. Later systems of administration used a form of government in which the governor 
was not bound by representative institutions and had direct control over directly employed, 
‘professional’ generalist administrators, both at the centre and in the outlying districts and 
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provinces. This system also emerged out of the county system but had developed in a 
different way due to local conditions. Typically, for example, the European official held both 
judicial and administrative roles, like the JP, and directly controlled the local population. A 
variant of this system allowed ‘indirect rule’ in which the European administrators worked 
through native authorities. In both cases the administration was dependent on local 
knowledge regularly reported to the secretariat.  The native authorities such as local rulers, 
chiefs, local elders, and so on were vitally important because they could be used both as a 
source of information and as a means of enforcing administrative decisions. 
  
Administrative Intelligence Co-ordinating machinery: 
 
The nature of the central administrative organisation in each colony was also important; 
sometimes it was very small and flexible and consequently many decisions and policies were 
made informally with administrative officials corresponding directly with the Chief 
Secretary. Over time however, as central administrative institutions developed, there was a 
tendency to adopt departmental structures on the British pattern which could lead to 
responsibility for native affairs, security, defence, and intelligence passing to individual 
departments rather than to the Chief Secretary. This process often led to larger differences 
between police and administrative intelligence activity.  
 
Police forces evolved later in colonial development. The early colonies relied upon 
watchmen, parish constables, and in extreme cases on the army or militia. In the colonies 
police forces had different jurisdictions with some providing coverage of the whole colony. 
In some colonies the police were an urban phenomenon with rural policing being carried out 
by ‘Court Messengers’, ‘District Messengers’ or ‘Tribal Police’ who were directed by 
administrators . In the middle were colonies where the police in rural areas acted under the 
orders of the local administrator outside of their internal chain of command. These variants 
clearly affected the level of coverage that police and administrators had for intelligence 
purposes and limited the opportunity to collect information in a standardised way. As 
independence approached the administration was indigenised first; so that information 






Co-ordinating administrative and police intelligence: 
 
It can be seen that the purpose and structure of colonial administration and the way in which 
it was co-ordinated differed from colony to colony and had a profound effect on the 
organisation of the intelligence machinery which supported it. Over time the development of 
professional police forces introduced a new element into the mix and which were to 
eventually form the professional element of the colonial machinery. Finally the idea of 
coordinating intelligence underwent change with a movement from collecting information in 
a ‘passive’ bureau to actively targeting indigenous targets using active Local Intelligence 
Committees (LIC). In some colonies the intelligence co-ordinating machinery was entirely 
informal and ‘ad hoc’. The Chief Secretary and the Police Commissioner or Head of Special 
Branch met with other officials as needed and carried out targeting and assessment, whilst in 
others there was formal machinery. In many cases the tendency was to passivity.   
 
During the Second World War most colonial governments set up either a standing ‘security’, 
or a ‘defence’ committee. These committees managed the colony’s defence including 
intelligence, however the members were not trained intelligence officers although the 
committees could target, co-ordinate, and assess information coming in. By contrast the 
Local Joint Intelligence Committees, later called Local Intelligence Committees (LIC), were 
intelligence committees structured to both assess information and manage local intelligence 
activity. LIC personnel generally included many of those found on the defence or security 
committees i.e. the Chief Secretary or his representative, Commissioner of Police or Head of 
Special Branch, local Military Commander, a professional secretary (a senior administrator) 
and, where appointed, the SLO. Other officials could be brought in as required. By the stage 
the LICs were coming to maturity some of their members had probably been trained by the 
Security Service, often these included the Head of Special Branch, SLO and the Secretary. 
The form of the output required by the CO and Whitehall had been set and many of the 
processes involved standardised. In the final stages of British rule a secret intelligence section 
made up of a sub group within the larger machinery was sometimes situated in the 
Governor’s or Deputy Governor’s Office. It is difficult to argue therefore that they were an 








As well as administrative models, specific police models were important to the development 
to the imperial intelligence machinery. The British treated political deviance as a ‘crime’; and 
therefore a matter for the police. Police practice was affected by their professional 
development. It has already been shown how research carried out into the development of the 
colonial police shows that the police were consciously modelled on two different British 
traditions of policing and that these merged eventually into a distinctive colonial police 
model encouraged by the CO.  Colonial police structures were important because they 
contained the professional intelligence machinery.  At colonial level it is probably correct to 
suggest that there was a ‘British /Metropolitan police model’ used by colonial police forces 
which gradually developed into a discrete colonial police model but that the so called ‘RIC 
model’ was actually a collection of precedents, which provided a grab bag of useful ideas for 
paramilitary police activity.
94
 Different intelligence models were associated with each police 
model. 
 
The Metropolitan Police and RIC Special Branches developed in different ways. The RIC 
predominantly relied upon information collected by uniformed police which was collated by 
a small body in district and national headquarters, although there were Special Branch staff 
attached at different levels of the hierarchy whilst the Metropolitan Police developed a 
specialised detective body and the political police emerged out of the Criminal Investigation 
Department system, as did the Dublin Metropolitan Police’s G Division.95 Both of these 
systems had connections with the Irish Chief Secretary’s Office (CSO) and the British Home 
Office (HO) respectively, through which information fed into government more widely. The 
role of uniformed police was a major difference between the two models. 
   
Distinct, standardised, colonial police and colonial intelligence traditions emerged during the 
twentieth century, which were formalised into models propagated by training, and inspection. 
The ‘Malayan Experience’ was a particularly important influence on police counter-
insurgency and intelligence practice but Indian, Ceylonese, Palestinian, Kenyan, and Cypriot 
experience also played a part.  
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 In the colonial intelligence machinery much was standardised including the organisation and 
records keeping structures so that an officer moving from one force to another would have no 
trouble adapting. There were still however local differences due to local administrative and 
police structures. British police precedents were transmitted through the use of advisers 
appointed by the CO and colonial governments. Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, for example, was 
used by the CO in the interwar years as an unofficial adviser. In 1948 a Police Adviser (PA) 
was appointed in the CO who was directed specifically to improve the colonial intelligence 
machinery. This system of transmission worked well because the CO had a tradition of using 
advisers for various purposes. The development of the colonial police into a body of men 
following British practice was a personal interest for a number of civil servants in the CO 
notably Sir Charles Jeffries, this internal agenda often clashed with those pursued in the rest 
of Whitehall. There is evidence that the CO preferred to work with the Metropolitan Police 
Special Branch rather than the Security Service.  
 
There was a transfer of ideas and precedents but this did not necessarily mean that it made the 
machinery more effective. The process of development and professionalization of the British 
intelligence machinery was an evolving model which was actively transferred to the colonies 
at differing times. Whitehall and the CO also developed wider, standardised, approaches to 
dealing with emergencies and to the process of handover of the intelligence machinery each 




The Colonial Office and its ‘administrative’ intelligence machinery: 
  
From 1909 professional interdepartmental intelligence machinery became a permanent 
feature of the British government. The CO, unlike the other departments of state with 
overseas or domestic security roles in the British machinery, did not have its own 
‘professional’ information collecting agency although it had a formal link to the Security 
Service, consequently the CO retained older conceptions of intelligence and its collection. It 
is necessary therefore to explain why this particular variation of practice occurred. 
  
Up until the end of the Second World War the CO relied on the older administrative 
conception of information gathering. Its approach was similar to the activity of the HO prior 
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to the early 1920s and the intelligence machinery inside the Irish CSO. The CO, like these 
offices, collected, assessed, and co-ordinated information gathering activity for its own needs. 
Unlike the HO or CSO, the CO‘s position was complicated because it did not directly control 
/or have a direct relationship with a police force having a security/political role. Rather the 
CO’s departments dealt with colonial governments which contained the information 
collecting machinery. There was an additional administrative layer between the collecting 
agencies and the CO. The CO also worked with the Security Service and SIS.  
     
As mentioned earlier arguably this difference made the CO an all source, analytical, 
intelligence organisation; more akin to the American conception of intelligence machinery. 
This difference in role may partly explain why it was in conflict with other elements of the 
British intelligence machinery.
97
 It also meant that the professional intelligence culture which 
evolved in the course of the twentieth century was less developed and understood in the CO 
than in other departments in Whitehall. The CO’s position was comparatively weak because 
of the tradition of allowing colonial governments considerable autonomy to run their own 
affairs, using their own finances. In consequence the CO only interfered when the colony 
could no longer cope. When this occurred the CO suddenly needed much greater quantities of 
information than it usually received. The CO's machinery for processing it was inadequate. 
When the British government wanted to manage colonial situations directly it needed even 
more information in particular forms and the system could not supply this.  
  
As head of the colonial intelligence hierarchy the CO functioned as a conduit to pass imperial 
ideas and influences up to the British machinery and British ideas influences downwards. It 
had its own ideas on what constituted the kind of intelligence it needed and this material 
shaped its policies and world view. Internal divisions in the CO shaped its intelligence 
practice. The ‘geographical’ departments were the guardians of the ‘old ideas’ on 
intelligence, the defenders of CO autonomy, and the main sources for the CO’s localised 
worldview. ‘Technical’ or ‘subject’ departments were seen as subordinate within the COs 
organisational culture but became increasingly influential from the late 1930s. The technical 
departments concerned with security took two lines. Civil servants concerned with 
intelligence also emphasised ‘local’ threats whilst the Police Adviser/IGCP and the Security 
Intelligence Adviser (SIA) (from 1954), as professionals, could see a wider view. The 
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defence/security departments liaised with the British intelligence machinery and gradually 
became a gateway for personnel from the Security Service to penetrate the CO’s defences and 
bring in ‘global’ ideas about intelligence. The resistance of the CO and in particular its 
geographical departments, substantially slowed the adoption of new machinery focussed on 
British government needs. As the defence and security departments evolved they became a 
conduit for ideas about intelligence to reach the colonies directly, and received colonial 
experience.  As the link with the Security Service they also fed into the British professional 
intelligence machinery. The Security Service was small in numbers so it relied upon input 
from the CO. 
     
The Security Service was an interdepartmental body which eventually ended up under Home 
Office sponsorship in the 1950s. The empire was not its main focus. It had worked for the CO 
since the  First World War but internecine struggles between the HO, Special Branch (SB) 
and the Security Service over control of domestic intelligence activity, meant that its 
responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies was not formalised until 1931.
98
 The 
Security Service did not normally conduct operations overseas. It was largely passive and 
relied upon a series of correspondents in colonial police forces and secretariats to keep it 
informed. It did however supervise the surveillance by Special Branch of colonial students 
studying in Britain. As central, professional, control of the central intelligence machinery 
developed in Britain the Security Service was incorporated into it. As the JIC became an 
intelligence management organisation it worked with the Security Service to offer advice and 
assistance to the CO.  The Security Service provided a ‘technical’ channel to send ‘top down’ 
reforms to the CO and the colonies, however the Security Service also worked with the CO to 




Counter insurgency and colonial intelligence models: 
 
The existence of a Malayan model has already been discussed; it now necessary to look in 
more detail at how it will be used in the thesis. The Malayan ‘counter-insurgency model’ has 
sometimes seen to be based on the application of six principles: the coordination of 
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government; defeating the insurgency not the insurgent; minimum force and application of 
the law; clear and hold not search and destroy; intelligence led operations; success lay in 
achieving a political settlement. Recently however there has been extensive criticism of this 
model based on actual practice applied in particular the level of violence applied.
99
   
 
The idea of a transmitted model based on Malayan practice has been criticised by a number 
of commentators notably David French
100
 and David Charters.
101
 French pointed out that 
lessons were not learnt and that much of the CO’s guidance was vague and contradictory 
leading to numerous versions of the Malayan system.
102
 The Malayan experience had 
negative effects on development.  The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was the only 
example of a ‘national’ intelligence agency in the colonial empire until 1948 and its problems 
and limitations probably had the effect of encouraging the Security Service to prefer police 




The thesis uses a much more limited definition. It simply uses the term ‘Malayan model’ to 
refer to a selection of organisational structures and practices in the colonial administration, 
police, and intelligence which may or may not have been effective manifestations of the 
greater principles. Nor does it attempt to consider whether the points were valid or effective 
per se. Many of them were in fact developments of practices used in other colonies 
previously. It is possible to see how these specific points were developed and codified in 
Malaya and then circulated by a combination of administrative action in the CO and the 
movement of people to other colonies and formed the basis of practice elsewhere.  These 
included the development of the co-ordinating LIC and its subordinate committees at lower 
levels; the development of the role of Director of Intelligence (DofI); the creation of a 
particular form of Special Branch with an investigative capacity and representation at each 
level of police administration which conducted covert operations aimed at penetrating and 
manipulating target organisations. The machinery was linked to the Security Service through 
the SLO system. These basics were supported by the development of specialised Counter-
Subversion machinery to co-ordinate covert operations. These elements of the machinery 
however could be linked together in different ways. 
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Whilst the ‘model was promulgated from the ‘top down’ it incorporated Malayan and 
colonial experience at different times. The same trend can also be seen in the development of 
the police and led to the development of a ‘colonial police model’. 
 
Whilst there are problems with creating a precise definition of a Malayan ‘model’, it is still a 
useful concept for considering the development of the intelligence machinery because it was 
accepted at the time. In 1948 the CO recommended that other colonies consider adopting 
Malayan practices.
104
 After 1948 ideas and practices were spread by; inspections by the 
Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) and Securitty Service officers, the transfer of 
experienced officers between colonies, visits of inspection by interested police officers and 
through training courses and conferences.  In 1955 the Templer Report was based largely on 
Templer’s experience in Malaya and ideas which had emerged from the Malayan experience. 
The reason for the recommendation is not clear but it may be that the scale of the Malayan 
Emergency had led to rapid development of the intelligence machinery and provided a 
precedent or that the inter war reputation of the police in Malaya and Singapore for 
intelligence work survived. Far Eastern police officers had been used to advise other forces 
during the war on intelligence and policing practice and this probably affected their prestige 
with the CO.
105
 The CO recognised that the forms would have to be adapted to suit local 
constitutional structures. The existence of a federal system, for example, affected the ability 




The Malayan ‘model’ developed out of earlier colonial experiences in a number of colonies.  
Then the Malayan models of policing and intelligence organisation and activity emerged over 
time and consequently elements were transmitted to other colonies at different points in the 
process of their development in Malaya. As new ideas about intelligence organisation and 
practice were tried out in Malaya successful innovations were transmitted piecemeal, to other 
colonies, although the CO issued circulars to try to keep all colonies to a standard pattern.  
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Sometimes these innovations in turn started off different local patterns of development which 
sometimes became regional models.
107
 Malayan ideas on intelligence practice and 
organisation, for example were transferred to Kenya as they stood in 1952, by the Security 
Service. Police officers from Central and East Africa visited Kenya and deliberately took the 
ideas to their own territories a process encouraged by the IGCP and the Security Intelligence 
Advisers.    
 
The Chronology of the development of the Malayan intelligence model: 
 
It is important to have a clear chronology of the development of the Malayan intelligence 
machinery so that the chronology of the process of transfer to other colonies can be 
established. Karl Hack showed how the development of the Malayan intelligence machinery 





Stage 1 March-June 1948 
The intelligence machinery in Malaya was unique. During this period ‘political intelligence’ 
(which included security intelligence) was gathered by Malayan Security Service (MSS) 
rather than by a police special branch. The structure was caused by precedent set before the 
war and the way in which Malaya had been reoccupied after it and had similarities with 
aspects of Indian practice. MSS was urban based and small scale. It transcended local 
administrative boundaries and although manned by police officers was separate from the 
local police forces. It was effectively an intelligence bureau which relied on information 
collected from local police. It was still trying to reorganise and make up its number after the 
disruption caused by the war. The MSS was led by an idiosyncratic leader, who had 
considerable impact at an operational level. He was an expert in Kuomintang (KMT) and 
Malay nationalism but failed to pick up on the change of policy in the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP) to adopt the tactics of revolutionary warfare.
109
 He was not effective at 
communicating his findings to consumers.  The Head of MSS also angered other intelligence 
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agencies leading to a conflict with the Security Service which led to his dismissal. As a result 
MSS was overwhelmed by the declaration of emergency and its structures and practices 
became a dead end in the development of a colonial intelligence model. 
    
Intelligence Reform: 
Stage 2 August 1948-August 1950 
In August 1948 MSS was dissolved and political intelligence collection transferred to the 
Singapore and Malayan Special Branches (SB).  As in India the Special Branch was a sub 
section of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Reforms were made to allow 
political intelligence from the administration to be compared with police intelligence but this 
was done in an operations room rather than in committee. There was no SB training 
programme at this point.
110
  
   
Intelligence Reform: 
Stage 3 April 1950-November 1951: 
 In April 1950 there were a number of developments to the intelligence machinery. Briggs 
was appointed Director of Operations. Co-ordination was improved by a number of means. A 
Federal Advisory Committee set up with help of Morton, Head of Security Intelligence (Far 
East) (SIFE). War Executive Committees were created (WEC) and by June 1950 subordinate 
intelligence committees had been created to support the WECs.
111
 Morton advised the 
Malayan government to appoint Sir William Jenkin as Intelligence Adviser. In May 1950 
Jenkin, late of the Intelligence Bureau in India, was appointed Intelligence Adviser to 
Malayan SB/CID. He expanded the Special Branch and appointed indigenous officers and 
Military Intelligence Officers (MIO) for liaison purposes. In August 1950 Jenkin was 
appointed Director of Intelligence with executive power over the CID. SB could only co-
ordinate police not military intelligence. May 1951 Jenkin reformed CID/SB into an 
Intelligence Bureau presumably as a result of his Indian experience. Jenkin refocused the IB 
on emergency duties. He changed his chain of command from Commissioner of Police to 
High Commissioner. In October 1951 the Commissioner returned and seized control of the IB 
and placed it back under the overall control of the CID but intelligence duties concentrated in 
the SB. 
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Reforms after Templer: 
Stage 4 April 1952-: 
In January 1952 Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations and 
commenced a series of reforms. In April 1952 Arthur Young was appointed Commissioner of 
Police. He reorganised Special Branch under its own Senior Assistant Commissioner and 
formed into a separate department within the police organisation. SB was now allowed to set 
its own agenda. SB absorbed many experienced CID officers. Morton, Head of SIFE, was 
appointed DofI. He was responsible for coordinating all intelligence both police and military. 
The DofI no longer had executive control of SB but was given direct access to Templer and 
seat on the Director of Operations Committee. The DofI undertook co-ordination of all 
intelligence both police and army. The Head of SB (SAC) undertook operational control of 
SB on a day to day basis. In 1952 additional MIOs were appointed and SB representatives 





Hack summarised the developments: 
 
‘This period thus saw the solution to a central problem of intelligence in low intensity 
warfare, that of no single authority capable of coordinating all agencies.  At the top 
Templer as Director of Operations, being also High Commissioner and an intelligence 
expert, ensured coordination of all military and civil agencies. He now had responsible 
to him a non-executive DOI who had authority to coordinate all intelligence. The DOI 
himself was served by a small Combined Intelligence Staff to prepare reports. At the 
executive level, 'Planning' Committees ranged from a SB Federation Intelligence 
committee chaired by Morton, down to SB committees at police contingent levels (that 
is, police headquarters in each state) and below. So an efficient system was in place - 
centred on SB coordination, but with the attachment of MIOs at all levels - to ensure 
                                                 
112
 Karl Hack, ‘British intelligence and counterinsurgency in the era of decolonisation ‘pp.130-146, 173-196. 
50 
 
coordinated collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, and prioritization of 
resources.’113 
 
 The Elements of the Malayan Model: 
 
 A model of intelligence machinery was emerging in Malaya which had a number of features 
which could be modified for different conditions in other places. There was a police Special 
Branch with a covert role, separate from the CID.  Committees were developed to ‘fuse’ 
intelligence collected by the administration, army and police, at each administrative level. A 
colony wide committee was developed to oversee these activities. The post of DofI was 
created. 
  
The first example of the dissemination of Malayan ideas was related to the formation role and 
command of Special Branches. Special Branches were encouraged in the CO’s Circular of 
1948 however the separation of SB into a separate section of the police was not uniformly 
applied. Many colonies continued to keep SB a section of the CID. SB not only collected 
information and had a role in collating it but also became the executive element in conducting 
covert operations. SB handled the operational aspects of covert action. It actively sought to 
penetrate and manipulate target organisations.
114
 It used passive and active methods of 
collecting all source intelligence including: surveillance; and mail and communications 
intercepts (in Malaya this included intercepting the Communist Terrorist (CT) message 
system); and informers. It actively bribed and coerced people into co-operation and tried to 
‘turn’ Surrendered Enemy Personnel. This included encouraging them to join ‘pseudo gang’ 
units tasked with actively killing insurgents. SBs worked closely with Information Services 
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The CO’s initial assumption seems to have been that SBs should be part of the local CID. 
This was not in fact the most effective organisation because it interposed a layer of the police 
hierarchy i.e. the Officer in Charge of CID between the Head of Special Branch and the 
Commissioner.  The arrangement hindered the Head of Special Branch’s role as adviser to 
the Chief Secretary. The final Malayan arrangement in Stage 4 of Hack’s summary separated 
the SB from CID under its own Senior Assistant Commissioner who was Head of Special 
Branch. The Head of Special Branch in Malaya emerged as the executive director of police 
intelligence and adviser to the Chief Secretary but his relationship to the Director of 
Intelligence was not completely formalised. 
  
The new organisation encouraged the professional development of SB officers who needed 
agent handling skills different to the informant handling skills used in the CID.  Special 
Branch activity was sometimes illegal and this created friction with ‘ordinary’ police officers. 
Separation improved security because CIDs and SBs had often shared accommodation. 
Ironically, given the fate of the Malayan Security Service, the Malayan SB developed into a 
body similar to the Security Service but with the addition of executive powers. 
   
The second area of Malayan influence was in the development of intelligence command, 
control, and coordination machinery. This was a complex process because there was 
experimentation in Malaya and different colonies copied the developments thereat different 
times. It took time for the implications of the roles of the DofI, adviser, executive director, or 
a co-ordinator, to emerge.
116
 The final version of the role involved strategic direction whilst 
day to day activities were carried out by the Head of Special Branch. In Malaya the DofI had 
a place on the Director of Operations Committee, which enabled him to get his ideas 
approved if conflicts of interest occurred. Not all colonies needed a DofI except those 
involved in counter-insurgency campaigns. The first DofI in Malaya was a Security Service 
officer and former Head of SIFE. The Security Service was the source of many DofI 
throughout the empire thereafter.
117
 A precedent was set which enabled the Security Service, 
a British service, to take on executive roles in colonies and consequently to increase its 
influence.  
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As discussed previously most colonies, but not all, adopted the central LIC and the system of 
lower level co-ordinating committees for co-ordinating and analysing intelligence, matched 
to administrative levels.   Local JICs had initially been set up in the Far East in 1948.
118
 In 
Malaya in June 1950 intelligence committees paralleling the ‘War Executive Committees’ 
which managed the war at a local level were set up. There was cross membership between the 
Malayan committees. The system culminated in a territory wide intelligence committee with 
the power to co-ordinate intelligence activity, set priorities, and analyse higher level activity. 
In Malaya this was a Federal Intelligence Committee. The committees were rapidly adopted 
elsewhere. Kenya, for example, adopted them in 1952-1953.  By 1953 the Permanent 
Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, Sir Thomas Lloyd, had issued a letter recommending 
the use lower level committees elsewhere in the empire although this no longer seems to 
exist. Clearly however the complex federal structure of Malaya led to complications not 
always necessary elsewhere. 
  
Each of these developments showed that there were a number of possible ways of organising 
and co-ordinating the machinery at every point of development and a certain degree of 
experimentation was undertaken. During this process of experimentation ideas and practices 
were already be circulated so potentially the particular form of the machinery at a given point 
could be adopted in other colonies. 
  
Colonial personnel in the metropole: 
  
The colonies had an effect on the metropole as well. Colonial personnel were incorporated 
into the British intelligence collecting machinery, in particular the Security Service. Petrie 
who was Indian Police and later Sillitoe who was an ex colonial policeman from Northern 
Rhodesia were both Directors General.  Numerous ex-colonial officers served in subordinate 
roles. Experience in the colonies was spread between colonies by the movement of personnel 
which included officers from influential colonies India, Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and 
Cyprus to other areas.  Ideas and practices were absorbed and promulgated in; CO circulars; 
the inspections of the Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) and Security Intelligence 
Advisers (SIA); and in Security Service training packages. 
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The effectiveness of standardisation of organisation and practice can only carry a system so 
far and other factors played a part. Colonial governments resisted reform for financial and 
cultural reasons (i.e. beliefs of the administrators) until it was too late to develop the network 
of agents and the records that could make them truly effective. The situations in colonies 
differed and transferring officers between colonies could carry ideas which were irrelevant to 
local conditions. More frequent postings also reduced the ability to develop local language 
skills which excluded police officers from understanding the local situation and thus being 




Counter subversion and covert action machinery: 
 
The USSR and its intelligence agencies sought to subvert other countries in the twentieth 
century by providing: support for local communist parties; involvement in the activities of 
left wing organisations like trades unions, youth organisations and the labour movement; 
through propaganda, both overt and covert; through espionage; the penetration of foreign 
governments; and through left wing journalists and media. Subversion resulted in the 
development of British and American counter- subversion programmes. 
 
Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who was involved in the central intelligence 
machinery, defined counter-subversion as: 
 
[…] clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against 
communism or, in the Colonies, subversive forms of nationalism […]119 
 
Other Commonwealth states were involved. The Australian government’s five point counter-
subversion programme was based on British ideas. 
120
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Counter –subversion activity is the ‘missing dimension’ of ‘counter-insurgency’. Counter-
insurgency has received most professional and scholarly attention partly because of the 
practical benefits of establishing a ‘template’ military solution, partly because fighting 
generated news, partly because the counter-subversion programme was less obvious to the 
public, and finally because scholars have tended to see the two as separate  phenomena. 
Counter-subversion as a concept appears to come to fruition during the Cold War as a result 
of the perception of the success of subversion as a means of warfare by senior figures in the 





In Britain imperial experience affected the way in which Whitehall dealt with the Cold War. 
The government already had precedents for dealing with global political problems such as 
‘Pan Islamism’ and ‘Communism’. The British government used surveillance to identify the 
people and organisations involved and ‘carrots and the sticks’ to manipulate the situation 
achieve a solution acceptable to British interests. The Indian government, for example, had 
kept Islamic groups under surveillance but also facilitated the visits of Indian pilgrims by 
providing diplomatic representations and practical support for their journey to Mecca.
122
 The 
idea was to both control and improve conditions for pilgrims and thus to limit the 
development of radicalism. Interwar interventions were co-ordinated by administrators in 
departments of state in relation to both foreign and imperial areas. The Interdepartmental 
Committee on Eastern Unrest (IDCEU) had similar characteristics to those of the JIC.
 123
 It 
involved representatives of the intelligence services and the departments of state. It created 
threat assessments which overlapped imperial and foreign areas (much to the dislike of the 
FO). It also possessed the capacity to encourage particular departments to undertake counter-
subversion work within their particular remit.  
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The involvement of the British intelligence services in counter-subversion varied. At the 
extreme end British intelligence services had been involved in major operations within 
Russia.
124
  Normally the British services supplied individual officers with local expertise who 
used native personnel they recruited themselves or obtained from native rulers prepared to 
collaborate with the British.  In ‘formal’ colonies they could draw upon from a variety of 
agencies including the police, customs, post office, and administrative services.
125
 
Intelligence work was becoming a professional activity and so collecting, assessing, and co-
ordinating machinery had to be created to achieve on a long term basis.  
 
The development of Counter-Subversion after the Second World War: 
 
Counter-subversion was a wider concept than the concept behind the interwar campaigns. It 
could be carried out in territories which were self governing, foreign, or no longer under 
direct rule. It involved ‘lip service’ to social, educational, and economic development, even if 
the resources available to put these kinds of reforms into operation were insufficient to carry 
it out. Like its imperial antecedents counter-subversion consisted of a mix of covert and overt 
activity and a range of activities from police and military action to political negotiation, 
propaganda, educational programmes, economic aid, training courses, and the provision of 
technical expertise. Counter-subversion was undertaken by a variety of individual British 
departments of state but it was increasingly co-ordinated at operational level by Cabinet 
Committees of various levels (although some departmental committees such as the Russia 
Committee also had an important role) and implemented by the Whitehall departments and 
the intelligence services with the support of a variety of other organisations including 
political parties and the Trades Union Congress.  
 
The British intelligence services had a role in counter-subversion; however their resources 
were very limited. The SIS and Special Air Service (SAS) had para-military capability to 
conduct special operations, controlled radio stations and had the capacity to conduct ‘black’ 
propaganda operations, predominantly in the Middle East, but it also used colonial territory to 
broadcast into target countries. The Security Service only provided advice and liaison to local 
security forces in the colonies. In some colonies it did not have a permanent representative. In 
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the Middle East it had more resources. It was involved in operations in Palestine between 
1945 and 1947 and it appointed liaison officers to the police and military forces of 




Counter-subversionary measures also had to be implemented at local level. Some colonial 
governments set up formal ‘counter-subversion’ organisations of their own, notably 
Singapore and Malaya,
127
 but most used their police Special Branches and administrative 
resources to apply the ideas and resources generated in Britain and locally. These included 
the activity of the Post and Telegraphs, Customs, Public Works Department, Education 
Department, and Native Affairs Departments. Organisations such as local trades unions, local 
employer organisations, local political parties, educational trusts and British bodies such as 
the British Council were all utilised. The result of this history is that the historiography is 
fragmentary, split across those of education, politics, and military history rather than being 
subsumed under a single ‘global’ literature. 
   
The thesis will argue that there were two strands affecting the precedents for counter-
subversion and counter-insurgency. Counter-subversion was shaped by ideas about political 
warfare and the appreciation of Communist subversion tactics which emerged during the 
Second and early Cold War. The British developed specialised agencies to carry out counter-
subversion and some capacity remained after the war.
128
 After the war the initiation of the 
Cold War led to a rapid development in the concept of and the means of delivering counter-
subversion. Nonetheless there were imperial influences.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with all of the implications of counter-subversion 
but it is necessary to examine how the CO became involved in the secret, intelligence 
machinery which was created to co-ordinate it. Counter-subversion was secret and from 1948 
it was carried out by committees in the cabinet structure and the FO notably the Anti 
Communism Overseas Committee (AC (O)) which had a global remit to deal with 
communism. From an imperial point of view, the techniques of anti-communist counter-
subversion were seen to be directly relevant to the suppression of anti-colonial nationalism as 
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well so AC (O)’s anti communist remit was gradually altered until it was abolished and 
replaced by the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies, a cabinet 
committee, and the counter-subversion committee in the FO. These two committees seem to 
have grown together by 1963 in practice when a single Counter-Subversion committee took 
over co-ordination of the British effort in this field. The process of development of the 
coordinating machinery shows how imperial intelligence machinery was changing to become 




The structure of the thesis: 
 
Taking into account these models and debates the thesis will attempt to explain the 
development of the ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ on a global scale. 
  
Chapter 1 will examine the development of the CO and the way in which it interacted with 
the imperial intelligence machinery between the beginning of 19
th
 century and the end of the 
Second World War. 
 
Chapter 2 will focus on the development of the intelligence machinery in the CO between 
1944 and 1950. In particular it will examine the process by which external forces such as the 
PM and Foreign Secretary (and behind them the Cabinet Office) pressed for the creation of 
‘professional’ intelligence machinery focussed on the communist threat and able to support 
the FO’s propaganda warfare activities in the empire against the Cold War communist threat. 
In particular it will examine the idea of the Political Intelligence Section (PIS) and debates 
about its potential use and efficacy. Instead it will be shown how the CO entrenched its 
existing approaches to intelligence assessment and co-ordination for its own purposes. It will 
show how the CO dealt with external requests to modify the colonial intelligence machinery 
to meet the ‘new communist threat’ and how the experience in Palestine, Malaya, and India 
influenced this process. Overall it will argue that the CO was able to resist change, but was 
forced to make some concessions. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine the same themes in relation to the period 1949-1956. In this period 
there was continuing external pressure from the rest of Whitehall, and the Cabinet Office was 
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becoming more and more important in centralising both Cabinet policy making and the 
British intelligence machinery. The CO somehow managed to partially avoid intervention 
into its activities. It will discuss the ‘settling down’ of the changes made in 1948-49, the 
abortive implementation of a PIS in 1953, the effects of the Templer Report and its 
recommendations, and the creation of the Intelligence and Security and Police departments 
within the CO. These were all ‘top down’ reforms which were largely driven by the 
development of professional agenda and the process of centralisation of administrative and 
intelligence notably the co-ordination and assessment machinery of the JIC and JIO by the 
Cabinet Office and the attempts both political and professional to get the CO to work within 
this frame work. Particular colonial and Cold War events however did cause acceleration and 
retardation of the process. Developments in the British machinery caused changes in the 
empire. At the same time the developing professional intelligence agenda was driven in part 
by the assimilation of experience in the empire which was fed back in the development of the 
machinery, not always effectively, by the JIC, and the Security Service. 
 
Chapter 4 will explore the way in which the imperial machinery was adapted to maintain 
British interests during and after the handover process in the context of a ‘spectrum’ of 
different kinds of  handovers from ‘friendly’ to ‘hostile’. It examines the development of 
bureaucratic models for handover of the intelligence machinery. It also shows how the local 
intelligence machinery was modified according to a developing bureaucratic model to enable 
British control of the final stages of handover.   
   
Chapter 5 will deal with the question of covert action from 1944 to 1966. It will take a rather 
different path to that in other chapters. Firstly it will suggest that there was a long term 
practice of covert action as part of the process of colonial management but that immediate 
precedents were set during the First World War in Russia and the Second World War by 
organisations like SIS and SOE. These represented a new strand in the intelligence machinery 
which was a change from gathering information and processing it to implementing policy 
which like the air offensive and SOE action in the Second World War was the only way of 
carrying out the Cold War without inviting nuclear retaliation. In the colonial empire this 
process had to work in a different way to that which it had worked in Britain. A large amount 
of it had to be carried out by colonial governments under the general direction of Whitehall. 
The majority of covert action was Special Political Action (SPA) rather than Special 
Operations (SO); i.e. a mixture of propaganda and police activity carried out against 
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Communists and anti-colonial nationalists who were seen as closely associated with them. 
This process came in time to be co-ordinated into a much wider plan or concept of counter 
subversion which was an attempt to co-ordinate all resources to avoid trouble breaking out in 
the colonies by positive action in the form of propaganda, social educational and economic 
development and police and military activity . This resulted in the need for co-ordinating 
machinery in Whitehall and a variety of bodies in the colonies ranging from counter-
subversion organisations to colonial information services and a mixture of British and 
colonial. The chapter will also examine how the imperial machinery became increasingly 




The thesis will argue that the development of the imperial intelligence machinery was driven 
by the development of the administration and the British professional intelligence machinery 
and their respective professional agenda over time. The process was advanced and retarded 
by historical events and trends. In Chapter 1 the thesis explores the connections between 
administration and professional intelligence machinery and their interrelationship and the 
emergence of distinct professional identities. In Chapter 2 these insights are applied to the 
development of the imperial intelligence machinery between 1944 and 1954.  It will point to 
the importance of interdepartmental conflict and internal conflicts in shaping the 
development of machinery in the CO and the colonies. In Chapter 3 the way in which the 
British professional machinery and other departments in Whitehall intervened to deal with 
what was perceived as the CO's failure to develop an adequate system of early warning and 
information to enable centrally coordinated action to be undertaken during emergencies in 
terms of colonial police generally. In particular the Templer report copied the machinery and 
practice of the imperial machinery. In Chapter 4 the thesis will show how the general trends 
continued to have an impact but also how administrative and intelligence preparation was 
made to enable the final stages of British control and to maintain methods of acquiring 
information to meet Britain's long terms needs. Finally in Chapter 5 the thesis will show how 
the development of ideas about covert operation in the 20
th
 century by the intelligence 
services fed back into the administration causing it to develop new methods of coordinating 







Precedents and Practices: information gathering and covert action in the British 
Empire 1880-1944. 
 
This chapter seeks to examine the historical development of the Colonial Office (CO) and its 
involvement in intelligence activity. It explores the relationship between the CO’s 
administrative structure and practices and its methods of dealing with both information 
collecting on its own behalf and the way in which it interacted with the British professional 
intelligence machinery in order to explore the connections between administrative and 
intelligence practice and their respective professional agenda in a long term context of events 
over the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the Second World War.. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the CO and the second 




The Colonial Office 1800-1944: 
 
It is necessary to examine how the CO developed its role as head of the imperial machinery 
with its different conception of intelligence and its unique dual role and reliance upon the 
colonial governments for information collection. The origins of the CO date back to the 
1660s.
129
  Responsibility for colonial affairs lay with the Boards of Trade and Plantations (a 
committee of the Privy Council) in 1695 and the Southern Department until 1768, and the 
American Department from 1768 until 1782 when the secession of the American colonies, 
which constituted most of the empire, meant the remaining duties could be handed over to the 
HO. In 1801 colonial affairs were handed to the War Office and a War and Colonial Office 
was created under its own Secretary of State. In 1825 the colonial duties were given greater 
prominence under its own Permanent Under Secretary for the Colonies. In 1854 a separate 
CO was created to deal with increasing amounts of business. In 1907 a Dominions division 
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was created within the CO which lasted until 1925 when a separate Dominion Office (DO) 
with its own Secretary of State, was created to deal with increasing correspondence with self 
governing territories. In 1947 the DO was amalgamated with the India Office to become the 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) until 1966, when the CO was amalgamated with it 
and it became the Commonwealth Office. Finally in 1968 the Commonwealth Office was 
amalgamated with the FO to become the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Despite 
this plethora of organisational changes the nature of the CO’s work and its practices did not 
change greatly during the period until the 1930s except to allow for greater or lesser number 
of colonies.  
   
The CO did not directly administer colonies; it was a secretariat for the Secretary of State. 
Colonial rule was implemented by Governors, the origins of whose powers lay in the Royal 
Prerogative, but because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty had also had a 
responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies (SofS) to implement the Colonial 
Regulations which went back to the 1837. Initially these were applied strictly although they 
were relaxed for colonies with representative institutions.
130
 The regulations covered specific 
areas. The Governor answered to the SofS for members of the Colonial Service who were 
appointed under the patronage of the SofS. The SofS also had overriding disciplinary 
authority for them although they were employed and paid by colonial governments.  The CO 
acted as the headquarters of the service. The CO also had to check regulations governing 
public finance and annual estimates which had to be approved by SofS. These were fixed, the 
governor could not alter salaries or number of officials, and the SofS could veto expenditure. 
The CO also dealt with petitions. Finally all legislative acts had to be approved and some 
kinds of legislation had to be submitted in draft. Essentially this supervision although strict 
was negative, Governors and CO consulted, approving actions by Governors rather than 
suggesting them. 
  
The result of this system was that the CO was organised geographically until 1925 when the 
first subject or technical departments made their appearance. As a secretariat the CO was in 
its essence an information collecting and processing body but the nature of the relationship 
(as discussed in the introduction) was to leave matters in the hand of Governors and not to 
attempt to manage them directly from London. This was in part because distance meant it 
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was impracticable to try to manage colonies directly up until the early 20th century. It could 
take months for correspondence to make its way from the colonies to London and vice versa. 
In the longer term these precedents explained the importance of the geographical departments 
in internal office politics. It also meant that it was very difficult to ‘professionalise’ 
intelligence because the consumers in the CO had very clear and limited uses for intelligence 
material.  
 
Control of the colonies was limited by the CO having no funds to govern colonies. The first 
time the British parliament made any British money available for colonial governments was 
in 1929 and the Colonial Welfare and Development Acts did not appear until 1941. Colonial 
governments relied on their own finances. The CO acted as a conduit for colonial 
governments to request assistance from British departments dealing with defence and foreign 
relations. Generally speaking money for defence either came from the War Office (or other 
service departments) or the colonial government for internal security. Some colonies had 
local military forces which were paid for locally and were primarily for internal security.  In 
the interwar years some military forces were managed by the CO in partnership with the War 
Office (Kings African Rifles and West African Frontier Force). 
  
These realities explain why the CO had different information needs to other British 
government departments. As long as the colonial government could cope it carried out its 
own intelligence activity gathering information about local affairs, assessing it, and using it 
for the purposes of managing its internal affairs. The CO and colonial government were in 
regular correspondence about the four areas covered by Colonial Regulations. Most 
governors kept the CO informed of important matters but the CO was not responsible for 
managing colonies directly. When additional support was needed the CO’s geographical 
departments with their long serving civil servants probably had a good overview of the 
colonial government’s position from the correspondence and the CO could ask for additional 
support from the WO, Admiralty, or Air Ministry, or other Whitehall departments if events 
went beyond its control. In colonies where there were bases the service intelligence 
departments also played a role in keeping Whitehall informed. The WO intelligence division 
in particular, had an important role in this until 1900. 
 
Geographical departments could communicate with other departments in Whitehall at an 
official level directly. They could also communicate with Whitehall through Permanent 
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Under Secretaries and interdepartmental or cabinet committees. Strangely geographical 
departments did not receive specialised despatches or regular intelligence reports although 
Governors did write to the CO about any sensitive issues. This was because political 
intelligence could be gained through administrative provisions and security information was a 
local responsibility. In certain cases the CO asked the colonial government to forward Special 
Branch or CID reports to it directly. The system meant that the geographical departments had 
proprietorial feelings about their role in political management and resented increasing 
interference by specialists. 
 
The General Department dealt with internal establishment matters and by the Second World 
War dealt with a number of technical subjects. Defence for example was placed in the 
General Division in 1939 because its remit was empire wide. By 1955 the subject 
departments had grown greatly in number and specialised Intelligence and Security (ISD) and 
Defence Departments were in operation. Defence did have an intelligence role however this 
was specifically related to military matters and liaison with the British intelligence services 
however geographical departments could approach these services directly themselves. The 
result was that all security intelligence matters were handled by the administrative machinery 
with civil servants attending interdepartmental committees where necessary.  
 
There was one exception. A system of official and contracted advisers had developed at both 
CO and colonial government levels. These were experts who advised the SofS or the colonial 
Governors on technical issues such as tropical medicine, forestry, and economic 
development. In the security intelligence field during the 1930s and 1940s, a number of 
colonial police officers such as Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, (Ceylon Police)
131
 Sir David Petrie 
(Indian Police and Intelligence Bureau),
132
 Sir Charles Tegart, and Rene Onraet
133
  
(Singapore Police Special Branch) visited various colonies to provide advice on setting up 
security organisations. Dowbiggin was particularly influential. He had served in the Ceylon 
Police which was regarded as a model force.
134
 Petrie was an Indian police officer who 
worked for the departments of Criminal Intelligence (later Intelligence Bureau) and set up the 
Indian government’s intelligence networks in the Far East during the First World War.  He 
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then became director of the Intelligence Bureau. He assisted Tegart to reorganise the 
Palestine Police and, after retirement he advised East African governments on the set up of 
Special Branches In 1941 he became Director General of the Security Service. Tegart had 
been in the Indian Police. In 1937-38 he was offered the post of Inspector General (IG) of the 
Palestine Police by the CO which he refused, but then he advised on reforms.
135
 Onraet 
visited the West Indies and may have been connected to the Security Service. He then 
returned to Malaya where he became Police Adviser and supported the recreation of MSS.
136
 
These advisers concentrated on the creation of civil ‘British’ or English model police forces 
with access to the latest police scientific forensic developments but security was not 
neglected. 
    
The degree of threat in the different regions had an important effect on how much effort was 
put into developing political police. In the interwar years security police were built up in 
India, the Far East, and Palestine. In the years just before the Second World War Petrie 
advised a number of African governments on setting up Special Branches.
137
 These experts 
were generally hired by the colonial governments facilitated by the CO. Dowbiggin, for 
example, although employed by the Ceylon Government until 1937, was commissioned by 
the CO to advise on the Cyprus and Palestine police. He made extensive tours of inspection 
between 1935 and 1937 and seems to have had considerable opportunities to travel and 




The Security Service was made directly responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in 1931; however it acted mainly as a record keeper and source of advice. It also undertook 
surveillance of colonial subjects in the United Kingdom until it started appointing Defence 
Security Officers (DSO) responsible for the security of bases in the colonial empire in the 
latter part of the 1930s.  Even then only a few ran networks of agents for themselves and 
relied upon liaison with the local police. Senior officers such as the Director General, Holt 
Wilson conducted international inspections in the late 1930s.
139
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The CO acted as a conduit for sharing British information with the colonies in the Second 
World War copying regular telegrams from Whitehall to the colonies and facilitating through 
the Defence and Geographical departments, the activity of British intelligence organisation in 
the colonies. 
 
The CO was involved in combating ongoing threats to empire including communism 
Islamism and fascism.
140
 It facilitated the work of the Security Service in empire and became 
involved in the appointment of advisers on security matters. Various colonies had periods of 
unrest some of which had international ramifications such as violence in Palestine. The CO 
was involved in various Whitehall security initiatives on an ongoing basis. Yet these 
situations seem to have been managed without the creation of specialised intelligence 
machinery in the CO. The activity of the Geographical departments seems to have been 
sufficient for the purpose of the CO. Geographical departments appear to have managed the 
offices information needs effectively and to have conducted any liaison necessary with the 
rest of Whitehall without requiring specialised machinery.  
 
The CO had to manage information demands and pressures from Whitehall the CO in the 
interwar and wartime years. The CO had responsibility for the collection of information from 
empire and its passage to other consumers in Whitehall. Why didn’t the CO create some high 
level machinery particularly during the war, after the intelligence machinery had been co-
ordinated by the JIC? Was this because worldwide threat was being handled by the FO, JIC, 
and the armed forces machinery? There appears to be no direct answer to these questions in 
the files. It may be that the CO personnel felt that the existing machinery worked adequately 
for the kind of information they required and the colonial governments were holding their 
own, or that there were other issues which were more important and required resources. It 
may be that the CO’s staff were ‘not intelligence minded’ there is some evidence that the 
CO’s personnel were essentially liberal minded and interested in colonial development.  
It might be that the CO’s perception of threat within the colonies carried on with the ideas of 
the interwar years when the threat was twofold.  The first was Soviet/Nazi German espionage 
which could be handled by the Security Service and colonial police working directly together 
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at a technical level. Counter-subversion in the colonies could be handled by local 
governments thus meaning the CO had no direct role in such activity.  
 
CO entered the Second World War with its ‘administrative intelligence’ machinery based on 
the activity of the geographical departments largely intact however the range of duties the 
department undertook were steadily expanding. Geographical departments had responsibility 
for all activity in their territories and for providing Whitehall with information/intelligence 
about colonial affairs but were supported by ‘technical/subject’ departments and there were 
often tensions between them. Technical departments required different kinds of information 
from geographical departments to function.  
 
There were a number of organisational alterations to the CO during the war which affected 
various aspects of intelligence organisation. The most important was the creation of new 
technical departments. The Defence Department was created by a merger of elements of the 
General Department and the old Military Department
141
 in 1939 to handle the CO’s defence 
responsibilities.
142
 The Defence Departments handled, inter alia, colonial forces and liaison 
with the armed forces and the intelligence services. The Defence Department became 
responsible for technical liaison with the military intelligence system and on general matters 
of security but the geographical departments could still liaise directly with the Security 
Service and other elements of the British machinery. In 1942 ‘Information Services’ was 
formed to deal with publicity about the colonies in Britain and abroad, and to create 
propaganda in the colonies in favour of the war. Later it was used to conduct a propaganda 
war against communism and anti-colonialism.
143
 The development of Information Services 
was part of the development of an early form of political warfare which had covert elements 
its activity was co-ordinated with that of wider British information structures.
144
In 1944 an 
International Department was created to handle the relations between British colonial 
governments, international organisations, and the governments of colonial territories 
belonging to foreign states.
145
 The CO co-operated with foreign colonial powers on matters of 
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mutual security against anti-colonial nationalism.
146
 In 1948-49 there was a proposal to set up 
a political intelligence section within the CO and this was raised again in 1953. In 1954 a 
Security Intelligence Adviser was appointed to the Secretary of State and in 1955-56 separate 





In the introduction the thesis examined the links between the administration, the intelligence 
machinery, and the respective professional agenda in the context of events and developed a 
conceptual linkage between them.  It is now necessary to examine the development of the 
relationship between the CO and the British professional intelligence machinery in the light 
of events. The CO interacted with the intelligence machinery in a number of different ways. 
The CO played a part in working with other Whitehall departments in relation to policy 
making and its implications for the intelligence machinery. The CO also worked directly with 
elements of the British professional intelligence machinery. The CO also managed its own 
internal machinery for dealing with intelligence matters in the empire. Finally the CO had a 
relationship with the colonial intelligence machinery at local level. These relationships 
evolved over time with various elements having differing amounts of influence over the 
development of the imperial machinery at different times. In each group of relationships there 
was a certain amount of information transfer in each direction. In order to understand some of 
the interactions between the CO and various parts of the administrative and British 
professional and colonial intelligence machinery it is necessary to look at an overview of the 
connections. 
    
The emergence of the British conception of intelligence machinery:  
 
The British intelligence machinery emerged from the administrative machinery. The earliest 
examples of this lay in the British intelligence machinery created to deal with the Napoleonic 
Wars.
147
 The newly formed Foreign Office (FO) needed information from overseas gathered 
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initially though diplomatic means and later through a centrally organised overseas 
information collecting service. 
  
Domestic law enforcement became the function of the ‘new’ Home Office (1782- Present) 
which supervised local ‘county’ and ‘parish’institutions. Subsequently the process of law 
enforcement became a separate professional activity with its own professional agenda. Once 
police had emerged the idea of criminal investigation developed firstly through the institution 
of detective branches and finally through the creation of Criminal Investigation Departments 
(CID).
148
  From these in turn, developed specialised political policing bodies, special 
branches, based on a mixture of English and Irish experience.
149
 A number of departments 
dealt with intelligence matters in Whitehall. The Home Office and Chief Secretary’s Office 
(CSO) dealt with internal security in England and Ireland respectively and with the various 
police forces who kept tabs on subversion and espionage. The situation in Ireland was 
frequently a catalyst of the development of internal security intelligence machinery in both 
England and Ireland.
150
 The Deputy Secretary and later the G Division DMP and the RIC 
took an active role actively infiltrating target organisations and trying to manipulate them, 
although the RIC’s ‘Crime Special’ was largely a collating rather than an operational body. 
The internal security machinery communicated regularly with police forces throughout the 
UK and empire and even maintained overseas intelligence networks in places like New York 
to keep an eye on Irish nationalists. These developments and ideas about machinery were 
transmitted to the colonies where they were superimposed upon local police colonies.
151
 The 
India Office represented the government of India and its intelligence needs in Britain and 
from the early twentieth century the Indian political intelligence worked in England and 
Europe India also acted as a major hub for intelligence activity in the Far and Middle East.
152
 
Each colonial government also had the role of maintaining its own security and working with 
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the CO to pass information when necessary to Whitehall where the CO distributed it as 
necessary. 
 
 In addition to domestic security intelligence and foreign intelligence there was a need for 
military intelligence. During the nineteenth century the War Office and the Admiralty ran 
their own intelligence machinery. In the latter part of the 19th century the War Office 
Intelligence Division was set up which had worldwide, especially imperial strategic interests 





The India Office had a particularly important role. British ideas about administrative and 
police machinery had been imposed in a complex way on existing Indian machinery.
154
 After 
the creation of the Indian police system, CIDs emerged within it. These contained both 
criminal and political special branch sections which reported to Department of Criminal 
Intelligence (later the Intelligence Bureau) which reported to the Indian Government Home 
Affairs department. The machinery concentrated on internal security intelligence. The CIDs 
took an active role actively infiltrating target organisations and trying to manipulate them.
155
 
The IB was not an investigative body in its own right but a collating body and this structure 
was an important precedent which clashed with the later development of Local Intelligence 
Committees which had a more active role. Indian ideas and personnel moved around the 
empire affecting the development of machinery elsewhere especially in the Middle and Far 
East but also in Africa. It set up Indian Political Intelligence in London to work with MI5 to 
keep nationalists under surveillance. 
      
In each case the department of state was an integral part of the intelligence machinery 
although in India there were also two levels of local government which played an important 
part in the process of collection assessment and coordination. The departments were involved 
in targeting and setting requirements were the consumers of the information, conducted 
assessment, and shared it within Whitehall where necessary. 
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The CO was rather different. Because it did not directly control the colonies it did not 
develop its own information collecting machinery it relied upon despatches and information 
passed from governors/ colonial governments which were processed in the geographical 
departments although it could obtain information and provide information to firstly the War 
Office machinery and later to the Secret Service Bureau with MI5, (one of the bureau’s 
successors), gaining a special responsibility to the CO in 1931. 
 
The British intelligence machinery in the 19
th
 century lacked a single central co-ordinating 
body although sometimes there was temporary machinery set up for a particular crisis. 
Coordination of government was achieved by general direction from the Cabinet but even the 
Cabinet was not backed up by its own administrative machinery. Special standing 
committees, like the Committee on Imperial Defence, were set up from time to time and 
interdepartmental committees and direct correspondence was the normal route for 
coordination.  There was no formal assessment body or indeed a formal assessment stage. 
Information was collected and informally processed during the collection process as a result 
of the collecting targeting parameters and the concerns and corporate mentalité of those 
involved. This information was then passed to the departments of state where it was 
circulated and information extracted by departments and individuals without imposing any 
formal parameters on the process. This made the process subjective. Finally the process of 
information collection was largely based on Human Intelligence (humint) and increasingly on 
Signals Intelligence (sigint).  The domestic collection machinery was generally self tasking 
and investigative because of its counter espionage and counter subversionary role than the 
foreign intelligence collection machinery. The domestic machinery was also subject to 
development in crisis and then subsequent reduction although some elements of it did survive 
in the interim periods. 
  
In these contexts the CO developed its autonomy as the specialist departments dealing with 
the colonial empire and developed as the head of its own intelligence hierarchy like the other 
departments with an external role. It cooperated with other departments in the intimate 
Whitehall village on matters of mutual concern, but it also developed some interdepartmental 
rivalries with the FO, the WO and the India Office which were to last throughout the 
twentieth century and have an important impact on the development of the British 




In the twentieth century the ‘modern’ British intelligence machinery started to emerge. The 
process started with the development of interdepartmental collection machinery, and then the 
pressure of warfare led to further administrative and intelligence development which in turn 
led to a much closer system of co-ordination and assessment and their centralisation in the 
Cabinet Office structure. 
       
In 1907-09 a committee recommended the creation of a Secret Service Bureau.
156
 It was 
interdepartmental although its personnel were drawn from the army and navy and its concern 
was espionage. It was designed to provide a professional screen between the administrative 
departments and the practical aspects of espionage and counter espionage.  It soon split into a 
domestic and a foreign section which became Security Service and Secret Intelligence 
Service in due course. MO5 (as MI5 was then known) started to develop an extensive registry 
to support its operations in Britain. Counter -Subversion remained a responsibility for the 
Special Branch which fed into the Home Office machinery and the G Division of the DMP 
and the Crime Special Branch of the RIC which fed into the Irish Chief Secretary’s Office. 
   
During the First World War there was much tighter administrative co-ordination of the 
national effort under the War Cabinet after 1916. The War Cabinet did not include the 
Colonial Secretary (or many other departmental ministers) being controlled by non 
departmental ministers. The Cabinet Office was created from other machinery of the 
Committee on Imperial Defence. From its inception it started to manage the records of not 
only cabinet but also the committee system which co-ordinated government business. After 
the war the process of centralisation continued and consequently started to erode the 
autonomy of the CO although the process of centralisation was slowed after the war. 
  
At an operational level Cabinet committees
157
  were set up to run theatres and military 
commands including GHQ on the Western Front coordinated the war effort and associated 
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intelligence activity in each area. These structures clearly had an impact on empire as well.  
MI5 
158
and MI6 were greatly expanded. MI5 undertook security work
159
 and some of it 
overlapped with the counter-subversion function of the Special Branch. MI5 and MI6 started 
to operate under the direct control of GHQ in France
160
 but they also spawned units in other 
parts of the world was well.  MI5 also developed an advisory role and liaison role in relation 
to the colonies and imperial possessions. 
161
 The development of correspondence between 
MI5 and the CO in relation to the colonies was important. It enabled surveillance of the 
increasing number of colonial subjects who lived or studied in Britain and on potential 
agitators moving from colony to colony. In addition the service intelligence machinery grew 
as well.  Theatre commands developed an intelligence function on a world wide scale and At 
this point covert action was being used to carry out British policy in Russia and the Middle 
East Intelligence led to covert action in Russia.
162
 Intelligence activity also occurred in the 
empire. The Indian government for example, worked with Indian and British intelligence to 




The CO during the First World War: 
 
During the war the CO had to coordinate the recruitment of personnel and the production of 
material in the colonies it also had a role when the war occurred in colonial territories such as 
the war in East and Central Africa. The CO had a role managing colonial military forces such 
as the WAFF and KAR.  The CO also passed information gathered by colonial governments 
to Whitehall and vice versa and arranging the cooperation of colonial authorities where 
necessary.   
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The interaction between the CO and the rest of Whitehall and the various elements of the 
intelligence machinery made the CO more aware of the British professional intelligence 
machinery. The CO acted as a conduit for ideas and information to pass from Whitehall to the 
colonies and vice versa and for providing a conduit for ideas about how intelligence should 
be organised and practiced by colonial governments and police forces. It did not however, 
unlike the FO, try to setup a central political intelligence section rather it relied upon its 
geographical departments and its military department and this meant that its outlook 
remained focussed on administrative intelligence. 
 
The Interwar Years: 
 
Towards the end of the war the War Cabinet set up a Directorate of Intelligence under the 
Home Office. It was developed from the Special Branch to deal with the revolutionary 
situation caused by the war and the Russian revolution.
164
 Its function overlapped with that of 
MI5.
165
 It not only had domestic intelligence duties but it also deliberately took an imperial 
role countering ‘bolshevism’ on an imperial level. The situation led to a series of disputes 
between the various intelligence organisations. In particular the Director clashed with the 
Commissioner of Metropolitan Police and MI5 and this eventually led to the disbandment of 
the Directorate and the reconstitution of the Special Branch, which had a feeling that and this 
resulted in a series of meetings of the Secret Service Committee.
166
 The dispute was finally 
settled by making the Security Service responsible to the CO and colonial governments and 
police forces for imperial affairs in 1931. This created an important direct relationship 
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At this point there were a number of crises which affected the empire as well as the rest of 
Whitehall. The situation led to the CO working in two ways with intelligence machinery. The 
CO participated in Whitehall activity on a global scale. Secondly the CO had to liaise with 
colonial governments to both ensure that local disturbances were suppressed and the 
communist activity was monitored and suppressed as well.  
 
The Irish rebellion (1916-1922) led rapidly to a state of civil war. The Irish administration 
and its intelligence machinery were no longer effective. Once the armed forces were 
committed there were seven bodies collecting intelligence and no overall system of co-
ordination.
168
 At the same time the Irish Republican Army closed down the RIC intelligence 
system by driving police out of their local barracks in the countryside. It also neutralised G 
Division in Dublin and penetrated its record system. Much of the period was spent by the 
British trying to recreate an effective intelligence system with coordinating and assessment 
machinery which was just coming into effect as the war was lost by the British. This involved 
colonial input from officers from India and Egypt.
169
  Ideas about how to counter insurgency 
and how to organise the necessary intelligence machinery were then transmitted throughout 
the empire. Irish policemen moved in a body to Palestine and other colonies. The CO played 
a number of roles in this process. It was responsible for the Palestine administration (despite 
disputes with the FO) and for a short while for relations with the Irish Free State.  
  
Other problems affected Britain and the empire. The Bolshevik revolution in 1917 had 
created a scare which was affected the empire as well as Britain itself.  This was followed by 
a period in which the British and Americans sought to contain Bolshevism. This brought in 
both the CO and the India Office whose territorial responsibilities bordered the new 
Bolshevik empire. These departments co-operated in organisations like the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Eastern Unrest to try to provide some overall coordination to an anti Bolshevik 
programme.  
  
The CO was involved in building security intelligence capacity in individual colonies. This 
occurred by encouraging the development of police forces and criminal intelligence divisions. 
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To complicate matters there were strong regional patterns to this kind of security activity. In 
the Far East the Indian government formed a regional hub to protect its own security and it 
had important responsibilities in the Middle East as well so the Indian police and IB had 




and Egypt.  
The Far East became the site of intelligence reforms because Indian experience was 
transferred as part of the process of keeping overseas Indians under surveillance and because 
the local colonies were relatively wealthy and subject to local disturbances, organised crime 
and Soviet espionage which involved an overall British interest.
172
 Local police and colonial 
government co-operated with each other in India, Malaya, Singapore,
173
 Shanghai, North 
Borneo, Brunei, Hong Kong, the British China treaty ports, like Wei Hai Wei, and Sarawak. 
This provided both the impetus and the resources to develop sophisticated surveillance and 
penetration practices which would set precedents copied elsewhere in empire.
174
 The notion 
of Criminal Intelligence (as opposed to Criminal Investigation) Departments seems to have 







      
Local disturbances, which in some cases were seen as being connected to ‘bolshevism’, 
occurred in the West Indies. Police forces there had always had an interest in labour 
control.
178
 The police were armed
179
 and local employers were allowed to employ estate 
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police. The police had CIDs but they did not generally seem to have found it necessary to set 
up separate Special Branches, perhaps because in small societies the general duties police and 
CID had a good idea of what was happening, and numbers and resources were limited. 
Nonetheless the West Indian colonial police and governments did share information of 
general concern and co-operated with each other. The West Indies also had a regional 
importance such as sharing personnel with West Africa. 
  
 In the Middle East Palestine was a League of Nations mandate which presented a number of 
problems. The mandate had to be secured under British control which required an ongoing 
military and police commitment and then the development of the ability to keep local politics 
under surveillance. The conflicts in Palestine had regional impacts in the Middle East. From 
the perspective of the CO this was a complex situation. It had international implications for 
the British Empire and was monitored closely in Whitehall meaning the CO had to operate in 
a more interdepartmental setting than it normally did. It led the CO into conflict with the FO. 
From an intelligence perspective it involved the Security Service and Army, Admiralty and 
Air Ministry intelligence.  The Palestine intelligence machinery was linked to the police 
forces in Egypt, Aden, India and Iraq. Later when the Arab rebellion became significant in 
the late 1930s the British intelligence machinery and army intelligence became involved. In 
consequence in Palestine, like the Far East, there was a perceived ‘national’ threat which 
meant that a number of departments and both British and colonial intelligence machinery was 
involved in the process of colonial management and the CO had to work with other 
departments. 
  
Africa, except for South Africa, was much less developed so most problems were localised 
and regional issues were not so important until the Second World War but there was a 
constant stream of local disturbances. There were, however, regional groupings of colonies 
which affected the threat to empire and thus the intelligence machinery required. In West 
Africa political feeling was developing and the level of educational attainment allowed the 
operation of a powerful native press. In East Africa there was less political consciousness so 
the intelligence and police machinery could be correspondingly less organised.
180
 In Central 
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Africa, like East Africa, there were labour problems and emergent nationalism.
181
 These 
problems were managed by local police and colonial governments without the need for 
central intervention from the CO. 
 
Towards the end of the interwar period the CO recognised that another world war was likely 
and encouraged colonial governments to undertake preparation for it. This was co-ordinated 
between the CO’s Defence Department (1939)182 and the geographical departments. In 
Malaya the Malayan Security Service was set up which was not only inter colonial but also 
interdepartmental.
183
 In Singapore there was a reorganisation of the Special Branch.
184
  In 
East Africa the CO encouraged colonial governments to set up Special Branches focussed on 
the substantial expatriate European populations of Germans and Italians resident in them.
185
 







                                                                                                                                                        
Right time: Policing the End of Empire (London; New York: Radcliffe Press, 1996)., pp. 17-19, 22; Georgina 
Sinclair, At the End of the Line; Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80, Studies in Imperialism, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 192-193; TNA, CO535/79/1 Intelligence reports by the 
King’s African Rifles, Italian Somaliland, 1926; TNA, CO535/82/1 Intelligence Reports by the King’s African 
Rifles on Italian troops 1927-1928. These reports cover the period until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
181
 Mathieu Deflem, Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A comparative analysis of Imperial policing 
in Nyasaland, Gold Coast and Kenya’ in Police Studies 17(1) (1994) 45-68 accessed at 
www.cus.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcolpol.htm 10 December 2010; TNA, CO537/846 Scheme for dealing 
with civil disturbances (CA23486) Nyasaland 1920; TNA, CO537/847 Scheme for dealing with civil 
disturbances (CA35229) Nyasaland 1920; Anthony Clayton, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British 
Colonial Africa, Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series No 51 (Ohio University Centre for 
International Affairs, 1989), pp. 67-68;  Tim Wright, Northern Rhodesia Police, pp. 227-228, 235; Timothy 
Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe 1923-80 (Rochester N. Y.: University of 
Rochester Press, 2011), pp. 6, 78, 201-202. 
182
 Replaced the older Military Department. 
183
 Richard J Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America  and the Politics of Secret 
Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),  pp. 20-24, 36-40; TNA, CO273/657/18 Director of 
Criminal Intelligence: Police Department; regarding of post. (Straits Settlements),  1939.  
184
 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, p. 135. 
185
 Tim Wright, The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police, (Bristol: British Empire and Commonwealth 
Museum, 2001), pp. 219-222, 225, 263; Edward Horne, A Job Well Done, pp. 159-162, 235-236; TNA, 
CO533/507/8 Police Department Staff: Formation of CID Special Branch: Kenya, 1939; Michael J. Macoun, 
Wrong Place, Right time: Policing the End of Empire (London; New York: Radcliffe Press, 1996)., pp. 17-19, 
22; Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line; Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80, Studies in 
Imperialism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 192-193; TNA, CO535/79/1 Intelligence 
reports by the King’s African Rifles, Italian Somaliland, 1926. 
TNA, CO535/82/1 Intelligence Reports by the King’s African Rifles on Italian troops 1927-1928. These reports 
cover the period until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 
186
 Anthony Clayton, Khaki and Blue:, pp. 67-68;  Tim Wright, Northern Rhodesia Police, pp. 227-228, 235; 
Timothy Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers, pp. 6, 78, 201-202. 
78 
 
The Second World War: 
  
The Second World War also had considerable effect on the precedents of the British 
professional intelligence machinery which were to later impact on the CO. The war allowed 
the Cabinet Office to become much more important once again as the government sought to 
coordinate its own activity. The CO’s role developed. The Defence Department coordinated 
the CO’s relationship with the military authorities and managed the CO’s responsibilities for 
the military activities of the colonial governments. New forms of intelligence gathering 
became important. Signals intelligence had become important during the First World War 
and signals intelligence stations had been set up around the empire during the interwar years 
but during the Second World War it became very important because of the ability to crack 
German codes.
187
 This encouraged a centralised intelligence system in Britain and this in turn 
meant the development of a centralised system of intelligence coordination and management 
and was a major factor in causing the development of the importance of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee.
188
 The Security Service expanded in numbers and jurisdiction. It set up a network 
of DSOs in the colonies which stared just before the war.
189
 These worked with the CO. The 
nature of the Security Services activity also changed from investigating espionage and 
subversion to running active penetration activity in the Double Cross system.  SIS also 
expanded. The UK became involved in political warfare. Special Operations Executive was 




A network of regional institutions 
191
 was set up across empire each of which had intelligence 
machinery including the West African Council 
192
 and the East African Governor’s 
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   In other words the intelligence machinery started to become directly involved 
in the implementation of government policy. New precedents and practice were created in the 
Second World War which affected the professional development of the intelligence 




After the war there was a certain amount of cleaning up to do as a result of the war itself. But 
there were also a number of colonial problems which were emerging.  After the Second 
World War there was nationalist activity at a time when police forces and security machinery 
was run down. The situation was worst in the Far East where Japanese occupation had broken 
down British colonial institutions and India where the British were in the process of losing 
control of the Indian intelligence machinery. The run down machinery was a factor in leading 




In conclusion, during the interwar years the United Kingdom’s vital interests started to 
change. The colonies became less isolated and there was greater international scrutiny of 
imperial affairs.  The Americans were already hostile to the British Empire and this was to 
have practical effects during the war on the relationship. The empire increasingly threatened 
the British government’s international prestige and reduced its strategic resources. There 
were different forms of threat to the empire. There was internal subversion by anti-colonial 
organisations and the threat of covert foreign intervention to encourage subversive activity. 
The colonial territories also faced threats from foreign powers during the war and peace 
through espionage and military action. Finally colonial governments needed to be able to 
defend their assets.  
 
Much of the intelligence machinery constructed between the wars was dedicated to the 
surveillance of Russian espionage and communist subversion but during the war this was 
expanded to deal with Axis espionage. Subversion within a colony posed a limited threat to 
the British government but provided an opportunity for hostile powers such as the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Germany, Italy and Japan to intervene against British 
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interests which was much more serious. Subversion also used military resources needed 
elsewhere leading to conflicts between Treasury, Defence/Chiefs of Staff, the CO and the FO. 
 
Pressure tended to exacerbate tensions between the CO, the FO, and the DO. During the war 
the influence of the COS and the Services became much greater. This set the scene for 
interdepartmental conflict during and after the war. By 1944 the COS had come into conflict 
with the FO.
195
 The pattern of interdepartmental conflict was to have an important effect on 
shaping the development of the intelligence machinery and the relative influence of different 
departments.  
 
There were considerable differences between the British and colonial /imperial intelligence 
machinery despite similarities. Local administrative structures and practices, based on those 
of eighteenth century practice, provided the context for the development of the intelligence 
machinery. The development process was also shaped by the financial resources of the 
colony, the organisation of the police, the level of threat, and the indigenous culture. 
 Professional developments in policing and information gathering in Britain were copied in 
the colonies but the colonial machinery also developed local practice and experience.     
 
Differences in departmental approach were important. The India Office (IO), for example, 
was more ‘intelligence minded’ than the CO. This was due to the Government of India and 
Indian Police Service being more centralised organisations and consequently the IO was able 
to manage them more effectively despite the huge variety of cultures and local problems at 
lower levels. The nationalist threat was long standing and the IO and the Government of India 
had forty or so years of experience of serious disorder and consequently had more experience 
of administration in the face of threat than the CO. The personnel of the Indian Civil Service 
like the Colonial Service often saw themselves as superior to Indian Police personnel and 
wanted to keep control over the information gathering and processing systems but were 
challenged by security professionals as threat increased.  Despite departmental differences 
many Indian personnel moved into British and colonial governments spreading that 
experience. 
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The personnel of the CO tended, as individuals, to have wider personal interests in the 
development of the territories. They saw intelligence primarily as a tool for territorial 
governments to manage local affairs. They resisted interference in departmental affairs from 
other departments in London. Administrators in the Colonial Service were ‘pro’ intelligence 
in some territories in the Far East like Malaya and Singapore but also resisted attempts to 
build local police intelligence systems in others notably in Africa. This may have been due to 
the regional divisions of the empire in which some administrators and police worked most of 
their careers in a series of geographically linked colonies creating regional norms for 
themselves. The regional pattern was to be broken in the last years of empire as personnel 
moved between vastly different territories.       
 
The period of development clearly demonstrates the importance of the precedents affecting 
the organisation of imperial and British intelligence machinery. The intelligence machinery 
was closely associated with the administrative structures in use. Reforms in the 
administrative system frequently affected the intelligence machinery. As the administrative 
machinery became more specialised, police developed to carry out law enforcement functions 
and the development of detectives provided machinery which could be adapted for political 
surveillance and control. There was a tendency to develop such machinery for particular tasks 
and roles and then to adapt them to others as necessary. Frequently this meant multiple 
agencies existed and these were coordinated informally by individuals operating within the 
administrative system or by the use of co-ordinating committees. Another mechanism was to 
set up bureaux which merely collected information from other agencies and collated and 
processed it for government use. The systems had a particular mentalité. There was real 
resistance to ‘active measures’ from personnel in the administrative machinery consequently 
such measures were frequently not employed where they might have been useful. Intelligence 
officers were frequently social and intellectual eccentrics.  The systems collected information 
and the consumers, generally administrators, analysed and used it. The process militated 
against the development of professional analytical techniques or organisations.  
 
At the end of the war the Security Service and intelligence machinery had grown. There were 
two trends. Firstly there was a trend towards greater central control in the context of the 
greater threats including direct intervention by the CO and other departments in colonial 
security problems which meant more intelligence was needed in Whitehall. The JIC had 
developed a global role and the CO was becoming less important. The other tendency was the 
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development of two strands in intelligence work: information gathering to inform 
administrative action; and covert operations designed to manipulate and control situations. 
This was set in the context of the ebb and flow of the relative importance of Whitehall and 
the colonies. The precedent of active intelligence led covert operations set by the SOE and 
the experience of ‘Double Cross’ operations to the Security Service changed the way in 
which intelligence operated in Britain and set precedents which were relevant to the Cold 
War and colonial disturbances. The concept of subversion used by the PWE was central to 
the concept of ‘liberation’ operations in countries like Albania and Yugoslavia and set useful 
precedents for counter subversion operations in the colonies. These concepts and operations 
also built on earlier experience held by intelligence officers who had served overseas in the 
Middle and Far East and colonial police officers who had experience of India and Far Eastern 
counter subversion operations during the 1920s and 1930s in the Far East. Finally colonies 
were important as sites for signals intelligence gathering, which meant they needed to be 
secured and in the Cold War this role helped to divert American hostility to empire. 
   
The CO worked with other departments in Whitehall in a number of other of ways. Firstly it 
responded to decisions made by Cabinet. Secondly it worked in interdepartmental committees 
on matters of mutual interest with other departments. Thirdly it communicated with other 
departments individually on its own business.  These methods of communication affected its 
relationships with the intelligence machinery during the 19
th
 and early 20th century. It still 
had considerable autonomy however and a strong departmental voice in Cabinet discussions 
and interdepartmental negotiations.  The CO worked with this machinery in a number of 
ways. It passed and received information between the various parts of the intelligence 
machinery and the colonial governments.  It contributed its personnel and ideas to 
interdepartmental bodies dealing with larger threats. It pressed colonial governments to take 
security action where necessary and shared the relevant aspects of higher level activity with 
governors. It also provided advice on the development of policing and administrative practice 
to the colonial governments. 










The CO and post-war intelligence development 1944-1950. 
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that there were two concepts of intelligence developed in the British 
Empire; administrative /political and secret /professional. Different organisational structures 
developed to deal with each; because of specific events, the administrative matrix in which 
they operated and professional development. Historical precedent encouraged particular 
patterns of organisation and practice (rather than alternative possibilities) in the collection, 
assessment and co-ordinating machinery. The individual and corporate culture of the 
personnel was also important.  
 
The chapter showed how the Colonial Office (CO) retained an intelligence system based on 
the older administrative conception of administrative intelligence whilst other departments 
tended towards a more professional approach although they retained some features of the 
older concepts of intelligence such as a departmental role in the assessment and targeting 
processes. The chapter showed how the two conceptions of intelligence and the machinery to 
implement them separated and came into conflict. These features continue to be evidence in 
the development of the intelligence machinery in the post war period but the machinery was 
also modified because of events, interdepartmental conflict, the development of professional 
agenda and administrative centralisation. 
   
Events had an impact on development. Colonial problems which could affect the alliance 
with the United States, cause trouble in the United Nations or affect the security of Britain 
could cause a more centralised pattern of management to be imposed on a colony. Palestine, 
was a threat to the United Kingdom’s for example, had negative implications for the 
relationship with the US.  Palestine was a Mandate of the League of Nations and 
subsequently as a United Nations responsibility which had implications for the international 
prestige of the United Kingdom (UK).Finally Jewish terrorists operated in the United 
Kingdom. As a result of these factors the British intelligence machinery operated directly in 
the colony. On the other hand the British intelligence machinery was withdrawn from many 





In 1947-48 there were two parallel crises. There was a collapse of intelligence about Russians 
and there were also a series of crises in the empire. The British machinery under the JIC 
concentrated on the Cold War partly because it remained part of the Chiefs of Staff 
machinery (COS). The CO, which headed its own hierarchy, did not have a seat on the JIC 
until 1948 and did not become a ‘charter member’ until 1956. 
  
The empire gradually became seen as a source of weakness (although until the mid nineteen 
fifties there were plans to use the empire as a source of resources). Imperial crises diverted 
resources and attention away from the Cold War. As a result the professional British 
intelligence machinery came into conflict with that of the administrative intelligence 
machinery under the CO because the CO had failed to provide adequate warning of colonial 
problems. The CO’s machinery was not set up to provide intelligence of the type needed by 
the COS, the Foreign Office (FO), and the Cabinet Office. An information panic resulted. 
From 1948 to 1956 there was a period of conflict between the two systems and their intended 
uses in which the CO’s administrative intelligence machinery was gradually assimilated into 
the more centralised, professional, British machinery and the CO and colonial machinery 
underwent modification to achieve this. The CO however resisted strongly for a variety of 
reasons and retarded the process. The British intelligence machinery in this period was deeply 
affected by administrative developments. The Cabinet Office led a process of centralisation 
and professionalization of Whitehall administrative machinery. The British professional 
intelligence machinery had to evolve to service the changing central administrative system 
and to adapt to its experiences during the war.  
 
After the Second World War the development of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to 
co-ordinate all war time intelligence fundamentally changed the way in which the British 
intelligence machinery operated. Philip Davies argued there were two phases to the 
development of the British intelligence machinery in this period. Firstly there was the 
‘Formalisation of Improvisation 1945-47’.196 Improvised war time organisation and practices, 
including the idea of central national co-ordinating and assessing machinery (JIC) were 
assessed and retained in the longer term. Between 1947 and 1956 there was a process of ‘Co-
ordination and elaboration’.197 During this period the JIC became increasingly important and 
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the intelligence machinery was gradually simplified and co-ordinated. The process was 
driven by a combination of Cold War events, professional inputs (including organisational 
and technological advances) and administrative developments, particularly centralisation. 
Whilst the CO resisted these administrative and intelligence developments; the chronology of 
intelligence development within the CO and colonial governments can be correlated to them. 
The dating of CO circulars suggests linkages with central reforms. The CO issued circulars in 
1948, a letter (copy unavailable) in 1953 and another circular in 1956. The period between 
1948 saw the centralisation of the CO machinery and 1956 its assimilation into the British 
machinery for purposes of control. Thereafter the CO’s machinery gradually withered away 
as decolonisation continued and the British machinery was centralised. Davies refers to this 
period as ‘the Great Centralisation 1956-1966’.198 There is evidence consequently for a high 
degree of correlation between the development of the imperial intelligence machinery, the 
CO’s experience and the professional development of the UK machinery and the rise of the 
importance of the Cabinet Office as a controlling mechanism which supports the idea of ‘top 
down’ intervention. The degree of local autonomy was important. In Ceylon the method of 
collecting information, for example, followed a process similar to that which had occurred in 
the ‘white’ dominions. There was local control of the intelligence machinery but information 
was passed as necessary to the CO by the Governor. Traditional CO intelligence practices 
came under attack as there were a series of crises unforeseen by the CO which required the 
Chiefs of Staff (COS) to deploy troops. 
  
There was a fundamental difference between CO and Whitehall thinking. The CO often saw 
problems as ‘local’ whilst the rest of Whitehall concentrated on the ‘global’ communist 
threat. The pressure was mainly directed at the colonial governments and only indirectly at 
the CO. The CO itself had no specialist intelligence co-ordinating or assessment machinery 
and relied largely on officials in geographical departments to deal with political intelligence 
and the Defence Department for security intelligence. In other words it continued to operate 
in the older ‘administrative’ intelligence tradition. In 1948-49 the CO started reforms, such as 
the abortive Political Intelligence Section (PIS) and the appointment of a Police Adviser 
(PA), and the development of Special Branches in every territory to assist intelligence 
development.
199
 If colonial governments were aware of problems they would pass 
information to the CO. The CO remained the channel through which this would pass to other 
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departments in Whitehall. In addition there was a ‘technical’ channel of communication 
between the colonial police and the Security Service and Special Branch in London might 
have been expected to facilitate the flow of information on colonial problems into the British 
machinery. 
  
The CO was not a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC); rather it headed its own 
intelligence hierarchy. The CO was asked to participate in the JIC on 23 September 1948 
however this was resisted because the CO had no rights to set the agenda of the JIC and 
because it did not seem an effective use of manpower.
200
 Unfortunately the CO found all 
kinds of excuses to avoid participating. It argued that the JIC was a largely military body, 
focussed on the Cold War and its staff concentrated on military issues. The CO believed that 
the focus meant it was not worth having a permanent representative.  
 
The chapter will deal with the development of the CO’s intelligence machinery between 1944 
and 1948. The first section will suggest that there were two parallel processes of intelligence 
development. The first continued largely within pre-war intelligence precedents and was 
applied in colonies without security problems. The second started to emerge as a response to 
the development of insurgencies and consequently the need to interact with other parts of the 
intelligence machinery within the colony and in Britain. The second section will examine the 
relationship between the CO and the JIC and the British intelligence machinery. The third 
will examine intelligence reforms of 1948 in the CO; examining the appointment of the 
Police Adviser (and peripherally the development of Special Branches in the colonies); a 
series of new reports on colonial matters demanded by consumers in Whitehall. The fourth 
section of the chapter will deal with the culture and motivations of Whitehall departments and 
of the CO’s administrative intelligence system. The chapter will refer to processes in the 
development of the events, professional developments in the British intelligence machinery 
which facilitated this process. Finally the chapter will briefly consider the post 1950 
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Two approaches to intelligence development in the empire: 
 
Immediately after the war major problems facing the CO were preparing for the 
independence of Ceylon (which was related to Indian independence, a major concern for the 
British government as a whole) and the revolt in Palestine. In Ceylon the CO had to deal with 
a colonial ‘handover’ and in Palestine with large scale direct intervention in colonial affairs 
by the British government and the British intelligence machinery. In the other colonies the 
CO had to rebuild local police and administration which had been starved of European 
manpower and funds during the war. 
 
Indian experience was to be important in determining the Whitehall and the CO’s approach to 
intelligence matters despite the fact that India was administered by its own Whitehall 
department. Experience gained in the Indian handover showed the necessity of retaining 
control of the intelligence machinery in the final stages of handover. It has been argued that a 
major factor in causing the onset of Indian independence was the failure of the intelligence 
machinery in Delhi.
201
 India offered precedents for the management of colonial records, the 
selection of successor personnel, and ways to maintain intelligence contact after 
independence. The handover of India freed officers with intelligence experience to take over 
emergency roles in the colonies.     
 
The CO was aware of Indian intelligence arrangements but its intelligence organisation was 
very different to that in India. There was no single equivalent to the Indian Intelligence 
Bureau and no equivalent to the Indian Political Intelligence organisation, which liaised 
directly with the Security Service and the India Office in Whitehall.  No individual colony 
had a security intelligence apparatus on the scale of the Indian Intelligence Bureau and 
provincial CID/Special Branches. No colonial government had the same degree of technical 
intelligence expertise as the Government of India until the Government of Malaya expanded 
the Malayan Special Branch with the help of ex Indian officers. 
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Ceylon was a largely peaceful handover. Representative institutions and universal suffrage 
had existed since 1931 and internal security was handled by the Ceylon Home Affairs 
Department and the Ceylon Police. The CO relied upon personal correspondence from the 
Governor for its understanding of security matters in the colony. This approach followed the 
pattern established in Canada and Australia prior to 1931. In 1931 British High 
Commissioners took over the intelligence role previously played by the Governors General in 
the dominions and this experience set precedents for the handover of colonies with 
representative institutions and local control. 
   
By contrast Palestine presented a different set of problems.
202
 The British intelligence 
machinery intervened directly in the Mandate through Security Intelligence Middle East 
(SIME) and the local Defence Security Officer (DSO)/Security Liaison Officer (SLO) who 
reported through it. There was a local SLO in Palestine who, unusually, ran his own network 
of agents. British signals intelligence units were deployed. The Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) deployed in Palestine and operated outside it to prevent Jewish refugees from reaching 
it.  The British intelligence machinery was used to cultivate Jews in the Jewish Agency and in 
Britain to gain intelligence about what was happening in Palestine. The British government 
and the JIC took a direct interest in what was happening there.
203
 As a consequence of these 
experiences precedent for direct central intervention in the colonies had been established. It 
was a more interventionist approach to colonial government than that normally exercised by 
the CO. The result was that the British professional intelligence machinery was directly 
involved in a colony. The situation in Palestine provided precedent for a much more 
centralised control of a colony. Because of the international implications of the situation for 
British prestige and the alliance with the United States the Cabinet was involved and the 
CO’s autonomy limited. Palestine thus set precedents for the management of major colonial 
crises later in the period of decolonisation and demonstrated some of the problems of 
coordination and control needed in a multi agency environment.    
 
The unprecedented increase in the scale and importance of intelligence activity and its 
detailed incorporation into government activity stimulated the professional agenda within the 
British intelligence services. At a colonial level the Security Service, partly at the behest of 
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the JIC, was seeking to maintain its system of representatives overseas and drive professional 
standards in police forces and their special branches. This process will be discussed in more 
detail later in the thesis.  Police officers in the colonies were wedded to a process of reform, 




The CO’s relationship with the JIC and its regional offshoots: 
  
At this point before turning to the question of the reforms at colonial level it is necessary to 
examine the CO’s relationship with the JIC in more detail. Unfortunately because of its 
process of institutional development the JIC Charter made no reference to colonial territories, 
to the need to provide global forecasts of trouble, or provide any executive powers to ensure 
compliance by other elements of the intelligence machinery.
205
 It had to rely upon input from 
the local intelligence machinery in the colonies but was not in the same reporting 
hierarchy.
206
 In Malaya this failed.
207
 The JIC had functional role in three areas: warning and 





The JIC had a military ethos because it had been created to support the COS machinery. It 
concentrated on military threats and came to see colonial problems through the prism of the 
Cold War and the global problem of communism.
209
 The military personnel in Joint 
Intelligence Staff (JIS) drafted material focussed on the military threats in the Middle East 
and Europe and often ignored the preoccupations of civil departments.
210
 This tendency was 
exacerbated in Malaya by the failure of local intelligence machinery to provide adequate 
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The JIC’s regional offshoots also had problems due to confusing charters and lack of 
manpower. There were problems with identifying both their chains of responsibility and 
channels of communication. The example of Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) (JIC 
(FE)) brings in the question of the role of JICs in the empire. In theory they had a strategic 
role to keep Whitehall informed of threats in the region. A distinction however was made 
between local intelligence responsibilities of colonial government, the Security Service, and 
the CO. The Security Service could have been the link between the two systems but 
wasn’t.212 In addition in Malaya and South East Asia there were inter-service disputes 
between the JIC (FE), SIFE (MI5), and SIS.  Security Intelligence (Far East) (SIFE), for 




Literature about the development of the British intelligence machinery has demonstrated a 
teleological approach which sees the centralised JIC system as the end point rather than 
seeing a number of alternative possible outcomes for the development of the British 
intelligence machinery. Approaching the intelligence problem from the CO’s perspective 
creates a different picture. The CO was the lead agency and the Security Service was its 
professional intelligence collecting body.
214
 The CO had limited interest in communism, 
security intelligence, and the Cold War. Its information gathering and assessment system had 
evolved to perform wider functions. The JIC was a recent specialised innovation originally 
designed to co-ordinate and assess intelligence for war time military situations. Its ascent to a 
national co-ordinating and analytical body was to some extent serendipitous.  It is also 
forgotten that the majority of the colonies did not undergo insurgency. Decolonisation is 
often seen through the prism of a defining series of insurgencies whilst many colonies 
suffered at most local violence which was relatively easily confined. This suggests that either 
a global threat did not exist, that the security systems in many colonies were adequate, or that 
the chronology of the development of violence was different for local reasons and the process 
of reform was sufficient to improve local security intelligence prior to the point where 
insurgency broke out. 
 
The CO tended to see events in each colony as being predominantly due to local sometimes 
regional issues and emphasised local agency in the development of events. This perspective 
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was partly created by the importance of the geographical departmental structure and the 
relatively limited importance of subject or technical departments in relation to analysis of 
political events, but also because the Cold War and communist global threats were of less 
importance in the empire. By contrast the Defence Department was more attuned to seeing 
the importance of Communism although this was less than other security related 
organisations in Whitehall. Investigation showed that in most areas local communists were 
weak and external intervention very limited. The problem affecting the JIC was that it 
perceived everything through European eyes in a Cold War prism and consequently found it 






 The 1948 reforms in an interdepartmental context: 
 
The national anti-communist Cold War programme had implications for the CO and the 
development of its intelligence machinery. The Prime Minister (PM) does not seem to have 
been a major influence in the development of anti –communist policy. Interdepartmental 
conflict had an important role in shaping the development of the national programme. The 
COS had identified the Soviet threat as early as 1944 so it is possible to argue that the Cold 
War started as early as this.
216
 Bevin and the officials in the FO sought to create a more anti-
communist, anti-Soviet policy in order partly to marginalise Attlee’s internationalism. The 
officials included Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Christopher Warner, and others who were to remain 
influential in anti-communist policy making and the intelligence community. They had 
influence on the committees which implemented anti-communist programmes like the 
interdepartmental Russia Committee sponsored by the FO. The FO quickly developed the 
capacity to conduct anti-communist operations. On the 8
th
 January1948 for example, the 
Information Research Department of the FO (IRD) was formed to develop propaganda and 
subversion campaigns against the Soviet Union and sought information from the CRO and 
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the CO on which to base its propaganda.
217
 The SIS was already involved in such activity 




 Officials in the FO also seem to have tried to retain control over foreign policy in the face of 
long term centralisation. Cabinet Committees such as the Overseas Defence Committee and 
the Anti Communism Overseas Committee AC (O), formed in 1949, showed how 
organisations falling under the Cabinet Office were becoming more important in developing 
and implementing foreign policy and limiting the FO’s influence. The role of the Cabinet 
Office was not obvious in these discussions. The Cabinet Secretary from 1947 was Sir 
Norman Brook who had a great deal of influence in administrative and intelligence circles. 
The Cabinet Office controlled the secretariat for the committees such as the Overseas 
Defence Committee which provided further influence. There is contextual evidence that the 
Labour government adopted a more co-ordinated approach to government activity using 
numerous committees so the invisibility of the Cabinet Office at this stage is not necessarily 





Overall there was considerable departmental ‘in-fighting’ between the FO, COS, CO, and 
other departments and within departments about the appropriate policies to implement. There 
was a general recognition of the communist threat and of the need to organise a central 
response to it. The CO had contributed to the debate and become involved in various ways. 
The CO had sent representatives to the Russia Committee and as early as May 1946 was 
involved in Kirkpatrick’s anti Russian propaganda campaign.220  The CO retained however a 
different perspective.  
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The immediate cause of imperial intelligence development: 
 
An escalation of the Cold War occurred in 1948 in parallel with the outbreak of a series of 
colonial emergencies, which were seen, not always accurately, as being communist inspired. 
In January 1948 the JIC requested the intelligence services to undertake a worldwide review 
of communism.
221
 The Security Service found that there was a shortage of information on 
Africa and South America and contacted the CO.
222
 It is unclear whether this was a 
professional initiative or a response to political pressure. There is no record of what happened 
but presumably the CO supplied the information.  
 
Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, had identified a Soviet threat to the colonies as early as January 
1948 and a series of crises in the Malaya and the Gold Coast midyear reinforced his ideas 
despite local differences. Bevin became seriously alarmed by autumn 1948 by the potential 
for a Soviet attack on Britain’s colonial territories and on the 18th September submitted a 
memo arguing for CO participation on the JIC.
223
 The PM and Foreign Secretary pressed the 
CO to make security and intelligence reforms at a number of levels. Generally the pressure in 
1948 came from the top down. At Whitehall level the first demand was for ‘reports on 
communist subversion’ in the colonies and for the development of machinery capable of 
creating the kind of security related intelligence reports required. The first reforms in the CO 
were initiated because by May 1948 Bevin had asked the CO for Fortnightly Reports on 
Communism, which may have been intended to meet the needs of the newly formed IRD. 
 
Creech Jones appointed a Police Adviser (PA) who had been an Inspector of Constabulary in 
England (HMIC), and who had been recommended by head of the Security Service, to carry 
out inspections starting on 1 November 1948. He had initiated special intelligence reports and 
a Fortnightly Review of Communism for the FO. He had arranged closer association with the 
JIC. Propaganda had been prepared contrasting British aims and method in the colonies with 
those of the Russians.  He had sent propaganda material to the colonies; some of which had 
been prepared by the FO. He had put forward proposals for development of a Colonial 
Broadcasting Service to counter Soviet propaganda and provided one million pounds funding 
                                                 
221
TNA, CO537/2628  Security Communism Generally, 1948. Minute M.L. to T.S. (Trafford Smith?), 13 April 
1948. 
222
 TNA, CO537/2628 Minute Sir Marston Logan to Wallace. Gorsuch, Boudell, Acheson, and Marple, 12 
March 1948. 
223
 P.H.J. Davies, Intelligence and Government, p.146 
94 
 
from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. Finally he had carried out research into the 
nature of the emergency powers in each colony, which were considered adequate.
224
  The 
letter is most defensive in tone.
225
 Strangely Creech Jones did not specifically mention the 
Circular on Intelligence issued on 5 August 1948 or the accompanying Secret and Personal 
letter issued on 20 August 1948 despite the fact it would have seemed a logical action to 




Political Intelligence Reports: 
 
The CO may already have been interested in some form of intelligence reports for its own 
purposes prior to Bevin’s intervention. It was already aware that colonial governments had 
been dealing with labour disputes in Singapore and Malaya and other countries towards the 
end of 1947.
227
 Regular reports from the colonies were new although regular reports had been 
submitted by Palestine in 1946-47
228
 and Trinidad and Barbados from 1947.
229
 By March 
1948 Andrew Cohen of the CO’s African departments had requested regular ‘political 
intelligence’ reports from the African governors. The initial rationale was probably the Accra 
riots in the Gold Coast, but the request for information by the Security Service may also have 
been a catalyst.
230
 Cohen sent out a request for regular reports and outlined the machinery, 
which would receive them.
231
 By early April the West Indies Department had also sent a copy 
of Cohen’s letter out to West Indian governors.232 In the West Indies action may have been 
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accelerated by the withdrawal of the DSOs in December 1947 and the subsequent 




Prior to 1948 regular ‘intelligence’ reports, as opposed to ongoing correspondence were, 
strangely, not required from colonial governments. This may reflect the CO’s expectation that 
Governors should manage their own internal politics and security and only refer problems to 
the CO for advice and additional resources when necessary. ‘Normal channels’ of 
correspondence were consequently sufficient. Previously when the CO asked the colonial 
secretariats for material they tended to send reports originally written for the purposes of 
internal management, sometimes adding a covering note from the governor or, sometimes 




In the late 1940s ‘cultural’ issues became important. The CO was attuned to ‘political’ 
intelligence obtained for the general purposes of administration rather than ‘security’ 
intelligence which was material used for security management within the colony.  In 
particular the CO was interested in local politics in the representative institutions rather than 
detailed knowledge of subversive organisations. Frequently even the colonial governments 
did not have detailed information on this kind of problem. Individual police officers probably 
had an idea but most colonies did not have large formal political policing structures capable 
of reporting this to Whitehall. The first ‘Political Intelligence Summaries’ dated the 5 June 
1948 (as opposed to ‘Fortnightly Report on Communism’) were superficial in content merely 
describing local, overt, political manoeuvres.  
 
Reports on Communism: 
 
In May 1948 Bevin, the Foreign Secretary asked the CO for reports on communism.
235
 The 
request appears to have been a separate requirement from the demand for information made 
by the Security Service and the CO’s internal demands. From mid 1948 the geographical 
departments compiled fortnightly summaries on Communism from reports made by colonial 
governments which, in turn, were compiled into a ‘worldwide’ summary. The world wide 
summary was then released to the FO and other interested departments. At some point, it is 
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unclear when, the two reports, the ‘political intelligence’ and ‘Fortnightly Review of 
Communism’ seem to have merged, probably in October 1948. ‘The Colonial Intelligence 
Summary’ made its first appearance in 1948.236  
 
‘The Fortnightly Review of Communism’ was compiled in the CO for the FO. By November 
1948 it was being circulated inside the CO as well; it would seem in part because heads of 
department found it a useful summary of activity occurring outside their areas of 
responsibility.
237
 The CRO was included on the circulation list but it expunged some material 
from the versions received by particular dominions.
238
 The FO requested the permission of 
the CO to circulate ‘The Fortnightly Review of Communism’ to the FO’s missions overseas.  
The CO agreed subject to amendments. 
  
In addition to the requests for information about the situation in the colonies  there was 
pressure from Whitehall, and the COS in particular,  to establish a system for collecting 
information of a different kind i.e. that needed to predict threats needing the deployment of 
troops and to monitor communist activity. The concern was driven by the need to control 
military resources of both men and money needed in Europe. 
 
Internal reforms in the CO:  
 
The demand for information led to reorganisation of the intelligence machinery in the CO and 
the colonial governments. There were a number of appointments at both the CO and colonial 
level. Within the CO the increased workload led to the appointment of Sir Marston Logan 
239
 
as part time co-ordinator for defence, security, and intelligence information in the Defence 
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 He had experience of colonial government, including 
intelligence, as both Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia and Governor of the Seychelles. 
His main job was to compile summaries of the reports submitted to the geographical 
departments. The Defence Department carried out liaison with the British intelligence 
machinery. 
 
The Secretary of State appointed William Johnson, an English police officer, as Police 
Adviser (PA), to reorganise policing and intelligence.
241
 His appointment was made easier by 
the existence of precedent for technical advisers in the CO. In the meantime Sir Percy 
Sillitoe, Director General of the Security Service, had already started ‘ad hoc’ inspections of 
the colonial intelligence machinery because the Security Service was tasked with inspecting, 
training, and reorganising intelligence machinery.
242
 In November 1948 the PA immediately 
started the ‘Review of Colonial Police and Security Forces for Communist Infiltration’. His 
reports started to become available to the CO and colonial governments in 1949. Initially 
there was an annual, later a triennial inspection.  
 
The circumstances surrounding the appointment of the PA showed how even at this early 
stage how the CO resisted external intervention. Although the PA was part of the reforms 
demanded by the PM and Foreign Secretary the CO’s senior personnel ensured that the PA 
could only advise colonial governments on police matters although he requested the power to 
direct them to comply and this limited the effectiveness of the reforms in colonies.
243
The FO 
and COS wanted the CO to force colonial governments to build the police intelligence 
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machinery but the CO was more interested in police reform. The first PA had been directed to 
build up police intelligence machinery but he was a ‘Home Service’ police officer who saw 
the colonial police forces thorough an English ‘prism’. He felt that ensuring the loyalty of the 
indigenous police officers was important, so his reports dealt questions of: police pay, 
conditions, housing, organisation, career opportunities, and training. These objectives crossed 
over with longer term agenda to reform colonial police forces on British models within the 
CO, pursued with particular vigour by Sir Charles Jeffries, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
State and a noted liberal and reformer within the CO.
244
 Jeffries, a committed Anglican and a 
liberal with particular interest in the success of the Ceylon independence process was 
committed to positive commonwealth relations.
245
 He believed that the English model of 
policing i.e. unarmed officers protecting the lives and property of the citizen was the 
desirable end rather than armed forces used by the administration to maintain control. He 
sought to encourage developments in this direction. He had been involved in the creation of 
the colonial service and the colonial police service in the 1930s and had sought 
unsuccessfully to create an Inspector General of Colonial Police at this time to further that 
agenda. Although he does not specifically address this question logically acceptance of this 
model meant acceptance of the Special Branch idea as used in London.     
 
Co-ordinating intelligence in colonial governments: 
    
The external forces pressing for reform were largely silent on how the co-ordinating and 
analytical machinery in the colonies should be organised. The Circular of 5 August 1948 
merely suggested that intelligence should be overseen by a senior officer.  Davies argued that 
the JIC was used as the model for co-ordinating committees.
246
 Local JICs were to be 
implemented in the Far East in 1949. There are alternative explanations however, for the 
development of co-ordinating committees, during the war individuals, sections or ‘Defence’ 
or ‘Security’ committees in the colonial secretariat had undertaken intelligence and security 
co-ordination. These were executive committees rather than professional intelligence bodies 
and had no formal analytical capacity or professional skills. In East Africa a local Director of 
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Intelligence had been appointed during the war and was retained afterwards.
247
 Some 
colonies like Gold Coast already had ‘central’ security committees but these do not seem to 
have the role of setting intelligence targets and encouraging professional development; a 
major feature of the LIC model. The use of Defence Sections for intelligence co-ordination 
ensured that the administrative staff retained control over security intelligence machinery. 
When LICs were created they often contained the same personnel who had formed the 
Defence or Security committees.  Local Defence Committees were generally chaired by the 
Chief Secretary and had the head of ‘native affairs’, police commissioner or head of Special 
Branch where one existed. DSOs where they had been appointed could attend so the LIC was 
in many ways an amended version of existing machinery. ‘Local’ JICs by contrast only 
appear to have been introduced in the Far East in 1948-49.
248
 They were professional 
intelligence bodies carrying out analysis and co-ordination. They became the dominant form 
of machinery for analysis and coordination of intelligence in the colonies by the mid 1950s 
when they were made part of the formal intelligence model in the Templer Report. 
 
The CO advised the colonial governments to set up Special Branches. In 1948 some 
governors were already setting up Special Branches within their Criminal Investigation 
Departments (CID) others dragged their feet. The PA, officials and politicians, including the 
Secretary of State and the Minister of State for the Colonies were biased towards ‘Special 
Branches’; they do not appear to have considered alternative intelligence models such the 
‘Political Section’ inside the local CID, or a separate security intelligence service. The reason 
is difficult to ascertain but may relate to a concern with ‘British’ practice; the Metropolitan 
Police Special Branch was a system understood by officials elsewhere in Whitehall. There 
was a traditional resistance to ‘political’ policing in Britain and, as Georgina Sinclair has 
pointed out, civil policing and ‘Britishness’ were closely associated.249 The Security Service 
model used in the Malayan Security Service (MSS) may have been seen as ineffective after 




From the examination of the run of reforms it is possible to see the outlines of the machinery 
but examining the debates over certain parts of it provides a much clearer idea of the 
perceived roles and importance of particular elements and interdepartmental struggles 
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involved. The debate over the issue of CO guidance to the colonies governors on the 
experience in Malaya, for example, serves to highlight the different views in Whitehall. In 
particular it serves to highlight the different conceptions of intelligence held by the CO and 
the JIC as head of the central intelligence machinery and between the CO and the JIC on the 
form and purpose of particular intelligence institutions. 
 
Colonial Office guidance and visits by experts to the colonies: 
 
The first example of the CO consciously promulgating the Malayan experience of 
intelligence development was Secret Despatch No.5 from Sir Henry Gurney, the High 
Commissioner of Malaya, on 30 May 1949. Gurney was a long time Colonial Service officer 
imbued in traditions of the service and committed to existing practice.  His advice proved 
controversial and initiated a long winded argument between the professional intelligence 
machinery and the CO. Discussion of the reforms reveals fundamental differences in the 
conceptions of the intelligence machinery. In particular paragraphs 9 and 10 resulted in much 
correspondence lasting through until 1950. 
 
In Paragraph 9 Gurney argued that the Special Branch should be both a ‘collecting’ and an 
‘assessing’ organisation. High quality senior police officers were needed to manage this 
system.  All intelligence material was collated in the Special Branch including material from 
‘native’ affairs and the labour department.  In Paragraph 10 he argued that the JIC model was 
a military one unsuitable for the management of local crises. He had resisted JICs in both 
Palestine and Malaya because he saw intelligence assessment as the duty of a specialist local 
officer in conference with other local officers. He advocated flexible conferences rather than 





Despatch No. 5 was read by the Overseas Defence Committee and then referred to the JIC for 
comment. Unsurprisingly the JIC took a rather different view to Gurney. The JIC advocated 
the use of Local Intelligence Committees in opposition to Gurney’s ideas on co-ordinating 
machinery. Davies saw the adoption of the LICs as a manifestation of the JIC system 
imposed from the top and Despatch No.5 would seem to suggest that this is how the CO saw 
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it as well. The JIC thought its own system should be imposed and redrafted the paragraphs 
under discussion.
252
The JIC argued that the Malayan experience was not directly applicable 
to all colonial situations, in particular they argued that: 
‘Para 9: [...]despatch could be read to meant one of the functions of Special Branch of 
the Colonial Police is to appraise political intelligence and draw the right conclusion 
from it. While we recognise that for certain purposes it may be desirable that senior 
police officers should be expected to perform these functions it is our view that when 
an appraisal of political intelligence is required as the basis for the formulation of civil 
policy the responsibility for such an appraisal  should rest with Governor advised by the 
Colonial Secretary and in appropriate cases by the Local Intelligence Committee if and 
when established. 
The JIC’s comment is interesting because in many colonies which lacked a LIC and 
possessed a Special Branch, and in which the police had a colony wide jurisdiction, the 
Governors and Chief Secretary’s actually did receive information which had been appraised 
in the police machinery. It was however particularly true in Malaya and Singapore where the 
police had an important role in intelligence activity and less so in other colonies. In effect the 
JIC was attacking one of the CO’s accepted systems. The JIC then discussed its approach to 
intelligence organisation and the role of the JICs.  
 Para 10 
2. In considering the relationships between local intelligence bodies and the Joint 
Intelligence Committee it is desirable to explain in more detail the working of the JICs. 
3. A JIC serves a British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (BDCC) or a Commanders 
in Chief Committee of an area for the purpose of co-ordination all intelligence within a 
certain area. It consists normally of the representatives of the FO, three services, 
Security Service, SIS and Joint Intelligence Bureau where the area of responsibility of 
the JIC covers colonial territories it is desirable that its membership should also include 
an officer competent to advise on and to assess political intelligence collected from the 
territories Thus the JIC (London)  includes a representative from each of the Colonial 
Office, and a member of  Colonial Affairs side of the Commissioner General’s 
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organisation sits on the  JIC(FE).  Further JICs can and do call in expert opinion which 
requires special knowledge. LICs are organisations partly for the purpose of 
coordinating all intelligence within a particular territory for the guidance of Governor 
and local Service Commanders and partly to provide a property constituted body with 
which the JIC can exchange views. LICs are not necessarily subordinate to Local 
Defence Committees (LDC) but might be responsible directly to the Colonial Governor 
himself whilst cooperating freely with the JIC. 
The regional JIC’s responsibility was to British regional administrative and military 
machinery not to colonial governments. Regional JICs fed information back directly to the 
JIC in London allowing it to carry out its role as a proto-national assessing and co-ordinating 
body and avoided the bottleneck of the CO. The JIC’s views on LICs were also interesting 
because they stressed the importance of ‘a properly constituted body with which the JIC 
could correspond’. The comment about the Local Defence Committees (LDC) showed that 
the JIC was seeking to bypass the existing machinery. A professional agenda was probably 
important as well as a political one; the LDCs and other machinery in the colonial 
governments seldom had professional intelligence input. It is also necessary however to 
remember that the situation in Malaya was different to that in many other colonies  
4. Circumstances in the Federation of Malaya are peculiar to that territory and other 
arrangements for the collation and assessment of political intelligence may be found 
appropriate in areas which have an administration of the normal colonial pattern. It is 
worth noting that among other places where LICs have been established are Singapore 
and Hong Kong. 
5. We consider that except in rare cases due to  special reasons to the contrary [...] it is 
desirable that there should be an LIC with a suitable permanent membership drawn 
from those officials most likely to be concerned with intelligence matters, Such a 
committee should be under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the colonial 
government and should contain representatives from the services and of any 
departments of the colonial government (police and Native Affairs) who by their 
knowledge and experience are in a special position to assist the LIC in making 
assessments. 
There was a certain tension in the JICs recommendations. Fundamentally JIC’s, as military 
bodies, were interested in political intelligence as it affected security. Squeezing the Special 
103 
 
Branch with its 'security’ focus out of involvement in intelligence assessment in favour of 
wider administrative/ police machinery seems counter-productive.  It may demonstrate a lack 
of understanding of the internal balances between administration and police in many 
colonies.  
6 In our opinion the advantages to be gained from a LIC are that: 
(a) the Governor  of a colony receives valuable information from a permanent body 
who are constantly assessing intelligence and are also available to obtain  advice on any 
particular subjects from experts and; 
(b) By exchanging intelligence with a JIC the LIC is able to keep the governor 
informed of matters outside the immediate purview of his particular colony and the JIC 
is able to keep Commanders in Chief and BDCCs where they exist advised when 
necessary on matters affecting the individual colonies’ 
   
This argument went part of the way to satisfying the CO because it emphasised CO primacy 
in colonial intelligence collection and assessment but it also sought to provide a rationale for 
incorporating the CO and its machinery into organisation which could at least communicate 
with the JIC and contained professional personnel. 
 
In 1950 discussion of the matter was still ongoing.  The CO, FO, Admiralty, War Office, and 
Security Service accepted that not all colonies needed LICs; only those with major problems, 
and those where the armed forces were deployed. The FO was initially split. On the one hand 
Bevin was anti communist so he was personally keen to see intelligence improved but at the 
same time he was aware of the influence of the COS and their tendency to interfere in foreign 
policy. The FO consequently followed a mixed approach sometimes siding with the CO and 
sometimes with the COS. In the discussion Juxon Barton laid out a clear explanation of the 
CO’s position on intelligence: 
 
 ‘It was the responsibility of the Colonial Office to ensure that timely and adequate 
intelligence affecting the deployment of the Armed Forces was passed to the Service 
Departments in London and that is was also the responsibility of the CO to ensure that 
such intelligence was obtained from Governor’s concerned. In cases where this 
committee on regional JIC required intelligence appreciations affecting particular  
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colonies where LICs had not been established such appreciations could always be 
obtained from Governors concerned through the CO.’253 
 
In these scenarios a system based on the CO’s local focus might have been more effective 
than an integrated system focussed on the importance of communism and the Cold War.  The 
discussions and developments ‘on the ground’ indicate that the British government needed to 
adopt a more co-ordinated approach as emergencies developed. The CO always pressed to 
retain its autonomy and resisted the pressure applied to it. The major sources of pressure were 
from the service departments who were concerned about early warning and the need to 




CO ‘Culture’ and the Proposed Political Intelligence Section: 
 
It is now important to consider the ‘culture’ of the CO and its affect on intelligence activity. 
The culture is demonstrated in discussions about a proposed Political Intelligence Section 
(PIS) in the CO. Ministers intended the PIS to enable the CO to contribute to the British 
intelligence machinery but the proposal was carefully altered by the CO’s staff into a system 
for doing the opposite. By examining the responses of the various departmental heads to the 
proposal it is possible to find out how the CO’s decision makers thought about intelligence, 
information, and the role and nature of the CO’s own intelligence machinery. 
 
A central PIS was proposed in late 1948.
254
 Officially the pressure came from the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary but in reality it seems to be Bevin who was pushing. By 
the 18 October 1948 discussions were underway between the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (Creech Jones), the Minister of State (Listowel) the Parliamentary Under Secretary 
(Rees Moggs), the Deputy Under Secretary, and the Assistant Under Secretaries.
255
 The 
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African Studies Branch, which had been operating for a number of years within the CO
256
 
and the Ministry of Food were suggested as precedents.
257
 Calder Walton suggests that a 
secret section was also set up in the CRO at the same time under Sir William Jenkin to 
coordinate information received from SIS, Security Service and GCHQ.
258
 The meeting dealt 
with four points which included: a programme of military and police organisation; 
development of machinery in the CO for the collation of political and security intelligence 
and for advising ministers on the political economic and other repercussions in colonies of 
events in the Commonwealth, and foreign countries; to consider both positive and negative 
approaches to communism, and to put in place a programme of propaganda. Discussion then 
turned to the creation of gendarmeries before turning to intelligence organisation within the 
CO. Clearly this showed that a ‘national’ rather than departmental approach to reform was 
desired. 
 
The discussion suggested that the P.M., Foreign Secretary, and ministers wanted the PIS to 
integrate CO activities with the central intelligence machinery. This would seem to suggest 
that the PIS was intended to link the CO and the rest of Whitehall. It is clear however that 
within the CO there were a number of different visions of its role. Some of this  discussion 
suggested the PIS was seen, within the CO, as an organisation for feeding external 
information into the CO's own imperial intelligence machinery from elsewhere in Whitehall. 
The CO’s vision of the PIS maintained and reinforced the idea that the CO was the 
autonomous lead agency in imperial intelligence matters. Another ‘vision’ in the CO saw the 
PIS as a research organisation for the benefit of ministers. Yet another saw it as a method of 
dealing with some aspects of the international relations of the empire; the latter proposal 
would have trespassed on the FO’s coverts. Strangely officials in the CO do not seem to have 
emphasised the PIS as a security intelligence department and none of the proposals seem to 
suggest that it should manage intelligence activity rather it was a bureau for collating 
information obtained by other parts of the organisation. The discussion was about assessment, 
not about liaison with security and political intelligence bodies elsewhere in Whitehall. The 
discussion would suggest that the CO needed to know about the global threat posed by 
communism (and other external global ‘isms’) in order to act with its own resources in the 
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empire; i.e. it meant that the CO remained responsible for imperial intelligence activity. The 
discussion also suggests an essentially passive approach. Security and its cost were a local 
responsibility, not a British one.  
 
Sir Marston Logan and Trafford Smith, who produced the Fortnightly Review of 
Communism and Political Intelligence Summary, were to be the core of the new machinery 
in the CO. The collation of the Political Intelligence Reports was to be continued within 
Defence Department. Overall a much larger organisation would be needed and it would be 
necessary to work out the relationship between it and the geographical departments. The 
meeting agreed that the collation of incoming information about communism required some 
kind of wider intelligence organisation which might be based on a research department in the 
International Relations Department. At this point the focus seems to be on using the security 
and defence orientated intelligence element of the CO to perform the new duties but there 
was uncertainty about the new machinery’s focus. Yet very soon the emphasis was to swing 
back to a political administrative focus. The discussion explains the practices for dealing with 
various types of intelligence within the CO but raises many questions. Security intelligence 
and liaison with the British intelligence services were seen as minor, niche activities, to be 
left to the Defence Department. The Political Intelligence Reports were not seen as fitting 
into this niche, despite Marston Logan’s role in summarising them. The Reports on 
Communism were also clearly seen as having wider relevance than a being mere defence 
matter.  
  
A meeting held in the Permanent Under Secretary’s room on the 2 November 1948 provides 
more detail about the view on the intelligence machinery held by senior officials in the CO. 
The meeting was chaired by Sir Thomas Lloyd, the Permanent Under Secretary.  The 
personnel who attended this meeting were the officials who formed the ongoing ‘mind’ of the 
Colonial Office because of their seniority and role as departmental heads. In consequence 
their decisions were likely to reflect their vision of the department’s role 
 
‘The meeting  discussed the idea of having a section of the Office which could diagnose 
and analyse political trends in the Colonial Empire as a whole, forecast probable 
developments in the political sphere and draw attention in advance to the possible 
affects in the colonies of outside events which may on the surface have no direct 
relevance to colonial affairs, and prepare appreciations for the information of 
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minister’s. Associated with this was the desirability of having a section of the office 
which would analyse information received in respect of Commonwealth and Foreign 
territories and disseminate it to the departments of the office concerned and to colonial 
governments.’259  
 
In many ways this sounds something like machinery used to distribute the FO’s TONIL 
telegrams during the war. It would be connected with the compilation of political reports on 
communism received from colonial governments in the Defence Department and work done 
by International Relations Department in the reception and dissemination of political 
intelligence from foreign colonies.  The first proposed duty; ‘diagnosing and analysing 
political trends in the empire as a whole’ was an attempt to look globally at problems like 
communism and its likely affects on imperial development rather than relying up the local 
and regional perspectives of the geographical departments. The second duty was about seeing 
the empire in a global context. This could be interpreted as meaning that the PIS was to be a 
means of carrying the FO’s ideas into the CO or, alternatively, as attempt to widen the CO’s 
role into external affairs and thus to confirm the unique identify of its intelligence machinery. 
The section would act as an entry portal for information about the global British interests and 
circulate these around the office. Finally the section was going to produce research briefs for 
ministers although it was,  ‘agreed that a political appreciation of position in each colonial 
territory or region must remain with the responsibility of the geographical departments and 
through them the colonial governments’,260 i.e. the system was not focussed on  passing up 
colonial information. 
 
The intention appears to have been to create a ‘fusion centre’ at the heart of the CO in which 
external and internal imperial information was amalgamated. What appears to be emerging 
from the ‘smoke’ of these discussions is not a method of extending the reach of the JIC into 
the CO to aid centralised control of colonial policy from Whitehall but rather machinery 
which would help the CO to perform the kind of assessment task undertaken by the JIC i.e. 
making the CO a parallel organisation to the JIC and retaining the CO’s independence from 
the central machinery. Given that the pressure was being placed on the CO to become 
involved in the JIC this approach might represent a ‘counter blast’ by producing an 
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organisation to perform the same kind of work as the JIC without the military preoccupations 
although unfortunately this kind of rationale is not explicitly stated.  
 
The meeting then examined:  
(a) Analysis and dissemination of political information from Commonwealth and foreign 
countries  and  
(b)   appreciation of trends  in the colonial empire as a whole particularly as affected by 
the events outside the colonial empire  which would be brought to notice under (a)  
(c) Scope for useful work under (a) extra staff needed work done by International 
Relations Department in the field was of use but might need to be disseminated within 
the office and to colonial governments. 
It was agreed that central organisation set up to prepare a general appreciation would have to 
seek regional appreciations from the appropriate geographical department and through it from 
the colonial governments. This seems to suggest that the role proposed was actually rather 
similar to that of the Joint Intelligence Staff ( JIS), i.e. the PIS was  intended to be a drafting 
body to inform the higher level work of ministers. The section would best placed inside the 
CO’s International Relations Department (CO-IRD) however the CO-IRD might need to be 
split and in order to determine how it should be structured it was necessary to obtain 
academic advice. Sir Thomas Lloyd suggested Professor Harlow.
261
 He also suggested that 
Martin should talk to Galsworthy on the possibility of a new section as an expansion of the 
IRD. It would be necessary to consult the CO’s Organisation Committee.262 
 
This discussion was confusing because it seemed to envisage two separate sections, a security 
focussed element and a research element and it is not clear how these fitted together into one 
section.  To summarise –the CO proposed to keep its existing methods of handling 
intelligence coming in from the colonies and therefore the way in which they were 
disseminated. Defence would continue to deal with security information because of its liaison 
with security organisations. The new section would research outside information coming in 
and global trends within empire including longer terms trends and advise ministers so that 
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valuable material could be disseminated. Again this appears to be a reform essentially 
intended to improve the CO’s assessment process and to allow it to continue its largely 
autonomous course; not a way of improving the flow of information to the rest of Whitehall. 
 
It is now necessary to examine the reforms to reveal the mentalité of the civil servants 
involved, particularly the CO’s AUS the conflicts between them, and the way in which they 
sought to subvert external pressure on the CO in relation to intelligence matters.  In particular 
they reveal the views of Assistant Under Secretaries in charge of groups of departments and 
some Assistant Secretaries and principals about intelligence reform consequently  it 
demonstrates the CO’s overall position on the issue of reform both within  the CO and 
Whitehall. The impetus for the proposed PIS came from outside the CO but its proposed 
organisation and role was the hands of the civil servants in the CO.  
 
Clearly these ideas were those held by high level officials at the time and this group may not 
be representative of all CO civil servants. An examination of their records of service also 
shows that all were administrators with their main backgrounds in the geographical 
departments.  Most had started their service before the widespread creation of technical 
departments. This preponderance may explain why the influence of the geographical 
departments was so important and why the proposal to create the PIS was not implemented. It 
also serves to exclude other influences which affected CO decision making. There was for 
example, a varying degree of ‘anti-communist’ thinking. Calder Walton for example, points 
to Harold Ingrams of the Information Departments as being a particularly anti-communist 
official,
263
 but a general anti communism was the norm at this time. Finally they had 
remarkably homogenous backgrounds. Most were privately educated, many had university 
degrees, and a substantial number had served in the First World War. From their educational 
profiles most appear to have been Anglicans. This combination of factors served to create a 
homogenous body of men who approached problems, including intelligence problems in a 
similar way. It is interesting how despite initially advocating the section officials like Seel 
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Divisions within the CO over the role of the Political Intelligence Section: 
 
The proposed PIS found some supporters within the CO.
264
 Generally technical departments 
supported the idea and geographical departments opposed it. Technical /specialist 
departments took a ‘global’ view of events because they provided expertise across the 
empire; consequently D&G could accept the idea of a global communist threat more easily 
than Geographical Departments which saw events as having ‘local’ or ‘regional’ causes. The 
attitudes of individuals could change. Some civil servants in D&G, for example, had come 
from geographical departments but seemed to adopt their new department’s approach. Civil 
servants subverted the machinery to achieve departmental goals in the CO.  
 
The process of negotiation started when Sir Thomas Lloyd, the Permanent Under 
Secretary,
265
 sought ideas from departments.
266
 This took place some months after the 
meeting on the 2
nd
 of November 1948. In that time there seems to have been some 
developments in thinking about the organisation’s purpose. It is not clear what perspective 
Lloyd had on the PIS himself although his views on the CO’s role were conservative.267 
Philip Rogers, an establishment officer, was placed in charge of drafting the proposal.
268
 
Rogers worked with Emanuel from Economic Department
269
 (the original intention was to 
make the section responsible for economic as well as political information although the CO’s 
Economic Department withdrew at an early date)
270
; Trafford Smith from D&G 
271
 and 
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George Seel, an Assistant Under Secretary for Eastern, General and West Indies 
Departments.
272
 All of these officers were to have an ongoing influence over intelligence 
development in the CO and they recommended that the creation of the section. Seel and 
Trafford Smith, head of D&G, may have been wanted to lessen Defence and General 
Department’s workload.273 The matter was then passed to other heads of departments for 
discussion.  
 
More detail emerged in early January 1949. Seel minuted Sir Thomas Lloyd that there was a 
need for a section to work with Geographical Departments, International Relations 
Department (IRD-CO) and the Economic General Department. He believed security work 
and ‘communism’ should remain with D&G with opportunities for liaison with the proposed 
PIS.
274
  There was discussion of whether or not the two intelligence summaries the 
‘Fortnightly Review of Communism’ and the ‘Political Intelligence’ reports ought to be 
merged. Seel did not consider it necessary to combine the general ‘Political Intelligence 
Summary’ with the ‘Communist Summary’. J.M. Martin from IRD-CO agreed.275 Blackburn 
of Information Services and Trafford Smith of D&G were not certain about amalgamation of 
the two products, but thought they should be compiled within the same section.  
 
The memorandum was then circulated to Assistant Under Secretaries and some principals 
concerned with defence matters. The commentary on the form and role of the proposed PIS 
provided by the Assistant Under Secretaries is illuminating because it provides evidence of 
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departmental viewpoints but also of some confusion.
276
 The key problem was the relationship 
between the ‘secretariat’ (the PIS) and the ‘geographical’ departments. The suggested aims of 
the secretariat were threefold: to study external trends affecting empire; to gather and collate 
intelligence from the colonies themselves; and to provide a research service to evaluate it.  
 
J.B. Sidebotham, the AUS responsible  for ‘Pacific Department’, agreed that there was a 
requirement for a section but was uncertain about the precise division of duties.
277
 He 
questioned whether it was it a machine for collecting information for summaries or giving 
advice to departments on the political repercussion of events in contiguous territories. He 
asked what relationship the PIS would have to International Relations Department.  Would a 
direct link between geographical departments and International Relations remain? Would a 
new department inform geographical departments of political events in contiguous territories 
or would direct links between geographical departments and external departments like the FO 





Sidebotham was clearly concerned to keep as much independence for his department as 
possible. His interest in International Relations department and external contacts with the FO 
probably related to the issue of Anglo-French relations in the Pacific particularly in the New 
Hebrides, which was ruled under an awkward condominium arrangement, which made an 
effective relationship with the FO essential. Inserting machinery between Pacific Department 
and its external contacts would have slowed work down and led to confusion. 
 
By far the most important concern of the departments about the creation of a PIS however 
was that it would break the direct link between the geographical departments; wherein lay the 
COs detailed knowledge of particular locations and regions, and the upper echelons of the 
CO and with the rest of Whitehall because it would insert an additional level of machinery. 
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 J.M. Martin, responsible for Mediterranean and Middle East,
279
 wrote to Sir Thomas Lloyd 
pointing out that although IRD-CO was overworked the view  within  Mediterranean 
Department was  ‘[…]to maintain the principle that political intelligence with respect to any 
Colonial Territory is the prime responsibility […] of the Geographical Department […].280  
L.H. Gorsuch who dealt with West Africa was strongly opposed to the PIS.
 281
 He believed 
the PIS might cause potential delays; duplication of work; and the loss of an overview of 
West African politics because it would add an extra level between his department and the 
higher officials. He pointed out that if a new system was implemented the geographical 
department would have to supply a finished product because an officer who was not working 
with day to day correspondence would not fully understand the context.
282
 He did not want 
West African Department, which worked with regional organisations like West African 
Council and the SLO West Africa, to be bypassed. West Africa, like the Pacific region was a 
complex area for both internal and external reasons. Internally the colonies had highly 
developed local politics; externally there was the need to manage relationships with the 
French government and the United Nations over mandates like Cameroon. From a security 
perspective the British maintained regional machinery and co-operation consequently it is 
possible to see the point of Gorsuch’s objections. 
 
By contrast to these objections Eastern Branch replied to Philip Rogers in the Establishment 
Department:  
 
[…] It will undoubtedly be useful to have a section collating information concerning 
foreign countries but I must insist that any suggestion that the new section should be in 
any way interposed between geographical departments and their contacts in the Foreign 
Office, C.R.O., etc., must be squashed from the outset. It must be the responsibility of 
the Geographical Departments to deal direct with the F.O. etc when any matters arise in 
foreign countries directly affecting the Colonial Territories. 
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[…] I am rather alarmed at the suggestion that an Assistant Secretary should be put in 
charge of since this in itself is bound to give the section a status to which it would not 
my mind be entitled if it is to fulfil the functions I have in mind. No self-respecting 
Assistant Secretary could be expected to be content that his department should be a 
pure collating agency and post office […]283 
 
 The Far East like the Pacific and West African regions was a complex area with British 
regional machinery, foreign colonies, and independent states all of which required liaison 
with the FO. Eastern Branch’s comments also demonstrate that the geographical departments 
could interact with other Whitehall departments in a horizontal way rather than going though 
formal channels between departments. They show that the CO could not always have adopted 
a collective, departmental perspective when dealing with Whitehall, because individual 
departments within the CO could negotiate directly with external departments on matters 
occurring within their regions.  
 
Many of the minutes raise the question of the purpose of the PIS. There was clearly 
considerable difference between collating reports from the colonies and ‘researching’ the 
empires foreign relationships and this was felt to impinge on the geographical departments’ 
role. C.J.J.T. Barton, a Principal who had just moved from the IRD-CO to the Commercial 
Relations Department, provided a detailed critique of the proposal.
284
  His perspective is 
important  because between 1953 and 1957 he took over the task of compiling the ‘Colonial 
Intelligence Summaries’ and the annual intelligence review from Sir Marston Logan and 
became deeply involved in intelligence activity. 
 
The object of the proposal seems to be (quite rightly) to stimulate a more regular and 
more searching appreciation of what is happening , of the trends which are perceptible 
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in the colonies as a whole or in groups of Colonies, and of where we might be going. 
This badly needs doing. But in my view a worthwhile appreciation (as distinct from a 
bald factual summary) can only be produced either by people who are doing the work 
(Geographical Departments) being given the time and encouragement to stand back and 
consider what they are getting at, or by somebody working in the very closest touch 
with them, or by both together […] 
 
It would not be true that to say nobody else could do it; but I think it is true to say that 
nobody else can do it for us –and if the appreciation is going to lead to action, it is 
surely the “us” that has to be got at. I recognise that it is proposed that the Political 
Intelligence Section should work closely with the Geographical Departments. But I do 
not believe it will be possible to achieve the degree of intimate touch necessary with 
eight or more Geographical departments covering the whole colonial world. Indeed I 
doubt very much what significant trends there are which are common the whole 
colonial Empire (apart from question of external relations which I would regard as with 




Barton’s suggested answer was to adopt full scale ‘regionalisation’ of the CO with regional 
studies branches and regular co-ordination meetings with the highest levels of officials. 
  
Beckett of the West Indian Department had discussed his ideas with Messrs Morgan, 
Kennedy and Mackintosh. 
 
[…] the proposal would not achieve a great deal as, except in relation to small number 
of subjects-chiefly communism, and to a lesser extent racial questions and questions of 
constitutional development – reports containing political intelligence from any of the 
well defined Colonial regions would gain little or nothing by collation and could for 
most purposes be best used in regional reports  rather than incorporation into a single 
document, which could do little more than repeat them one after another with little or 
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Beckett’s minute is again very revealing. His comments suggest that the minister’s major 
concern was with the Cold War and intelligence related to security issues. It also clearly 
points to the CO’s civil servants in both geographical and defence departments, belief that 
local issues were the most important and that the Cold War was not a major issue in many 
regions. These beliefs help to demonstrate the collective mentalité of the CO’s personnel and 
how it differed from that in other departments in Whitehall.   
 
Andrew Cohen was responsible for the African Departments and an influential reformer in 
the CO. He was a progressive who believed in careful research and took a regional approach 
to the activities of his department. He had set up the African Studies Branch to study regional 
problems. Cohen however argued:  
 
I agree that it is desirable that adequate arrangements should be made for (a) the 
collection and collation of political intelligence, and (b) assessments to be made of the 
effect which developments in Commonwealth and foreign countries may have in 
Colonial Territories. But I do not agree that (b) should be the function of a general 




 Because Cohen already had the African Studies Branch, he had less need of a PIS carrying 
out a research function a departmental level. 
 
 At the close of the exercise Seel wrote to Sir Thomas Lloyd recommending that the proposal 
be dropped on the ground of general opposition within the department. This seems to suggest 
that the PUS was able to use departmental opinion in order to justify not taking any action 
over the PIS when dealing with his ministers and by extension the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary. This suggests that the Secretary of State was able to convince Bevin that 
he had taken sufficient action perhaps because of the CO’s new but limited role in the JIC. 
The department was opposed to seeing intelligence as a special field and the geographical 
departments should continue to handle it.  Seel disagreed with some by accepting that there 
were general trends affecting the empire.
288
 Contributors argued for a variety of solutions: the 
maintenance of the ‘status quo’ i.e. the responsibility of the Geographical Departments; or 
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some form of the PIS; a general ‘political’ structure within the CO; or a regionalised system 
based on the African Studies Department. A major criticism, which showed the 
‘departmental’ viewpoint, was that the plan for the PIS imposed a layer of officials between 
the geographical departments and their contacts and caused delay.  
 
The salient points in this discussion are very revealing. It was clear that the geographical 
departments within the CO did not have an absolutely clear idea of what the proposed PIS 
was intended to do but equally that they were committed to retaining as much autonomy for 
the CO and their individual sections of it as possible. Ideas, demonstrated in the minutes, 
ranged from a section collating political or security information for ministers, essentially a 
security function, to a research department dealing with global trends affecting the empire, 
essentially an international relations responsibility. It does not seem to have been envisaged 
as an organisation to co-ordinate security and intelligence activity; rather as a body designed 
to collate analyse and interpret information received from the new reports. This role may also 
apply to the abortive PIS proposed in by Sir Thomas Lloyd the PUS in 1953 but of which 
little record has survived.
289
  Nonetheless the PIS was clearly intended to be influential 
because it was to have its own Assistant Under Secretary. The proposed role of the PIS does 
appear to be different from the role to the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) 
eventually introduced after the 1955 Templer Report reforms discussed in Chapter 5. ISD had 
a managerial and analytical rather than a strictly analytical role and it contained security 
professionals rather than the civil servants and academics proposed in 1948-49.  
 
The question of precedent is interesting. Cohen’s African Research Branch was an analytical 
research body dealing with African affairs. The ‘secretariat’ in the Ministry of Food was 
suggested as a precedent. It is not clear however what it did but it may have been a collating 
body. The intention of the Foreign Secretary was probably to push the CO to set up an 
organisation, which had similarities with the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department 
(PUSD) of the FO. PUSD managed the relationship with the SIS probably including acting as 
a conduit for passing material to intelligence consumers in geographical departments in the 
FO who had posed questions for SIS to answer.  PUSD was to be consciously used as a 
model in 1954-55. 
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The discussion showed something of the institutional culture of the civil servants, their 
concern for administrative primacy, and their resentment at external interference. The 
reforms showed that the CO had chosen collectively to slow down and subvert the 
interference in its internal affairs from the rest of Whitehall. It also showed that divisions 
between geographical and technical departments played an important part in internal politics 
within the CO. Traditional administrative information gathering and processing machinery 
was preferred to intelligence professionalization. The ‘victory’ was only temporary, however, 
hard experience in the colonies and the increasing threat was to gradually remove the CO’s 
autonomy and force it to act within a centralised and co-ordinated Whitehall as Chapter 3 will 
show. The dispute does however identify the forces within the CO who wished to slow down 
intelligence reform and this knowledge is important when surveying the subsequent 
development of the 1948 system.  
 
There were important differences in the understanding of what constituted ‘Political 
Intelligence’ and its relationship with ‘security intelligence’. Political intelligence was seen as 
‘superior’. Civil servants believed only the Geographical departments were able to 
understand the complexity of the material and should remain the most important element of 
the CO, including the right to liaise with Whitehall departments. Geographical departments’ 
views were ‘localist’ and ‘regionalist’. Some officials, however, recognised there was a 
global view. The emphasis on political intelligence meant the CO was unable to provide the 
Service Departments and the COS with ‘security’ information needed to plan troop 
deployments in advance a purpose for which political intelligence was too diffuse. It also 
helped the CO to resist Whitehall’s emphasis on links between communism and nationalism.  
Officials recognised the differences between ‘British’ and imperial interests. Most colonies, 
however, did not have local communist parties and whilst Soviet espionage did exist in some 
colonies it was limited in scope in late 1940s and early 1950s.  
 
‘Nationalism’ was clearly a very important influence on developments in the empire but there 
were other influences of importance. In some territories ethnic (Chinese in Malaya) or tribal 
identities (Somaliland), religion (Brunei), or other local realities were as important if not 
more so. Nationalist movements had existed for decades in many colonies. Frequently 
however nationalist ideas were closely associated with elite educated groups within colonial 
societies and so had limited impact on the security of colonial governments. Over time ethnic, 
religious and economic factors became more intertwined with nationalism sometimes giving 
119 
 
it a specific character. The CO was well aware of these complexities because it surveyed the 
way colonial governments manipulated local conditions to maintain control. This array of 
anti-colonial factors increasingly became lumped under the term ‘nationalism’ after the 
Second World War by other departments in Whitehall. By contrast ‘Communism’ had been 
seen as a separate threat which operated in the colonies by creating tensions and setting up 
local communist parties some of which were in conflict with more conservative nationalists.  
There were a number of reasons why Whitehall conflated the two one of which was that   
‘nationalist’ politicians sometimes operated within ‘labour’ movements which used the 
rhetoric of class warfare.
290
 The response of the CO was mixed. Geographical departments, 
although starved of funds, continued to place more emphasis on social and economic reforms 





 Alterations to the CO’s machinery post 1948:  
 
The Security Intelligence Adviser: 
 
The next major point in the development of the CO’s internal machinery was the appointment 
of the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA) in 1954. In 1952 the Kenyan government asked for 
support to rebuild the Kenyan Special Branch which had failed early in the emergency.
291
 
Like the intelligence machinery in Malaya it had been starved of resources. The police had 
small numbers in the rural areas and Special Branch was small and urban based despite the 
fact that the Commissioner was O’Rorke who had served in the RIC in the 1920s.292 In 1947 
the Security Service had recommended reforms but these were not implemented by the 
Kenyan government. As a result the government was taken by surprise.  Initially the 
Governor approached Sir Thomas Lloyd, the CO’s PUS, who approached the Home Office 
(HO) for support. An officer from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was provided by 
Sir Frank Newsam, the PUS of the HO. Sir Percy Sillitoe, the Director General of the 
Security Service, however heard of the request and offered to provide a Security Service 
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officer. Eventually he managed to convince Sir Evelyn Baring, the governor, to accept his 
offer. Alexander MacDonald, late Indian Police, who had experience in Malaya, was 
appointed to carry out the reforms. 
  
The response to these actions demonstrated divisions within the CO. Lloyd and Jeffries were 
infuriated by Sillitoe's actions. Clearly they preferred a ‘police centred’ rather than a ‘security 
intelligence centred’ approach, drawing on the resources of their allies in the Home Office. 
No doubt they did not appreciate the embarrassment either! The incident shows how the 
Security Service was taking a more active role in the colonies. In 1952 Sillitoe and 
MacDonald reorganised the Special Branch and MacDonald was left in Kenya as Director of 
Intelligence to supervise the implementation of the reforms. In 1954 the Colonial Secretary 
appointed MacDonald his SIA in the CO and by November MacDonald was involved in 
advising Templer on colonial intelligence for his report. The files on Kenya show that the 
system developed and expressed by MacDonald formed the basis of his recommendations for 
the Colonial model as a whole.
293
 The Kenyan incident demonstrates that the Security Service 
had gained influence over the development of the professional influence on the colonial 
police. This looks like an afterthought and needs further integration 
    
Conclusion: 
 
The war created a new international situation in which the position of Great Britain was much 
weakened. The UK was economically weakened. The United States alliance during the war 
became a key stone of British policy and the United States followed an anti imperial policy. 
The creation of the United Nations increasingly provided a forum in which other states could 
criticise the British Empire and keep British colonial practice under surveillance.  
 
During the war the nature of British government had undergone considerable development. 
There had been a tendency to centralisation. Departments had become much more 
interventionist. Associated with this was an emphasis on ‘planning’ in both the external and 
internal spheres. The relative importance of different parts of the British government had 
changed. The COS for example, had become much more important whilst the SofS for 
Colonies was not a member of the War Cabinet although Attlee represented the dominions as 
                                                 
293
 TNA, CO822/445 Organisation of Intelligence Services: Kenya 1952; TNA, CO822/790 Organisation of 
Intelligence Services: Kenya 1954. 
121 
 
Deputy Prime Minister.  The British government also undermined the degree of autonomy of 
colonies by appointing Minister’s Resident and creating regional military and administrative 
structures. 
 
The nature of intelligence machinery and its relationship with the government had also 
changed British intelligence machinery had become central to the war effort in part because 
of the central importance of signals intelligence and the code breaking capacity developed 
which for the first time gave the British government almost ’real time’, accurate, intelligence 
to assist in decision making. 
   
The international situation and the changes in administrative structure and relative 
importance had had their effect on the relative importance of the British intelligence 
machinery which became central to government decision and policy making. There was 
extension of the scale, an increase in the degree of central control and the gradual 
development of the JIC as the centre of the co-ordinating machinery. The collecting agencies 
were also expanded greatly; the Security Service undertook overseas activity like SIS. The 
service intelligence organisations expanded and developed new systems of intelligence 
collection including image intelligence.  
 
CO responsibility in other territories: 
      
Palestine had an effect on subsequent counter-insurgency operations but not the same impact 
as Malaya. This is in a sense rather strange; it was a large scale ongoing crisis which had 
directly involved the British government and significant military forces. It did however have 
some specific effects on the development of the colonial police. Palestine personnel were sent 
all over the world although their influence in Malaya was limited by the internecine strife 
within the police force that their arrival created. Palestine officers had an impact on the 
development of the colonial police model. In particular towards the end of the mandate the 
idea of general duties police backed up with a paramilitary element for emergencies and an 
extensive intelligence organisation based on Special Branch became the norm in the colonies.  
Ex-Palestine Police officers entered the Security Service practically all colonial police forces. 
Some Palestine officers became the peripatetic experts like Sir Richard Catling and John 
Fforde who advised the CO and Whitehall on counter-insurgency and intelligence matters. 
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The chapter has also demonstrated how the Cold War created  external pressure on the CO  
from Whitehall to integrate it into the wider British intelligence machinery under the JIC but 
also how the CO resisted this process and why it resisted. It has also explained why the CO 
was organised on an older pattern of intelligence machinery. It has examined the attitudes to 
intelligence work in the geographical departments and consequently helped to examine how 
the personnel in the CO saw the world and the intelligence crisis of 1948 and how they 
resisted interference in their autonomy including their autonomy as head of their own 
intelligence hierarchy.  
 
The next chapter will deal with the Templer Report and how it affected the imperial 
intelligence machinery in both the CO and the colonies arguing firstly that it marked an end 
to the CO’s autonomous role as head of its own intelligence hierarchy and that secondly 





















The Colonial Office intelligence machinery: The Templer Report and reform, 1955. 
 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated how despite pressure being placed on the CO it 
fought a campaign of resistance against external intervention in its intelligence and security 
machinery. The Templer Report and the subsequent second round of reform within the CO’s 
intelligence machinery in 1954-56 did not emerge out of nowhere. Rather reform drew on 
experience gained in the intervening years since 1948, both in the colonies and in Whitehall. 
There were a number of reasons for reform.  External pressure was placed on the CO as a 
result of the perception by other departments that the CO had failed to provide intelligence to 
prevent a further series of emergencies. Experience gained in various counter-insurgencies 
was assimilated to varying degrees. A professional ‘colonial’ model of intelligence 
organisation and practice was developed, largely by the Security Service and the JIC, which 
reflected developments in the British machinery in the same period. Dissatisfaction with the 
CO’s performance in providing intelligence to predict trouble led to the Templer report. It 
was not really concerned with new ideas but rather a codification of ideas which had 
developed in the intervening years. 
 
Whilst the factors examined in previous chapters continued to be important one of the new 
features of this period was the imposition of professional intelligence models on the CO and 
this chapter will seek to understand how this process occurred. The Security Service and JIC 
created a preferred model of colonial intelligence organisation which was imposed on the 
Kenyan government in 1952 and in 1956 was recommended as the standard form for use in 
colonies. To ensure its input in Kenya the Security Service had ‘seen off’ a Metropolitan 
Police Special Branch candidate supported by the Home Office (HO).  Likewise the 
appointment of a Security Intelligence Adviser by the CO, prior to the Templer Report placed 
a Security Service officer inside the CO and so created a professional figurehead for 
intelligence work in the CO. The Templer Report later forced the CO to create a department 
modelled on the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department (PUSD) of the Foreign Office 
(FO) and designed to link the CO much more directly into the British machinery.  This 
chapter will examine the events which led to the set up of Templer’s Report. It will examine 
the provisions of the report and how they affected the structure and practice of the CO. Then 






The reasons for setting up the Committee on Security in the Colonies: 
 
The need for a review of colonial security seems to have come from Macmillan during his 
time as Minister of Defence 1954-55. The ostensible rationale was to consider the position of 
colonial forces in British defence planning and their redirection to security work, hence the 
need to develop the security intelligence apparatus in the colonies. Macmillan’s 
memorandum ‘Internal Security in the Colonies’ indicated that the main military interest in 
colonial intelligence was related to obtaining adequate warning of the need to deploy military 
manpower. It also, however, identified a number of other motivations.
294
  This was partly 
driven by the re-focussing of British defence on nuclear weapons at the expense of 
conventional forces. The need to cut defence spending was another major factor.
295
 Pressure 
was also created by the military perception that the CO could not control colonial 
governments or get anything done during emergencies. 
  
A fear of communist subversion by senior government personnel played a large part in 
causing the review. Templer had strong views on the effectiveness of communist subversion 
and wanted to use the techniques of subversion against the Soviet Union.
296
  Harold 
Macmillan had similar ideas when he was Minster of Defence 1954-55 and continued to be 
interested in them as Foreign Secretary in 1955. Macmillan and Templer for example 
advocated a central organisation for dealing with subversion which was to come to fruition in 
1956 as the Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies.
297
 Both men were closely 
associated with Patrick Dean the Chairman of the JIC, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick in the Foreign 
Office, and the Chiefs of Staff who also saw the benefits of such an approach. They were 
aware of the threat subversion posed in Britain and the colonies. Dean, for example, 
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personally intervened in counter-subversion activity in Singapore and Malaya in 1955-56.
298
 
The CO by contrast was able to find little evidence of communist threats, at least in the form 
of organised communist parties, in most of the colonies. They had a much more nuanced and 




Templer had other radical ideas too which grew out of his perception of the best methods of 
dealing with subversion. He wanted to hand over colonies as quickly as possible so that 
indigenous people could have experience of government whilst it was still possible to provide 
British assistance and supervision. He specifically warned British expatriates to be aware of 





Templer’s ideas about the development of the colonial intelligence machinery need to be seen 
in this ‘active’ context. He was concerned both to protect colonies against subversion but also 
prepared to consider an active policy to achieve this. As an ex coordinator of SOE in Europe 
(1945) an ex-Director of Military Intelligence (1946-48) and with his experience in Malaya 
(1952-54) he tended to see the importance of intelligence from the perspective of providing 
forewarning and guidance for military operations. He was used to the idea of covert 
operations.  He was very conscious of CO failures to provide early warning to the armed 
forces.  His definition of intelligence and his views on the machinery for creating intelligence 
recommendations were likely therefore to be fundamentally opposed to the CO’s.  
 
The Committee on Security in the Colonies 1955: 
 
As a result of these pressures the Committee on Security in the Colonies was set up in the 
orders of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in January 1955. It was tasked to ‘review the 
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existing organisation of Armed Forces, Police and Security Services in Colonial Territories’ 
and produce a report. Its members included the Colonial Secretary, Minister of Defence, 
Secretaries of State for War, and Air, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and the 
Financial Secretary of the Treasury. It was initially chaired by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Lord Swinton who had extensive intelligence experience.
301
 
Presumably his role as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was considered 
relevant as his department was assuming responsibility for the self governing colonies and 
relations with ex-colonies, but his ideas may have been affected by interdepartmental 
rivalries between the CRO and CO. He was later replaced by the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Kilmuir. It was provided with two secretaries from the Cabinet Office, Sir George Young and 
D.A. Scott.  
 
By the 18 January 1955 it had been decided to appoint General Templer, recently returned 
from Malaya, to write an interim report before taking up his post as chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS). Templer was also supported by a JIC working group whose records do 
not appear in CAB 2922 but may indicate that the JIC saw an opportunity to do a little 
‘empire building’. His appointment was made in the context of the anti communist 
programme. Young wrote to General Sir Neville Brownjohn, the Chief Staff Officer at the 
MOD, asking whether Templer should be formally introduced to the Anti Communism 
(Overseas) (AC(O)) committee because of its role in ‘[...] stimulate and co-ordinate- under 
the general supervision of ministers all anti-communist activities (including related to 
information ) overseas.
302
 Brownjohn disagreed however he pointed out that Templer had 
been one of AC (O)’s founders. Templer recognised that the main threat was in two parts 
firstly anti British groups and secondly the potential of Russian support for them but in 
practice was to concentrate on the communist threat.
303
   
 
Templer then visited a relatively small number of colonies, notably Cyprus, and discussed 
matters with various officials from interested departments including the CO as he wrote the 
report. Templer submitted the report on 23 April 1955 and implementation of its 
recommendations had started by the 23 July 1955. Cabinet ordered the Colonial Secretary to 
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carry out the reforms.
304
 The Committee on Security in the Colonies was left in being, and a 
‘Subcommittee on the Military Implications of General Templer’s Report’ was formed to 
oversee the reports implementation.  By January 1956 however many of the reforms had still 
not been implemented.
305
 A crisis  in Aden in April 1956 when the CO failed to inform the 
COS and JIC of problems, resulted in a ‘counterblast’ from the Minister of Defence who 
discovered that the appointment of Deputy Inspectors General of Colonial Police (DIGCP), 
Deputy Security Intelligence Advisers (DSIA) and the issue of guidance to local intelligence 




Clearly the CO was not pleased with the report which would effectively remove much of its 
autonomy. It had set up the ISD and Police departments by the end of 1955 but it sought to 
slow things down in other ways. It did not get around to issuing the circular on intelligence 
requested by the report until April 1956, after a number of reminders. It also sought to attack 
the JIC and JIS in detail pointing out that the JIC and JIS lacked members with colonial 
experience, and most papers were irrelevant to the CO and thus did not warrant the 
attendance of a CO representative.
307
 This ‘counter blast’ was to lap over into debates about 




The COS expressed its dissatisfaction with CO’s provision of intelligence a year after the 
Report had been submitted. The COS said ‘[...] Colonial Office representation on the JIS was 
inadequate and there was little opportunity for discussion on matters affecting the colonies.  
This would present a good opportunity for the Minister of Defence to emphasise the 
unsatisfactory state of intelligence in Aden and Colonial Office representation on the Joint 
intelligence Staff.’ It was noted that the CO had not passed information on a crisis in Aden to 
the COS and the first COS heard of it was in a telegram from the British Defence Co-
ordination Council (Middle East).  He also noted that the CO had still not issued guidance to 
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governors on Local intelligence Committees (LIC) a year after the event.
309
 The CO issued 
Circular 458/56 on 28 April, presumably in response to this pressure. In July 1956 the 
appointment of DIGCP, DSIA, and police housing was still outstanding issues. These 
examples clearly show that the COS’ need for forewarning of emergencies in the empire was 
not being met even after the report. It also demonstrates how the personnel in the CO were 
continuing to hold on to their autonomy and practices. It is clear then that the context of the 
report was the centralisation of both administration and professionalization of the intelligence 
machinery under the auspices of the Cabinet Office and the JIC and that the CO was very 
isolated in Whitehall, facing a determined attack from the MOD, and the Service 
departments. The CO resisted the defence establishment and disputed the recommendations 
of the Templer Report although in practice much of the report codified existing practices 
rather than introducing new ones. The report’s recommendations and this resistance caused a 
run of correspondence which casts more light on the CO’s intelligence machinery and its 
relationship with other departments and the JIO and also the conflicts which had led to the 




Interdepartmental differences and the co-ordination of the CO’s intelligence machinery 
into the British machinery: 
  
In addition to the specific pressure of events on the defence establishment, there were also 
long term pressures leading to administrative centralisation. As government became 
increasingly complex, the role of the Cabinet Office in the British government was increasing 
for a number of reasons.  The Cabinet Secretary had an overview of both policy and an 
understanding of the machinery involved. In certain cases he also acted as a committee 
chairman at official level and the Cabinet Office oversaw the implementation of the Cabinet’s 
decisions in Whitehall.  The two Cabinet Secretaries in this period Sir Norman Brook (1947-
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 Sir Norman Brook was particularly influential because he held a number of key roles in the 
civil service. These included the duties of Cabinet Secretary from 1947 and from 1956 the 
role of Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, and Head of the Civil Service.  This 
combination of duties enabled him to facilitate intelligence activity. He was very close to the 
various Prime Ministers he served and consequently an important adviser at the highest level. 
The Cabinet Secretary had a number of roles in relation to intelligence activity. He was, for 
example, a member of the Permanent Under Secretaries’ Committee which controlled the 
allocation of funds to the intelligence services.
311
 Brook was involved in a range of 
intelligence related activities ranging from the selection of the Director General of the 
Security Service, Sir Dick White, to head the SIS in 1956 to the implementation of the 
national counter subversion programme in 1955-56. In 1956 his correspondence about the 
Official Committee on Counter Subversion demonstrates how he played off the various 
secretaries of state against one another and sought to settle the CO’s ruffled feathers whilst 




The Cabinet Secretary and the Cabinet Office were responsible for the Cabinet Agenda, 
setting up Cabinet Committees and the official committees which serviced them   and 
circulating paperwork between interested parties. Increasingly the Cabinet Office managed 
and oversaw organisations like the Defence Committee and the Colonial Policy Committee 
(later the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee). The Cabinet Office had become 
increasingly important as the British government was centralised as a means of transmitting 
Cabinet decisions to the departments of state and supervising their implementation. In the 
process it had become an increasingly important element in the British central intelligence 
machinery and after 1957 the JIO was included in its ambit. The Committee on Security in 
the Colonies’ was administratively supported by the Cabinet Office which supplied General 
Templer with a secretary, but the committee used the Ministry of Defence for other 
administrative support. This allowed the Cabinet Office to liaise with Templer and keep an 
eye on his work.  
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Interdepartmental conflict after Templer report: 
 
Apart from the JIC and the CO, other departments played a part in the process. The Cabinet 
and Cabinet Office had an interest in incorporating the CO into more co-ordinated 
government machinery. The Secretaries to the Committee on Security in the Colonies 
provided a commentary on the disputes between various departments as they co-ordinated the 
committee’s work which demonstrated the ongoing tensions. Their notes show the anti-CO 
attitude in the War Office, MOD, and COS. The notes also point to internal differences 




On 10 April 1956 Commander  Eardley-Wilmot, Central War Plans, Cabinet Office, who 
acted as the Secretary to the Official Committee on the Military Implications of General  
Templer’s Report,  wrote to C.W.B Rankin, Lord Kilmuir’s secretary in Lord Chancellor’s 
Office, discussing the need to wind up the Committee on Security in the Colonies more 
widely.  Eardley-Wilmot voiced Whitehall’s negative opinion of the CO: 
  
‘There is something to be said however, for the committee remaining in operation until 
the end of the century to ensure that the Colonial Office face up to their 
responsibilities. If the committee is wound up in six months time present indications are 
such as to justify the assumption that it would have to be reinaugurated in about three 
years as more colonies become the scene of strife owing to lack of intelligence and the 
wrong priorities.‘314 
 
Whilst Eardley-Wilmot was a serving officer his views do not seem radically different to 
those expressed by D.A. Scott and Sir George Young suggesting that this was a widely held 
view in both the Cabinet Office and Whitehall more generally. All of the material 
demonstrates the desire to incorporate the CO intelligence activity with the British 
professional intelligence machinery.  
  
                                                 
313
 TNA, CAB21/2922 Part 2 Discussion of the West India Regiment. Note to General Templer from Sir George 
Young, 17 February. ‘This seems to be the old story of Colonial Office failure to chase governors [...].’ 
314
 TNA, CAB21/2923 Note to Rankin, Lord Chancellor’s Office, from Commander Eardley-Wilmot, Central 
War Plans, Cabinet Office, 12 April 1956, para 3. 
131 
 
The existence of the committee and the associated interdepartmental conflicts demonstrate 
that Whitehall was concerned with the CO’s handling of colonial affairs generally and there 
was pressure on the CO integrate its activities more closely into a more co-ordinated 
approach.
315
 In this case the evidence relates primarily to intelligence and military forces, but 
there appear to have been wider interests. The existence of the Cabinet Committee on 
Security in the Colonies could be seen as an example of a tendency to centralise power under 
the Cabinet Office. It is interesting that the committee’s two secretaries both evinced an anti 
CO feeling. This may reflect in part the secretaries’ appreciation of Templer’s views but there 
is also a sense that the CO simply did not respond to ordinary requests. 
 
One of the major features of Templer’s report is that he criticised the CO’s conception of its 
own role. He saw the CO as an ‘information’ addressee and not as an ‘action’ addressee. It is 
clear from various comments that Templer had been made aware of the constitutional 
limitations of the role of the CO and the way in which it operated to ‘advise and caution’ 
rather than to ‘direct’ so his criticism reflected a criticism of its very constitutional role in 
Whitehall. For a soldier like Templer (and presumably for other Whitehall departments with 
the possible exception of the CRO) the constitutional limitations were difficult to accept.  The 
conception of the role of the CO and its effects on the form of the intelligence machinery has 
already been discussed in previous chapters but here we see a graphic example of how this 
caused interdepartmental discord and made co-ordination of effort and information extremely 







The Recommendations of the Templer Report: 
 
The CO and the JIC and JIO: 
 
It is now necessary to turn to the relationship between the CO’s intelligence machinery and 
the JIC’s intelligence machinery. Prior to 1956 the CO had disseminated imperial information 
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and intelligence products in a number of different ways. The Secretary of State might, in 
important cases present information at cabinet meetings, information might be passed 
between officials from different departments either in committee or individually. The CO 
might pass information to the JIC but it was a constant complaint from the JIC that the CO 
didn't pass relevant information on. The CO had a long tradition of resistance to working with 
the JIC.  
 
The decision to integrate the CO into the JIC system fully made sense in terms of ‘national 
objectives’ but it also affected the internal balance of power in Whitehall. If the JIC and COS 
gained power the CO lost it. The specifics of the reforms to the CO-JIC relationship were 
three fold. Firstly the CO was made a charter member of the JIC; i.e. the Secretary of State 
for Colonies had the right to place items on the agenda of the JIC. This presumably was to 
address the CO’s objection that it had no input to the JIC. The second two developments were 
more profound. The CO was requested to send permanent representatives to contribute to the 
Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) at two levels. The first was the Heads of Section meeting at 
which various departments from across Whitehall had their input to the machinery and there 
was wide ranging discussion. The second was at the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) where 
representatives from the CO had the opportunity to contribute to drafting papers to be seen by 
the JIC itself.
317
 There were two parts to the JIS a senior team and a junior one. Both 
consisted of relatively junior military officers who wrote up submissions and prepared briefs 
for the JIC.  The composition of the JIS (as well as its place in the COS’ machinery) ensured 
there was an institutional bias towards a military perspective within the JIC.  
 
The JIC’s view of the CO on these points emerges through its correspondence with the COS 
whilst it was still a part of the COS machinery. The JIC produced a brief on the situation on 
25 April 1956,’ Colonial Office Cooperation with the JIC: Brief on the Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies’. The brief specifies the areas in which the CO was not co-
operating with the JIC a year after the Templer Report. It also provides a sense of ‘tone 
‘which is remarkable in a government document.  
 
JIC dissatisfaction came through very clearly in Para. 7-8:  
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 ‘However representation is not enough. No matter how many Colonial Office 
representatives attend either of these meetings, nothing will be achieved unless there is a 
change of heart and a new approach to the concept of Joint Intelligence by the Colonial 
Office. There appear to be two basic faults: 
  
(a) Failure to realise that cold war is global and simultaneous 
It does not appear to be appreciated in the CO that what happens, say, in Egypt today, 
can happen in the Gold Coast tomorrow. 
(b)  Resentment of what is thought to be interference in their exclusive area of 
responsibility. 
As a result their approach to Joint Intelligence work is dogmatic and insular. It is true 
they contribute but this generally consists of tabling a written statement on which they 
are not prepared to admit of discussion or amendment. 
  
Para 8 Thus whilst the Colonial Secretary can rightly claim that his departments 
contribute, it cannot be said to co-operate in the work of the Joint Intelligence 
Organisation. Not only this in every possible way the Colonial Office seek to avoid the 
tabling of papers or discussion of subjects pertaining to the Colonial Territories with the 
Joint intelligence Structure and appear to make it a point of principle , when 
interdepartmental discussion of a colonial subject is inevitable , to do this specifically 
outside the Joint Intelligence organization.’ 318  
 
Clearly the members of the JIC were not impressed with the CO’s position and wished 
matters to change. By implication the document also demonstrates the degree of autonomy 
and freedom held by the CO and its intelligence machinery outside of the Joint Intelligence 
Organisation. Tensions led to a conflict between the CO and the JIC between 1955and 1957. 
 
Rory Cormac has examined the situation from both the CO and JIC’s perspectives.319 The 
difficulty with his explanation is that he approaches the situation from the teleological 
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position that the JIC was the correct way forward in order to provide national intelligence co-




‘These various channels of communication allowed the JIC to be kept updated of 
colonial developments but notably did not allow the committee to take an active role. 
The JIC was restricted merely to passive updates which somewhat negated the JIC’s 
potential response in a situation where they were theoretically well placed to offer 
useful input. Colonial disturbances and the subsequent counterinsurgency operations 
often crossed the boundaries of traditional policy spheres by intersecting the foreign 
and colonial policy domains, as well as the military and political, and the local and the 
regional. The JIC, being inter-departmental committee assessing all-source intelligence, 
was well placed to offer input on such issues that could not be resolved by the CO 
alone.’321 
 
By approaching the debate from the JIC’s position with a sense that the JIC did become the 
national intelligence machinery he fails to fully appreciate the CO’s position or consider 
whether or not the CO’s machinery had the capacity to fulfil the needs of the other 
departments. The CO’s officials had been annoyed by pressure from the JIC and COS to 
implement the recommendations of the Templer Report.
322
 The CO was particularly annoyed 
by the JIC’s military bias and concentration of communist subversion which the CO believed 
did not do justice to the complexities of the colonial situation.
323
 From the CO’s perspective 
there was already a working system in place for transferring information and intelligence 
which suited its own needs and was based on older precedents. It must be remembered that 
CO officials were limited by both their perception of the CO’s constitutional role and 
committed to maintaining the prestige and autonomy of the CO for a complex series of 
reasons; political and social. 
   
The Secretary of State for Colonies provided information to Cabinet and cabinet committees, 
officials from geographical departments could communicate directly with those from other 
departments or work in interdepartmental committees. When there were colonial crises the 
traditional method was for the CO to act as the lead agency and to co-ordinate the overall 
                                                 
320
 Ibid. p.251. 
321
 Ibid. p.251. 
322
 Ibid. p.254. 
323
 Ibid. p.254 
135 
 
response from Whitehall. This generally occurred on a regional or individual colony basis 
and operational command of the situation, political, military, administrative, was generally 
delegated to that level. The passage of information followed this process. From this view 
point the Cabinet Office was fundamentally a ‘secretariat’ for the Cabinet, rather than a 
‘controller’ of subordinate specialist departments. The JIC was a specialised military 





For the CO information collecting and processing was an intrinsic part of the administrative 
process rather than a specialised area of activity. The CO’s definitions of intelligence 
particularly ‘political intelligence’ demonstrated this.  Templer described the conceptions of 
intelligence involved in the colonies but this had it has equal validity for the CO itself. 
 
‘Briefly what is wrong with the existing “intelligence” reports is that they tend to be too 
much like Situation Reports, dealing with things that have happened instead of being 
forward-looking documents, dealing with what looks like happening next, and drawing 
the necessary conclusions. This has of course, been largely because those responsible 
for their production were primarily interested in political reporting, and not in the 
collection, appreciation and use of security intelligence. It is almost impossible to draw 
a hard line between political and security intelligence material and it is indeed the duty 
of Governors to combine the two in a balanced appreciation. The two streams should, 
as recommended in the Colonial Office paper (GEN485/5), be joined together  as close 
to the source as possible; the security intelligence, provided by whatever source, should 
be considered in the light of the political intelligence produced by the representative of 
the Secretariat, or the Labour Department, or whatever it may be. , but there should be a 
clear distinction between “reports” which are primarily political and those which are 
primarily “intelligence”. At present the “Intelligence Report” is more often than not a 
“political monthly summary”; this is indeed more often than not this the LIC has been 
told to produce. This is wrong. The LIC product should be first and foremost an 
intelligence document; it should be kept quite separate from any monthly political 
summary the Governor may be called upon to produce. The LIC products should be 
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written for and received by, the new Intelligence Department of the CO (paragraphs 78-
40; the political report would continue to be received by the geographical departments 
each would of course be copied to other departments.’325 
 
The paragraph demonstrates major differences in the conception of intelligence between the 
CO and the rest of Whitehall which go to the heart of the difference between ‘administrative 
/political’ and ‘professional/security’ forms of intelligence and explains why the two were 
incompatible. The importance of degree of incompatibility is then further emphasised: 
  
‘[...] in the Colonial (and other) civil services [...]”intelligence” is often considered 
being a narrow if sensational function of the police. The administration is apt not to 
concern itself closely with the machinery for its collection and appreciation, or with its 
relation to security in the broadest sense. As a result security intelligence  has come to 
be regarded as a kind of spicy condiment added to the secretariat hot pot by a 
supernumerary and possibly superfluous cook, instead of being a carefully planned and 
expertly served dish of its own’ 326  
 
In consequence of these beliefs the CO’s relationship with the JIC was passive: it issued a 
monthly review of intelligence; communicated directly with service directors of intelligence; 
and contributed to War Office (WO) situation reports. Its representative on the JIC could 
update JIC members, but frequently did not attend JIC Heads of Section meetings, meaning 
the updates were frequently delivered after the event.
327
 When pushed by the JIC, COS, and 
FO in 1956 the officials in the CO urged the Secretary of State to attack the JIC directly. It 
did not like being forced to reform, and in particular to introduce a new department, the ISD, 
by a JIC which it regarded as internally flawed.
328
 The CO regarded ISD as a department 
which affected the constitutional relationship between the CO and colonial governments.
329
 
Templer’s criticism of the CO helps to explain the CO’s conception of intelligence, i.e. 
political administrative and the way in which the CO headed a hierarchy which lay outside 
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the JIC’s area of authority. This was an attempt to push the professional security based 
organisations out of central policy and decision making. 
   
Philip Davies also picks up on the differences between the CO and the central intelligence 
machinery. The Suez crisis of 1956 provided the impetus for change to the JIC’s role.  The 
JIC remained a COS committee working through the Minister of Defence until 1957. The 
members of the JIC sought to move the JIC into the Cabinet Office to reach the right decision 
makers. There were however objections from the CO. In February 1956 Carstairs argued that 
the proposed change posed  ‘complicated problems for his departments  ‘His concern was 
that the Colonial Office already had him and his departments to handle political intelligence 
as it affected defence whilst a more general political intelligence  was the affair of the 
political departments i.e. geographical departments of the CO.
330
 This would also mean the 
Cabinet Secretary would be able to influence matters even more partly through his 




The CO’s Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) and the Foreign Office’s 
Permanent Undersecretary’s Department (PUSD): 
 
Templer most important recommendation was that the CO should create two new 
departments: the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) and the Police Department to 
replace the single individual working in this area within the Defence Department.  The 
structure of the ISD was to be based on the PUSD of the Foreign Office which handled 
liaison between the FO and the intelligence services.
331
 The analogy between the ISD and the 
PUSD is a very important one. It demonstrates that Templer either did not fully understand 
the implications of the CO’s role and information gathering system or that he wanted to 
utterly change it. The problem was that the FO and the CO were very different despite a 
superficially similar system of geographical and technical departments. The geographical 
department were the paramount analytical bodies incorporating both political and 
administrative intelligence. The CO did not have its own intelligence service providing core 
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information about it primary role. (Although it could use the Security Service they did not 
control it in the same was that the FO controlled the SIS). Because the empire was regarded 
as an extension of domestic territory it was only given security intelligence organisations 
which were very different to those providing external intelligence services. SIS was tasked by 
other departments whilst the Security Service was largely self tasking in Britain and only 
provided limited services in the empire in the form of advice, liaison and training. Finally it 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the devolved nature of the core structure of the 
empire in which local issues were handled locally and the CO only intervened when matters 
were beyond local control. These differences meant the problem of controlling intelligence 
was very different in the two departments. It is necessary to look in detail at the differences 
between the two structures. 
 
PHJ Davies, quoting the ‘Departmental Allocation of Work in Foreign Office 1955’ 
described the duties of the PUSD as: 
 
'[...]maintain liaison with the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff; represent the 
Foreign Office on certain Inter Service Committees, in particular the Joint Intelligence 
and Joint Planning sub committees of the Chiefs of Staff. Coordinate exchange of 
scientific information. Provide the secretariat of the Permanent Under Secretary’s 
Committee (PUSC) which consists in the main of the Under Secretaries of the Foreign 
Office and has as its ongoing object to consider long-term questions of foreign policy 
and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State when appropriate[...]’ 332 
 
The PUSD did the multiple duties of managing FO relations with the intelligence community. 
It represented the interests of the intelligence machinery in the FO. It also used intelligence to 
consider long term policy. The PUSD machinery consisted of sub committees working to the 
PUSC including C Committee, which handled SIS, and an overseas planning staff which took 
over the Russia Committee's paramilitary planning work. 
  
The FO in this period had a much clearer focus than the CO. Its major conception of national 
interest was focussed on the Cold War and the threat of communism. Foreign intelligence 
was mainly focussed on this single and easily definable threat. By contrast the CO saw many 
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different local and regional threats in addition to the communist one and had other interests 
such as an interest in development which was not merely an adjunct to a counter subversion 
programme. The PUSD’s role in the integration of intelligence into policy in the FO was 
similar to those considered for the proposed PIS in the CO in 1948-49. In the CO the 
differences between regions and colonies meant that the Secretary of State and PUS were 
better off going directly to the geographical departments rather than dealing with a section 
simply collating material from those departments. Although the ISD compiled annual reviews 
of communism and other security trends and played a role in the reception and circulation of 
reports from the colonies there was no equivalent imperial interest. The FO focussed on 
communism but the CO had a much wider view of what affected ‘trends in empire’. 
   
The PUSD authorised politically hazardous intelligence collection operations. The FO could 
veto such operations and this was vitally important after 1952 when covert operations carried 
out by SIS failed. In May 1952 approvals in principle were ended. ‘Requests for the approval 
of operations were made through the JIC Chairman as Supervising Under Secretary of the 
PUSD.  PUSD cleared activity with FO geographical departments before submission to the 
Permanent Secretary.  Originators had to certify the Chiefs of Staff already knew about the 
plans. An FO Adviser was established in the SIS to approve and supervise plans there.
333
 By 
contrast until the later stages of empire operational decisions were made at local level in the 
colonial government because it was their resources which were being used. They could seek 
advice from the CO but were generally left to get on with it. Clearly given the size of the 
empire direct control of the operational level of activity on a global scale would have been a 
major task for any department in the CO.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the PUSD’s duties and those of the JIC. The JIC could 
receive intelligence reports direct from the SIS.  The PUSD liaised between the Foreign 
Office and the Secret Intelligence Service and its structures. The PUSD funded SIS and 
approved or passed for approval certain operations.  It acted as a ‘cut out’ between covert 
activity and the bureaucracy of the FO. The PUS also sat with other PUS’ on the Permanent 
Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security (PSIS).
334
 It seems that the PUSD also 
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passed intelligence reports from SIS to other departments in the Foreign Office. By contrast 
the CO tended to combine aspects of the JIC and PUSD’s role in its own internal 
management structure based on the geographical departments.  
 
It is necessary to consider the allocation of duties to the ISD and its successors over the 
period in order to chart the approach taken by the CO to these issues. The allocation of duties 
to the ISD was described in the Colonial Office List. It is apparent that they changed over 
time as intelligence police and defence duties of the office were combined in different ways. 
In 1956 the ISD was to provide general guidance to Colonial Governments on handling of 
liaison with security intelligence bodies in the UK and protective security except in the 
CO.
335
 In 1958 intelligence from colonial territories, intelligence organisations in colonial 
territories were added. In 1959 it became the Intelligence, Police and Security Department 
(IPSD). 
  
From 1959-1960 the IPSD’s duties included: intelligence organisations and security training 
in colonial territories; colonial police questions, civil defence, liaison with the Home Office 
on police matters , emergency regulations; liaison with security and intelligence bodies in 
UK, protective security except in the CO; general liaison with military authorities. In 1961 




In 1962-1963 IPSD and Defence departments were merged into the Defence, Intelligence, 
and Security Department (DISD) whose duties were: ‘intelligence and security matters in 
colonial territories, colonial police questions, civil defence, emergency powers, and liaison 
with security and intelligence bodies in the UK. General liaison with military authorities on 
colonial intelligence, colonial defence, colonial forces, military flights over colonies, visiting 
forces, colonial military legislation, military land, Overseas Defence Committee, censorship, 
war histories, and disarmament. 
  
In 1964-65 DISD became the Defence Intelligence and Hong Kong Department (DIHK).  
They continued with the duties above but added security aspects of immigration and travel 
control, liaison with Chiefs of Staff and Joint Planning Staff, Hong Kong, civil defence, 
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liaison with security and intelligence bodies in UK disarmament.
337
 The addition of 
‘geographical duties for the colony of Hong Kong may suggest either that the departments 
was seen as less important or reflect the fact that Hong Kong had major signals intelligence 
facilities which were tied into GCHQ. Finally in 1965 it was renamed the Defence and 
Intelligence Department (DI). 
 
Although no doubt incomplete, these allocations of duties demonstrate some of the 
differences between PUSD and ISD in practice. The ISD was focussed on security 
intelligence issues. It had much wider liaison duties than the PUSD because it the CO did not 
'own' the Security Service.  Its personnel did not exclusively handle CO representation in the 
British intelligence machinery with other departments; these could be handled by 
geographical departments as well. It handled intelligence material. It is interesting that 
despite the changes of name and allocations of duty over time it was still being referred to as 
ISD colloquially in the department throughout suggesting that there was a core element 
which remained identifiably the same. 
  
The CO, the Security Service, the FO, and the SIS: 
 
The relationship between the Security Service and the CO was not the same as that between 
SIS and the FO. The FO had direct responsibility for the Secret Intelligence Service in a way 
that was very different to the Security Service’s relationship with the CO. The FO provided 
the chairman of the JIC. It had responsibility for Britain's overseas relationships with 
independent countries and it largely relied upon diplomacy and influence which made its role 
more difficult than that of the CO in colonial territories where a degree of co-operation from 
the colonial security apparatus might be expected. The FO and the SIS had an active role in 
the Cold War from the beginning. Bevin had approved active measures against the Soviet 
Union in Special Operations (SO), Special Political Action (SPA), propaganda and a number 
of other areas. The FO was in consequence directly involved in planning and approving 
paramilitary operation and counter subversion operations against foreign states. It controlled 
the Information Research Department (IRD) which was actively involved in creating in 
creating black, grey and white propaganda with the SIS. In other words it had a role in the 
direct management of such activity. By contrast the CO relied upon the colonial governments 
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to use their police, military forces, information services and administration to carry out any 
campaigns. Colonial governments retained a degree of autonomy about how they did this. 
Secondly the CO did not directly control or task the Security Service. It did not need to 
finance all of its operations directly. Security Service operational assets could be managed by 
colonial governors with minimal problems. They worked within formal government 
structures reducing the overall political risks. Their main role was to provide advice, liaison 
and training; whilst operations were carried out by local Special Branches. The Security 
Service’s approach was not generally risky so the ISD was more concerned with liaison than 
control.  Because the CO had a world view which stressed the ‘local nature’ of most threats it 
generally did not see it as necessary to contemplate centrally organised global campaigns 
such as the ones which the British government started to develop against communism. 
Despite its views the CO became increasingly involved in Counter-Subversion but in practice 
it did not have its own machinery. Technical /specialised input was received from the IRD for 
example. Therefore ISD had less of a managerial role than the PUSD. 
 
The use of the PUSD as an example to be copied in the CO raised difficulties because of the 
differences between the departments. Did Templer merely mean to give the CO an 
organisation which could be a ‘one stop’ organisation on intelligence matters providing 
advice, liaison, training and possibly some degree of assessment or did he have a wider 
ambition? Did he simply misunderstand the role of the PUSD and the CO and fail to see that 
the departments would need to be very different? Was the CO to conduct operations as a 
proxy for the central organisations or was it merely to be made more effective in managing its 
own intelligence machinery? Was it possible that he envisaged the CO developing a much 
more active role in counter subversion? Templer was interested in subversion and counter 
subversion and acutely aware of the limited military resources available. Certainly in his 
report he rails against the passivity of the CO in the empire generally and part of his intention 
was to make it easier to ‘act’ in security and intelligence matters.  
 
There is evidence of the CO’s machinery being adapted for counter-subversion. Templer had 
suggested grouping particular departments under a single AUS and this appears to have been 
implemented.   An examination of the 1955 organisational table could be interpreted as 
creating a central core of organisations capable of implementing some centrally controlled 
approach to global communism similar to that in the FO. Templer had suggested that the CO 





 In 1955 the AUS responsible for these departments also obtained responsibility for 
Information Services in the Colonial Office.
339
 The result was that the CO ended up with an 
organisation which looks as if it could have been designed to facilitate counter-subversion. 
Confirmation of this suspicion however must wait upon examination of the files of the CO’s 
Information Services.  
 
At the same time it is clear at this time that the CO was being integrated into greater Cabinet 
structures dealing with counter-subversion. In 1956 the decision to create an Official 
Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies showed how the CO was being integrated.  
Although it was under the general control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies the CO 
was forced to accept membership from the FO, CRO and the intelligence services whilst the 
FO was allowed to have its own committee with no intervention from other departments. 
There was also an intention to integrate the committees by using the same personnel. Brook 
had hoped that Dean  who had a number of other roles would be Chairman but recognised 
that this would upset the  CO so he took over the Chairmanship himself thus lessening the 
CO’s role whilst leaving  the  Secretary of State a ‘fig leaf’ of control.  
 
The other clear influence on Templer’s ideas of how intelligence should be managed came 
from his time in military intelligence as a consumer, as Director Military Intelligence, and 
from his time as High Commissioner in Malaya. In Templer’s eyes the ISD was supposed to 
operate in clear command hierarchy dealing with ‘security’ intelligence particularly 
‘forewarning of threat’. Cormac comments on how Templer’s acceptance of dual threats, 
local nationalism and the possibility of Russian intervention in its support but in practice 




Differences between the ISD and PIS: 
 
The Intelligence and Security departments also seems to be a different concept to the Political 
Intelligence Section (PIS) which had been proposed in 1948-49 and again in 1953.As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2  there were a number of different views about the role of the 
proposed  PIS. The main idea however was to have a section receiving information relevant 
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to empire from elsewhere in Whitehall and to process this a way which helped to develop 
colonial policy  i.e. in a way it was a little like an internal JIC. Other views saw it as a body 
for collating intelligence from empire for the benefit of ministers and the rest of Whitehall. It 
might have been conceived as a small study body reporting direct to ministers or as a 
collating cell but there no mention  in the discussion of liaison with British intelligence and 
security bodies or management of colonial intelligence as a whole, which were probably seen 




The Templer Report, the CO, and the Security Service: 
 
The Security Service had a direct responsibility to the Secretary of State for Colonies for the 
provision of advice liaison and training through the provision of staff to colonial 
governments. The relationship between the CO and the Security Service took place at two 
levels. In Whitehall the CO liaised directly with the Security Service on imperial matters. All 
departments in the CO could approach it directly on matters of concern. 
 
In 1954 before the Templer Report a Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA) from the Security 
Service had been appointed to the CO whose task was to travel the empire inspecting colonial 
intelligence machinery and providing advice and liaison Templer recommended that this 
system was strengthened by giving the SIA a number of deputies (DSIA) to improve his 
capacity. The appointment of the SIA was very important because it placed a Security 
Service officer inside the CO itself and gave the Security Service the opportunity to 
implement its professional agenda in both the CO and the colonial governments. This 
development might almost be described as a professional colonisation of the CO’s own 
intelligence machinery. Yet the appointment of the SIA does not seem to have generated the 
opposition inside the CO that the Templer Report's recommendations and JIC's ideas did. 
Perhaps this was because the Security Service had a duty to the CO.  
 
Templer made recommendations on the role of the Security Service in the empire. He made 
specific recommendations about the role of the Security Liaison Officers (SLO) when 
supporting colonial governments. He advocated a model of intelligence machinery in each 
colony where the Security Service would supply a Director of Intelligence (DofI). This 
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appears to have fallen flat in part because the Security Service did not have the manpower to 
supply every colony with such a figure and because the costs would have to have been born 
by individual colonies. Nonetheless certain colonies did adopt such a position. This was a 
complex area and there was a considerable debate about the role of the DofI which had 
originated in Malaya. He discussed the role of the SLOs and advocated that they be 
developed into ‘Security Service Representatives’ (SSR) with a more interventionist role, 
actively advising Governors on intelligence matters. Whilst these were not adopted the SLOs 
did become progressively more important where they existed. There were however, some 
surprising omissions such as British Guiana which was managed by the SLO from Trinidad.  
 
It is clear that he was advocating the Security Service’s view of what constituted good 
practice, in the colonies. Indeed the appointment of the SIA and the adoption of the Kenya 
model machinery demonstrated the success of direct Security Service intervention in the 
CO’s organisation. It is interesting however that the Security Service was partially effective 
because its intervention was framed in a way which reflected existing practice in the CO; the 
SIA was an Adviser and there was precedent.  The advisory post of PA/IGCP had been a 
relatively recent creation which directly influenced the creation of the SIA. It is clear that 
Templer agreed with these reforms since he used it to produce the standard model he 




The Police Department: 
 
Templer also recommended the creation of a police department to improve the quality of 
colonial police forces. The CO’s police professionalization agenda was important because the 
police formed the matrix in which the Special Branch, the colonial professional intelligence 
machinery, sat and from which its personnel were largely recruited. Prior to Templer, police 
matters had been handled in the Defence Department and predominantly by the Police 
Adviser/ Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP).  The IGCP was merely an adviser 
although making him a ‘director’ of the police service had been discussed in 1948-49. It was 
decided that a central director of colonial police was unconstitutional because of the role of 
the colonial governments and local governors. The IGCP toured the empire inspecting forces 
on a triennial basis. He made a report on each which was submitted to both the Governor and 
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the CO geographical departments concerned. The Governor decided on what 
recommendations to implement after consideration of local finances. The geographical 
departments then corresponded with both and the whole process could take years. 
  
Existing trends in the development of police forces: 
 
A colonial police model started to emerge. Whilst there was a long term trend in official 
thinking in the CO which wanted to move towards British/Metropolitan practices it was 
recognised that colonial policing operated in a violent context. Armed paramilitary groups 
were recommended in most colonies i.e. forces were generally armed, but they also contained 
specialist bodies organised along military lines and equipped with transport, communications, 
and heavier weapons like the General Service Unit in Kenya. Special Branches were seen as a 
way of managing political violence although surprisingly not all colonies possessed them.  
 
The CO had created a Colonial Police Service in 1936, based presumably on the Indian 
model, in which expatriate gazetted officers became part of a service under the control of the 
Secretary of State. After the appointment of the PA /IGCP this system was used to gain 
control over the appointment and promotion of senior officers. The system gave the CO an 
important tool for controlling police development and for minimising the local control of 
police forces on technical matters. Technical channels also favoured the development of 
Whitehall centralisation since they bypassed the administrative machinery with its loyalties to 
the CO. No equivalent of the discretionary HO grant, which was such a potent tool for 
centralisation, existed for colonial police forces but after the Second World War the CO 
sometimes used colonial development funds and later special subventions from the Treasury 
to reform police forces when the colonial governments did not have the necessary resources.  
The CO corresponded with the HO over police reforms. It recruited British officers to inspect 
colonial forces with the assistance of the HO. These developments were intended to fix what 
Templer described as ‘lack of intelligence mindedness’. Templer specifically described the 
process of receiving and collating information in the geographical departments and then 
circulating it to subject departments and finally reabsorbing it. This process was 
exceptionally slow and meant that even though advisers had tried to reform colonial 





One of the ways in which the colonial police model was promulgated was by visits of 
inspection by experienced police officers acting as police advisers (PA). The first permanent 
PA appointed in 1948 was appointed to improve the efficiency of the police in internal 
security roles. The IGCP and the new SIA seemed to work harmoniously at a professional 
level.  The IGCPs role in security intelligence did not entirely disappear when the SIA was 
appointed in 1955. There were some tensions. Sir Thomas Lloyd and Sir Charles Jeffries both 
would have preferred the Kenyan review to be carried out by the Metropolitan Special 
Branch in liaison with the Home Office whilst the Governor preferred in the end to ask for 
Security Service support. The ICGCP had an important influence over intelligence 
development because had responsibility for selecting expatriate police officers for 
appointments in the colonies although he did consult with the SIA on Special Branch 
appointments. As a career manager his views had weight with ambitious colonial police 
officers. He had an increasing input to training. As an inspector and training planner he could 
shape ‘good practice’. 
 
Templer’s decision to model the CO’s Police Department on the HO’s Police Department 
raises more questions. The Home Secretary in England had three powers. 
341
 Firstly he had 
the power of the purse; English and Welsh police force received half their budges from 
central government when they were adjudged to be ‘efficient by His Majesty’s Inspectors of 
Constabulary (HMI). The HO also controlled the HMI who made the necessary inspection.  
The HO could also make regulations covering discipline, terms of service, and pensions. This 
was an interesting precedent. Scholarship about the development of the British police tends to 
suggest that the HO consistently sought to centralise control of the police from the nineteenth 
century.
342
 This was achieved in a number of ways.  Firstly the HO controlled the 
discretionary element of police budgets and the process of inspection by HMI of 
Constabulary which determined ‘efficiency’. The HO had partial control of the purse. 
Secondly the HO started to consult directly with police commanders on matters of state 
security, avoiding the watch committees. Systems for police forces to support each other in 
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the event of mass unrest existed prior to the First World War and such measures were 
extended during it. The HO could alter police structures in war time and these reforms, which 
generally reduced the number of police forces, generally remained in force afterwards. War 
planning created direct links between Chief Constables and central government imposed 
administrative districts or regions to deal with war time regulations. Between the wars the 
HO also acted to encourage the development of shared resources such as wireless stations and 
forensic activity and the HO directly controlled the Metropolitan Police and consequently the 
Special Branch. Indeed for a short time after the First World War they set up a HO 
Directorate of Intelligence which directly competed with the Security Service. If Templer 
fully understood the nature of the HO’s Police Department then it seems he wanted the CO’s 
Police Department to centralise control of the colonial police in administrative and logistical 
ways. This would improve police morale and loyalty and make it a more effective force for 
carrying out security duties. In 1956 the duties of the CO’s Police department were:  General 
Colonial Police questions including relations between Police and Administration; problems 
affecting police forces in constitutionally advanced territories; civil defence. 
343
 In 1957 
liaison with Home Office on police matters   was added and in 1958 colonial police 
questions, civil defence liaison with Home Office on police matters and emergency 







The CO and the collecting end: 
  
Templer’s report not only discussed the change needed in the CO itself but also laid out a 
standardised model for the colonial intelligence machinery. The model consisted of a Local 
Intelligence Committee (LIC) to replicate the function both managerial and in terms of 
assessment-making to advise the Governor and a Special Branch to carry out collection. The 
LIC replicated the functions of the JIC in Britain and provided assessment for the colonial 
government and managed intelligence gathering within the colony.   This was sometimes 
supported but not always by a series of lower level committees which matched those of the 
administrative and police hierarchy. These normally were developed at District and 
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Provincial level. Each of the lower level committees was associated with the local war 
executive committee where an insurgency existed but were intended to  act as collection 
points and  fusion cells and in which information needed for local activity was collected and 
other information passed up to the central intelligence committee. 
  
The development of the colonial intelligence machinery has been much more frequently 
discussed in scholarly work but there appear to be some specific points about Templer’s 
reforms which were to have a special effect on the CO. Firstly the new machinery was 
designed to produce information suitable for Whitehall management of the security problem 
rather than for the CO or colonial government’s management.  The LIC’s reports focussed on 
the military need for forecasting political development. As such they represented a major 
change in the purpose of the intelligence machinery. This was a direct attack on the role and 
form of the machinery the CO and the colonial governments advocated. The new reports met 
the needs of the COS and to a lesser extent the needs of the JIC.  It also represented a 
strengthening of the ‘professional’ intelligence machinery with its police and security bias 
and thus altered the internal balance of the various elements within the CO itself. Finally 
standardising the intelligence products used on a regular basis (and it must not be forgotten 
that there were other products such as ‘studies’ which have not survived) tended to focus 
their content in a specific way.  
  
These LICs were manned by Colonial Service and Colonial Police personnel for the most 
part, with the occasional SLO or Director of Intelligence from the Security Service and the 
British armed forces. This composition allowed the CO to resist reform to some extent. 
Governors like Hugh Foot for example bypassed the LIC by submitting their own reports to 
the CO in advance of the LIC ones. 
 
 Administrators tried to retain primacy over the proceedings but were limited because of the 
tendency to rely more and more upon the local SB for information especially as the 
administrative staff was indigenised. The SB was the subject of Security Service training 
courses and advice which tried to make them separate from the CO and in some ways 
independent. The Colonial Service was also very short of manpower so the ideal of attaching 
a long term administrative officer trained by the Security Service, as secretary to the LIC, 
was not often achieved. This may have left more and more of the business of these 
committees in the hands of intelligence professionals. It is interesting that not only were SB 
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officers circulated around empire on posting but that many of the more able one s were 
absorbed into the Security Service. 
  
More and more information was gathered through Special Branches as the specialists in 
‘security’ information and it became more and more important as indigenisation grew- this 
meant that the information reaching the CO for its various purposes was becoming more 
security orientated. Templer was much more specific about what the ideal form of a SB 
should be. Previous guidance had asked colonial governments to create SBs rather than 
relying upon CIDs to perform political duties. Here there was a clash of models, practices, 
and language of which it is necessary to be careful. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch 
(the main model) had existed within the CID. Indian Police CIDs had had either a political 
section or a SB within the CID (there was a range of variations). The Security Service’s 
preferred option, which had emerged out of the Malayan experience, was a SB completely 
separated from the CID in terms of its personnel, command arrangements, and physical 
location. When Templer spoke about SBs he meant a separate agency under its own Assistant 
Commissioner of Police reporting directly to the commissioner yet, and this is the strange 
part, the control of these duties was still considered to be a police activity. The Security 
Service model was not exported but it is not entirely clear why. In England the Security 
Service used the SB to make arrests and to carry out some of the investigations although its B 
Branch also had investigators and intelligence officers who ran agents. The Security Service 
model had only been exported to Malaya in 1938-39 largely to prepare for the security issues 
which were likely to occur as a result of war.  
 
The Head of Special Branch’s duties were not mentioned directly but he had a seat on the 
LIC and did not necessarily report operationally through the commissioner of police. He was 
responsible for the internal working of the Special Branch itself and under the Templer model 
he must have been considered the conduit for implementing the LIC's targets. Presumably 
however he also had considerable input to the targeting process. The police, as a uniformed 
force, seem to have been more security intelligence ‘minded’ and were to play a large part in 
creating the kind of products Templer wanted.  
 
Finally Templer targeted the administrators who traditionally had an anti intelligence bias. 
This was not true of all, some individuals, such as the Chief Secretary of Palestine, Sir John 
Shaw, were intelligence minded from practical experience, but many were relatively liberal 
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and disliked security activity. Templer recommendations about the relationship between the 
LIC and Governor meant that the professionals had a voice in intelligence matters and could 
submit dissenting reports to the governor and administrators. Templer also wanted 
administrators serving as secretaries of LICs to undergo specialised training with the Security 
Service although this was not always possible. The LIC system thus became a way of 
impressing intelligence mindedness on colonial governments.  
 
Once Templer reforms were formally circulated to colonial governments in Circular 458/56 
dated 28 April 1956, the main shape of the colonial intelligence model had been established 
and only minor development was considered. Further Circulars modified the basic system by 
instituted additional reports such as Periodical Reviews of Local Intelligence which 
essentially assessed the local priority of threats. 
345
  There were also modifications to the 






The Templer Report was initiated as a result of a number of different pressures including 
interdepartmental conflicts and events. The armed forces and FO were able to force the CO to 
adopt a similar definition of intelligence but there reforms were not completely adopted and 
CO resistance continued. Some of the reforms demonstrated that the initiators did not 
understand either the role or the internal workings of the CO. They wished the CO to adopt a 
very different role which fitted in with their own view of what it should do.When 
recommendations were made they often failed to fully understand the administrative context 
in which they would have to operate as the role formation of the ISD demonstrated clearly. 
  
Templer’s recommendations were not entirely new; they drew upon the collective experience 
of the Security Service and the colonial police. They were intended to change the intelligence 
system from one which suited the CO to one which suited the rest of Whitehall. This included 
integrating the CO hierarchy of machinery into the hierarchy headed by the JIC altering the 
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balance between the professional intelligence element and the administrators in both the 
colonial governments and the CO. Templer was driven by his professional experience and the 
needs of the military establishment which shaped his personal view of the purpose of the 
machinery. 
   
New problems, however, were developing as the machinery was prepared to perform two 
roles after colonial independence. Firstly it had to provide internal security for the new state it 
supported and secondly it had to continue to provide the British with information relative to 
its national interests and Cold War problems. This had to be achieved during a handover 
process which the British needed to control until the last possible minute. The process of 




























The development and hand over of the ‘imperial’ intelligence machinery 1956-1966 
 
The Colonial Office, Whitehall, the British and colonial intelligence machinery:  
 
After 1957 the Colonial Office (CO) continued to resist intelligence reform but in a more 
muted way. The CO was gradually incorporated into a more centralised colonial policy which 
incorporated more of the intelligence produced by British professional intelligence 
machinery. The main focus for the development of the intelligence machinery had changed. It 
was now to develop machinery to secure British intelligence needs in the longer term, to 
prevent communist intervention in the colonies, and to secure local governments from 
communist subversion rather than providing information to enable the CO to supervise 
colonial governments. These aims had to be implemented by developing processes for 
handing over the machinery and by creating British machinery to deal with British needs. 
During the transitional phase of decolonisation it was necessary to modify the intelligence 
machinery at all levels and responsibility for British intelligence needs moved between a 
number of agencies. During this period the security elements of the CO now advocated 
intelligence ‘models’ whilst the civil sections continued to seek to limit and modify them. 
 
During decolonisation the intelligence machinery had to be prepared for handover to the 
successor state. The British also had to ensure ongoing intelligence liaison and this required 
modification of structures. This process was complicated by a number of factors. There were 
changes in the British professional intelligence machinery to reflect changes in the British 
administrative structure which included the amalgamation of the Colonial Office (CO), 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), and Foreign Office (FO) into the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) by 1968. The British professional intelligence machinery was 
also affected by professional and technical changes. Both affected the development of the 
imperial intelligence machinery and provided a developing context for its development. 
Finally the CO and the rest of Whitehall became progressively more directly involved in the 
management of the colonial intelligence machinery. Special intelligence machinery was 
created to parallel that due to be handed over to ease the process of handover and maintain 
control until the last possible minute. The first section will deal with developments in the 
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British administrative and professional intelligence machinery and consider its implications 
on the process of intelligence management. The CO (and its successors) and the Security 
Service had to work out a standardised process for handover of the local intelligence 
machinery. This was different in ‘friendly’ and ‘hostile’ decolonisation processes. The 
chapter will examine the ‘friendly’ process in Ceylon, Malaya, and Gold Coast, the complex 
and less friendly handover in Northern Rhodesia, and the hostile handover in British Guiana 
from the perspective of the CO and Whitehall.  Finally the chapter will examine how the 
process of handover in British Guiana had much wider implications for understanding the 




The development of the British administration and British intelligence machinery: 
  
As the administration in Whitehall developed there was a re-arrangement of the British 
machinery for dealing with intelligence matters. The gradual absorption of the CO and CRO 
via the Commonwealth Office into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) led to 
different approaches to intelligence collection. The FO, the dominant partner in the merger, 
had its own intelligence history, approaches, and precedents which were firmly entrenched in 
the British professional machinery such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and SIS. 
Intelligence co-ordination and management at a national level however was increasingly 
moving to the Cabinet Office. This office had its own approach, shaped in part by the 
personalities of the Cabinet Secretaries Sir Norman Brooke and Sir Burke Trend. The Cabinet 
Office (CAB) machinery was developed into three interlocking hierarchies: intelligence; 
policy; and planning. In 1957 the JIC was integrated into the Cabinet Office machinery.  
With administrative amalgamation the membership of the JIC changed; the CO lost its seat 
on amalgamation with the CRO in 1966 and later the Commonwealth Office (which had had 
a predominantly diplomatic focus and thus some synergy with the FO) lost its seat in 1968 to 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in which the former FO’s influence was 
predominant. The process continually lessened the residual influence of the CO’s officials 
and their specific worldview.  This meant that over time the imperial machinery reported to 
different bodies in the British administrative machinery although in practice the CO 
personnel dealing with intelligence matters moved to the Commonwealth Office  and the 
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Security Service took back the SIA but kept him dealing with the same duties providing a 
greater degree of continuity  than might be expected.  
 
The centralisation of the intelligence and policy making in the Cabinet Office: 
 
The thesis has already examined the role of the Cabinet Office in relation to the Templer 
Report and accepted Cormac’s argument about the way in which the CO played a part in 
causing the JIC to move from the Chief of Staff (COS) machinery to the Cabinet Office 
machinery in 1957.  The move made the JIC more responsive to civil departments and a 
maker of national rather than military assessments. The JIC continued to build its influence 
over the colonial machinery by providing technical advice and liaison. Very soon after 1957 
the Cabinet Office intelligence and policy making machinery was reformed which gave the 
Cabinet Office an even more powerful position in the British machinery.
347
 By the mid 1950s 





At the top of the intelligence hierarchy was a Ministerial Intelligence Committee. Under this 
were the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security Services (PSIS). 
PSIS was chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. Under this came the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC), the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) and the JIC secretariat. The FO chaired the JIC. Both 
the CO and the CRO had seats on the JIC along with Defence and the intelligence services. In 




The security machinery consisted of the Ministerial Committee on Security supported by an 
Official Committee on Security (S (O)). The official committee had representatives of the 
Home Office, FO and Defence and JIC members (including Security Service and SIS). It was 
chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and attended after 1968 by the Intelligence Coordinator. 
  
The policy machinery consisted of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee from 
October 1963 (formed from an amalgamation of the Defence and Oversea Policy 
Committees), consisted of a ministerial committee supported by an Official Committee on 
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Overseas Policy and Defence (OPD (O)). The ministerial committee was chaired by the 
Prime Minister and the Official Committee by the Cabinet Secretary.
350
  There was an 
Overseas and Defence Policy Staff.  The chairman of the JIC sat on OPD (O) as did the 
Intelligence Coordinator from 1968.
351
 Under this was the Joint Action Committee to deal 




The Cabinet Secretary worked closely with the Prime Minister and was able to intervene in a 
large number of areas.  This was one of the most important informal factors in causing the 
growth of the Cabinet Office’s influence. Both Sir Norman Brook353 and Sir Burke Trend354 
were powerful and well informed figures personally interested in the intelligence machinery. 
The Cabinet Secretary chaired various pivotal committees including: the Permanent 
Secretaries Intelligence and Security Committee (PSIS) committee, which financed and later 
from 1968 set intelligence priorities at a national level; the Official Committee on Security, 
S(O), which performed the same function for security matters. The Intelligence Coordinator 
appointed in 1968 was a Cabinet Office official. 
   
As the policy making activity of the British government was centralised the Cabinet 
Secretaries and the Cabinet machinery had more influence over colonial activity. Sir Norman 
Brook served on the Official Committee on Communism Overseas and chaired the Colonial 
Policy Committee and the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies 
amongst many others.
355
  This development shows how Cabinet Office influence waxed 
whilst that of other departments waned. Tom Bower argued that many senior officers in the 
Civil Service such as the PUS of the Home Office, Sir Frank Newsam, took little direct 
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The integration of the CO and CRO and their intelligence machinery: 
 
There were a number of changes in the Colonial and Cabinet Offices in this period which 
may have affected the CO’s approaches to intelligence work. The Cabinet Secretary changed 
from Sir Norman Brook to Sir Burke Trend in 1962. There were three Colonial Secretaries in 
the key period: Macleod from October 1959-October 1961; Maudling from October 1961 to 
July 1962; and Sandys from July 1962- October 1964. Macleod was a centrist and ‘supported 
decolonisation. Sandys was of the conservative right and a staunch anti-communist and, as 
the situation in Aden demonstrated, was inclined to interventionism. Ministerial enthusiasms 
were however limited by the permanent officials. The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) of 
the CO changed in this period from Sir John Macpherson August 1956-August 1959 to Sir 
Hilton Poynton from 1959 August to 1963. Both were long term CO officials familiar with its 
policies and likely to have kept departmental world views alive. 
  
The machinery for dealing with colonial affairs at departmental level was also undergoing 
alteration and development. The Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) took over the duties 
of the Colonial Office (CO) as colonies came to self government. During the period of self 
government both departments undertook liaison to smooth the transition. The relationship 
between the two departments was acrimonious, particularly in relation to the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Discussions about a potential amalgamation of the CO and CRO 
started as early as 1954 but did not come to fruition until 1966 with the creation of the 
Commonwealth Office.
357
 In addition certain activities were handed from the CO to the 
Department of Technical Development, later the Ministry of Overseas Development. In 1966 
when the CO and the CRO were amalgamated into the Commonwealth Office the problem 
was handled by dividing the new office into two divisions the Commonwealth and Dependent 
Territories Divisions.
358
 The amalgamation of departments of state altered the context in 
which the imperial intelligence machinery operated. Firstly the amalgamations changed the 
‘traditional’ departmental approaches to colonial and intelligence policy. Secondly the 
intelligence structures themselves were altered necessitating amendment of channels of 
communication and the hierarchy in which information was passed, collated, and analysed. 
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As previously discussed the CO had headed its own semi-autonomous intelligence hierarchy 
until 1956 when it was incorporated more closely into the British machinery as a ‘Charter 
Member’ of the JIC. Even after this, the CO was still prone to be ‘difficult’ about colonial 
affairs with other departments in Whitehall and with foreign powers like the United States.
359
  
The CO needed to work more closely with the CRO as colonies moved to self government. 
This change resulted in the incorporation of the CRO more firmly into the British intelligence 
machinery. The CRO obtained a seat on the JIC in 1955.
360
 The internal structure of the CRO 
was essentially ‘functional’ rather than ‘geographical’. Traditionally it had dealt with 
intelligence matters by receiving despatches from Governors and Governors General. During 
the interwar years it started to receive despatches from the network of British High 
Commissioners and information from direct liaison with dominion High Commissioners 
appointed to London.
361
 The CRO’s intelligence machinery was split over a number of areas. 
The CRO's Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Divisions dealt with the foreign and internal 
affairs of the dominions respectively. Military issues, and later liaison with the Joint 
Intelligence Organisation, were handled by the Defence and Principal Staff Officer’s 
Departments. Communism and the Trades Unions were dealt with firstly in Political Affairs 
until 1953-54 when they became the responsibility of the, oddly named, Communications 
Department led by Cyril Grove Costley-White. As mentioned previously this probably grew 




Communism was a major area of interest because of the Cold War. Costley-White 
corresponded with the British High Commissioners over matters such as the distribution of 
IRD propaganda and about Britons spying for Russia in Australia. The CRO seems to have 
operated on the behalf of the FO in these matters. In the case of Australia the British High 
Commissioner spoke directly to the Minister of External Affairs R.G. Casey and the Prime 
Minister’s Department.363  Costley-White was very anti SIS and was apparently a very 
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difficult individual, perhaps because of pain from a medical condition which kept him in a 
wheel chair.
364
  The CRO was very pro ‘Commonwealth’ and consequently supported the 
Attlee Doctrine which meant the Security Service was the lead intelligence agency and SIS 




This particular development meant that between 1956/7 when the first colonies achieved self 
government and 1966 when the CO was absorbed, the responsibility for intelligence 
machinery and duties at the ‘receiving end’ were split between two competing departments 
and then between two divisions of the same department. The way in which the intelligence 
functions were amalgamated in the new Commonwealth Office is unclear. It is probably that 
the various elements simply continued to exist as they stood given the very short time before 
the Commonwealth Office was amalgamated with the FO, but now worked within a single 
departmental structure. The CO retained the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA), and his 
deputy and the Inspector General of Colonial Police /Police Adviser (IGCP) who by this 
stage worked out of a department which combined defence, police, and intelligence duties 
which had responsibility for liaison with the British machinery.
366
 The SIA moved back to 




The remaining colonies now sent LIC reports to the geographical and ‘defence’ departments 
in the CO for consideration until 1965/66 when remaining colonies reported to the 
Independent Territories Division of the Commonwealth Office. Once self government was 
granted, self governing colonies ‘copied’ the reports to the CRO as well. From 1965/66 given 
the incomplete absorption of the CO this probably continued. The CRO appointed an 
adviser/liaison officer to work with the colonial government and governor. At colonial level 
administrative activity was split and some functions were retained under British control a 
similar to the system of diarchy used in India and different departmental objectives and 
cultures obviously complicated the intelligence production process. 
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To add to the complications the role of the Commonwealth Office now overlapped with that 
of the Foreign Office.  After the Plowden Report in 1965 it was decided to unify overseas 
personnel of the CRO and the FO into HM Diplomatic Service.
368
 Whilst the withdrawal of 
the Security Service’s Security Liaison Officers (SLO) from colonies and Commonwealth 
states in 1966 appears to have been driven by their cost, the general process of administrative 
centralisation may well explain the decision to make the empire the responsibility of the SIS. 
These administrative changes affected the British and imperial intelligence machinery 
because responsible ministers, the civil servants dealing with intelligence and the reporting 
lines for the colonial intelligence machinery changed.  More importantly the mentalité and 
preoccupations of the officials concerned also changed as new officials took over 
consequently the information demanded by consumers also changed. The changes in the 
administrative structures and their intelligence machinery also flowed down to affect the role 
of the British intelligence services working in the empire.  
 
The role of the British machinery in the empire 1956-1966: 
 
As has been demonstrated the Security Service was the main British security intelligence 
agency in empire and the provider of intelligence advice and liaison but its role evolved from 
the mere provision of advice and liaison to the CO and colonial governments by the provision 
of an SLO, to providing the direct intelligence link between the British and local intelligence 
machinery. This meant the Security Service had to liaise with both CO and CRO. The 
Security Service undertook surveillance of colonials on their visits to the United Kingdom 
and maintained extensive records for example on figures such as Cheddi Jagan of British 





The Security Service had its own general policy towards it duties in the Commonwealth. It 
dealt with matters which affected the security of the realm as a whole; rather than local 
problems.  The general position of the service including E Branch which handled liaison with 
the empire and commonwealth , was that the focus should be on communism rather than on 
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local problems, although in practice a great deal of information was collected on both.
370
 The 
Security Service also wanted to continue to co-operate with new states on the communist 
threat after self government. It worked therefore with local agencies in an overt manner; it did 
not operate its own covert networks or investigations. 
 
In order to develop anti-communist co-operation the CO and the Security Service had to work 
together to prepare for self government and independence. The Security Service, worked 
closely with the JIC on developing the professional colonial intelligence model to be 
transmitted to the colonies. This model was promulgated in CO Circular 458/56 28 April 
1956 and formed the criteria upon which the CO’s Security Intelligence Adviser’s (SIA) 
inspections were based although it was modified by subsequent Circulars1135/59, 64/60, and 
960/61.
371
 The Security Service and the CO needed to indigenise the local intelligence 
machinery. They needed to prepare an organisation to maintain information flow during 
handover, introduce the new politicians to the SLO and the local intelligence machinery, and 
try to convince the local politicians of the need to keep the intelligence machinery politically 
neutral. 
    
Handover of intelligence duties from the Security Service to the Secret Intelligence 
Service: 
  
After independence SLOs worked under the control of the local British High Commission 
and were generally embedded in the local intelligence machinery. They continued to be 
allowed to attend LIC meetings and frequently had office space within the host government’s 
facilities. The Security Service however did not long hold its authority over intelligence 
matters in the Commonwealth, between 1965 and 1968 the SLO network was closed down 
and the SIS took over. Leaving the Security Service in charge of imperial intelligence links 
had been partly due to established precedent and the excellent established links with 
successor services but may also have been partly due to inertia  but it was probably also due 
to the CO and CRO’s distrust of the SIS and its ‘dirty tricks’.372  
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Whilst the SIS did not traditionally operate in the colonial territories they did have a presence 
in the SIME and SIFE organisations at regional level in the Middle and Far East although not 
in Africa. The SIS was concerned that the CO and CRO were insufficiently worried about 
Soviet subversion and that there were no covert networks to keep Britain informed if for 
some reason overt liaison failed. SIS had conducted its first covert reconnaissance of Africa 
in 1956.
373
 In 1960 the SIS involvement in the Congo Crisis led it to try to expand its activity 
to the empire despite opposition from the CRO in particular.
374
 There after it seems to have 
had an increasing presence in empire until in 1968 after the withdrawal of SLOs the SIS took 
over responsibility. 
  
Military Intelligence in the Empire: 
 
The service intelligence machinery was involved in the process of development in a number 
of ways. Military intelligence supported any troops deployed into a colony and attached 
liaison officers to work within Special Branch Headquarters. As decolonisation progressed it 
became more difficult to recruit ex-colonial police officers who were taking advantage of the 
retirement packages being offered. In consequence it became necessary to use Military 
Intelligence Officers (MIO) to reinforce some colonial police forces and their Special 
Branches. As the European dominated administrative and police machinery was handed over 
the CO and CRO’s grip on the information collecting machinery loosened. In a number of 
colonies this period occurred at a point where disorder was growing and consequently the 





Some colonies became strategic bases in which case military intelligence was deployed to 
support the operations for the bases and to liaise with the local colonial intelligence 
machinery.  This was an aspect of the British intelligence machinery and so marked an 
interim phase in some colonies in the process of the imperial machinery being converted into 
the British machinery. Aspects of this can be seen in the cases of Kenya, British Guiana, and 
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 In the Middle East SIME, although associated with the Security Service,  was 
primarily a military organisation designed to support Middle East Command but for reasons 
both of geographical necessity and historical precedent it worked closely with both imperial 
territories and countries where Britain had influence. For part of the period British regional 




Apart from these major developments there was also a need to continue to provide 
intelligence support to the residual colonies.  Once the reforms of the imperial intelligence 
machinery were in place in the CO and the colonies after 1956 there were no major 
developments to them except for ‘tweaks’ required by the change in administrative 
departments in Whitehall, internal developments in the CO (loss of colonies leading to a 
general reduction and amalgamation of functions within internal departments) and the 
development of local machinery to met changing political conditions. The SIA at the CO 
however did continue to suggest technical improvements. In particular in the period from 
1960-1965 local governments were continually reminded by the CO to implement an ongoing 
process of review of their own intelligence needs through their LIC. Clearly this series of 
circulars was not much regarded as the CO had to send continual reminders out to colonial 
governments! 
378
 This complex and changing situation in Whitehall inevitably affected the 
process of handover because it altered reporting chains and the relative importance of 




The problem of ‘handover’: 
  
 At colonial level two things needed to be achieved in order to hand over the intelligence 
machinery. Firstly ongoing British intelligence interests including both the need to maintain 
internal security and to maintain long term anti-communist liaison needed to be safeguarded; 
essentially that meant the provision of SLOs to prevent the spread of communist influence. 
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Secondly the intelligence machinery needed to be prepared for handover in order to maintain 
local security for the successor government. Because the SIA remained in the CO until 
1965
379
 and the Inspector General of Colonial Police (IGCP) remained in the CO and was 
amalgamated into the CRO, there was a degree of continuity in the intelligence relationship 
between the colonial and later independent governments and the Whitehall machinery in 
intelligence matters.   
 
Preparation for handover involved a number of elements. The process was gradually 
standardised into a bureaucratic process with formal advice being issued by the CO to 
colonial governments on how to implement hand over of the intelligence machinery in the 
final stages.
380
  Unfortunately the advice does not seem to have survived so it is necessary to 
piece it together by looking at a number of examples. Whilst most were relatively straight 
forward, certain cases were more complex. The process of handover involved three functions: 
provision of British advice and liaison; records management; and indigenisation and the 
provision of temporary British ‘dual’ machinery. The process of providing British advice and 
liaison has already been covered in Section II so the question of records will be addressed 
first and then indigenisation. 
 
Records were a major issue for the British and colonial governments and the police at a 
number of levels particularly where there had been a controversial emergency or counter 
insurgency before independence. The driving influences in the process were the need to 
protect and maintain: British international prestige by preventing the opening of controversial 
material; secrecy about British ongoing policy; British intelligence processes; British 
security; and to protect indigenous people who had worked or were working against the anti-
colonial nationalists. Some files were necessary to the ongoing activity of the successor 
government and this material became known as ‘legacy’ or ‘heritage’ material to be handed 
over.  
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The result was three kinds of action: destruction of incriminating material of little ongoing 
value to British policy; the removal of material of ongoing significance to Britain itself; and 
the handover of ‘legacy’ material. As can be imagined this was a complex process and given 
the time and resources available a patchy one. A great deal was burnt. Surprising amounts of 
material were left in the archives of successor states. Finally it has recently emerged that 
significant numbers of files were transferred to Britain and kept undeclared in the FCO 
archives. Significant files also seem to have been transferred to the Security Service, 
especially personal files on significant nationalists and anti -colonial leaders.
381
 
      
Indigenisation was a complex process. The degree of indigenisation differed from colony to 
colony and region to region. In some colonies such as Malaya, the West Indies and West 
Africa for example, the number of ‘educated’ local people educated was relatively high and 
the administration and police were already partly indigenised.
382
 There was a greater pool of 
people with the requisite skills to carry on the process in the short term. In other colonies 
such as those in East Africa, far fewer educated personnel were available and the local 
prejudice against indigenisation seems to have been higher. 
 
From an intelligence perspective however indigenisation was complicated by the need to 
maintain information flows during the final stages of self government. The amount of 
information available to the British varied over time due the process of handover and this 
periodisation needed to be taken into account.  Lack of intelligence after 1946 had proved a 
crucial problem in India when Congress politicians seized control over the intelligence 
machinery too early for British interests and blinded the Viceroy during the final 
negotiations.
383
 This meant the British lost both control of the administration and knowledge 
of what was going on and thus the situation caused a major loss of British prestige.  In 
addition there was a timescale to the process of handover.  
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Information/intelligence was collected and collated by both administration and police. 
Different elements of the government were handed over at different times. Generally the 
lower levels of the administration were indigenised first and then the general duties police. 
The SLO was then ‘declared’. The intelligence co-ordinating machinery and the Special 
Branch were handed to responsible ministers as late as possible. The gradual handover meant 
senior British officials and the British government became progressively less able to 
understand and shape events as the hand over progressed. The British consequently created 
‘dual’ machinery. The local co-ordinating machinery  was duplicated by creating a 
Governor’s or Deputy Governor’s Office in which senior European personnel from the 
Special Branch were able to provide input in case the Governor needed to use his reserve 
powers. In certain cases the handover was relatively straightforward and the British were not 
worried about internal problems, as in Malaya, and relied upon embedded British personnel 
who were serving after independence and Security Service liaison to maintain their flow of 
information. The second problem caused by this process was that there was progressively 
more reliance on ‘security’ intelligence with its emphasis on political violence.  The lack of 
independent networks of agents outside of the official structures was however to prove a 
hindrance where the host organisation was not aware itself of political development and when 
there was a need to build up an undeclared SIS presence in some countries. There is some 
anecdotal evidence that some SB informers were kept on the payroll in some independent 
states and consequently passed on to successor British agencies. 
 
The CO’s geographical departments, the Defence /Intelligence Department, the IGCP, the 
SIA, the Governor and the Chief Secretary
384
 liaised to establish the best local arrangements 
within the frameworks imposed by precedent and experience.
385
 In some cases there was also 
discussion with local politicians on at least the overt elements of the reforms. The 
arrangements were implemented by the colonial government. 
  
There were complications in the process of hand over in some colonies for structural, 
constitutional, reasons and in others because the new governments were ‘hostile’ to British 
interests. American intervention in colonial affairs also required modification and 
development of the imperial machinery during handover. Each of these problems required 
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modification of the bureaucratic process  The handover in the colonies which had formed the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for example, was complex because of the necessity to 
firstly uncouple the local intelligence co-ordinating machinery which had been partly 
integrated with that of the Federal government and secondly because it occurred in the 
context of increasing hostility between the government of Federation (and later Southern 
Rhodesia) and the British government. British Guiana was very complex because it was both 
a ‘hostile’ decolonisation process and a colony in which the United States intelligence 
services were directly involved.
386
 This meant it was necessary to have a more complex 
version of the machinery for supporting the  use of the Governor’s Emergency powers than 
was usual and it was necessary to retain control of the Special Branch by splitting it into 






 ‘Friendly' and ‘neutral’ hand over processes: Malaya, Gold Coast, Kenya. 
    
The processes of hand over in Malaya and Gold Coast both involved ‘indigenisation’ 
processes. Malaya was a ‘friendly’ decolonisation. During the Emergency substantial 
numbers of indigenous personnel had been recruited and promoted in administration and 
police. In particular Chinese personnel had been recruited to Special Branch. Indigenous 
officers were also involved in the intelligence co-ordinating machinery. Substantial numbers 
of European personnel remained in place in key positions. Indigenous personnel were co-
operative and a friendly successor government which shared British concerns with 
communist influence was happy to continue to supply information needed by the British.  
 
The situation was made even easier because of the ongoing existence of regional British 
intelligence machinery; Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE) continued to operate from the 
British High Commissioner’s Office.  British training programmes and technical assistance 
continued to both Malayan and Singapore Special Branches helping to keep alive personal 
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 Incidentally Malayan decolonisation freed many Europeans with 
intelligence experience to serve elsewhere in empire.
389
 Because it was one of the first 
‘decolonisations’ the Malayan model provided precedent for subsequent CO activity.390 The 
Malayan Special Branch played a very important part in supplying intelligence to underpin 
both security and policy making but seems to have gained control of the local situation by the 
time of political hand over. Special Branch appears to have taken a ‘wide’ view of its duties 
and officials kept any eye on what was happening suggesting that the police did not ‘skew’ 
the information reaching government too much, perhaps because its consumer was a 
sophisticated administrative structure.  
 
Gold Coast provides a detailed picture of the indigenisation and the handover of the 
intelligence co-ordinating machinery.  It is particularly interesting because it was the first 
African ‘handover’ and provided precedents to the CO for use in the rest of Africa. 
Intelligence developments needs to be seen in the context of a developing constitutional and 
administrative structure in which the Secretariat evolved into a departmental system, political 
power was devolved and the system of local administration was changed from a ‘personal’ 
system based on the Chief Commissioner –Governor relationship to a formal system of local 
control. Whilst the administration was handed over relatively quickly, European control over 
Special Branch was retained for as long as possible and continued to report to the Governor 




The development of the intelligence co-ordinating machinery in Gold Coast had occurred 
rapidly after 1948. In 1948 a ‘Security Committee’ co-ordinating internal security 392  and an 
‘Intelligence Coordinating Committee’ were set up.393 In 1949 a Local Security Liaison 
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 Defence which included internal security had been retained under 
the previous constitutional arrangements. In 1956 the Governor explained how he intended to 
organise and hand over the co-ordinating machinery.
395
 The organisation of intelligence in 
Gold Coast was rather more complex than in some other colonies. The Defence Committee, 
which co-ordinated defence and internal security and dealt with intelligence, had been 
partially indigenised with the aim of making it responsible to ministers.
396
 The Central 
Security Committee (CENSEC)
 397
  and Local Intelligence Committee 
398
 were sub 
committees of the Defence Committee and these committees were also indigenised although 
this took longer because senior police officers and administrators were expatriates.
399
  
A Deputy Governor, (the previous Chief Secretary), provided the intelligence machinery for 
British control in the final stages through an ‘Office of the Governor’ and received the reports 
from senior expatriate SB officers.
400
 The SLO was ‘declared’ to ministers in October 1955. 
The SLO was to continue attending the committee after independence when appropriate.
401
 
The SLO maintained close contact with Special Branch; the army; the Minister of the 
Interior; and the Governor. The SLO continued to advise the Governor as well through the 
parallel structure of the ‘Office of the Governor’. 
  
The Ghanaian experience showed how the CO and colonial governments undertook 
handover. The ongoing presence of Europeans in key positions seems to have been the key 
factor in providing ongoing control during the final phases. Ministerial committees were 
handed over before official committees as they were in Northern Rhodesia. Care was taken to 
ensure that only committees controlled by expatriate officers obtained all of the information 
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and the situation in Malaya was specifically referred to in various minutes.
402
 It was unusual 
because the higher level of organisation and channels of communication were more 
complicated than in most colonies. 
 
The effects of this process in Gold Coast were complex. Whilst intelligence machinery was 
strengthened in the crucial period of 1949-51 the new Governor, Arden-Clarke, seems to 
have placed great importance on developing a working relationship with African politicians 
and ‘thrashing out’ political solutions. He seems to have opposed the pessimistic views of 
European administrative and security personnel.  Given these high level pressures it is 
difficult to see whether the administrators took much notice of negative intelligence input 
although reports were circulated.
403
 Walton however argued that Arden Clarke consulted 
constantly with Overseas Division of the Security Service.
404
 It is also unclear how far the 
Special Branch assisted the governor in by providing him with detail of the political position 
of African politicians.  
 
It is clear that precedent was examined by both CO and colonial governments when working 
out how the administration and intelligence machinery could be handed over. The importance 
of the Malayan precedent has already been noted but by 1963 there was actually a 
memorandum covering the subject.  
 
In 1963 the Kenya handover was guided by a ‘Memorandum: The Intelligence Organisation 
in a Colonial territory during the period of Transition to Independence.
405
 It is possible to 
reconstruct some of its salient recommendations by examining other evidence about the 
handover of intelligence. In the Kenyan case other surviving documents suggest that the 
document probably covered: the importance of the Governor’s Office; the destruction of 
records; and the declaration of the SLO.
406
 In 1963 security and political intelligence were in 
the hands of the Deputy Governor. It had been hoped to supplement the intelligence 
despatches from Kenya to the CO and CRO with a ‘UK Eyes Only’ element but this proved 
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impossible. In August 1963 the Kenyan responsibility for answering ‘military’ queries from 
Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), Joint Intelligence Committee Middle East (JIC (ME)), and 
Political Office Middle East Command (POMEC) was moved to the General Officer 
Commanding East Africa (GOC East Africa).
407
 The Deputy Governor and the Director of 
Intelligence would provide assistance as long as they could but such assistance was no longer 
guaranteed. 
  
The creation of a standardised model for intelligence handover tended to ensure that the 
strengths and weaknesses of the process were transferred throughout empire.  In the case of 
Northern Rhodesia, it is clear from various references that precedents used during internal 
self government in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and the Federation of Malaya were 
examined to provide guidance on how to hand over the intelligence and security 
machinery.
408
 The inclusion of the Malayan experience suggests that this was an imperial 
process rather than a regional one and emphasises the role of the CO as a source of advice. 
   
‘Neutral’ handovers: 
 
Northern Rhodesia and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were the subject of 
complex internecine battles within Whitehall. Both the CO and CRO had interests leading to 
the intervention of two different departmental intelligence machines. Under the complex 
federal constitution the component colonies retained responsibility for internal security and 
their own police forces and intelligence machinery on the standard colonial pattern. The 
Federal government was responsible for defence and ‘national security’. It had created the 
Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau to co-ordinate intelligence at Federal level. The 
FISB was merely a collating bureau relying upon material submitted to it by local Special 
Branches in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and from the Security Branch of the British 
South Africa Police (BSAP) in Southern Rhodesia. The FISB supplied liaison officers to 
each. The Security Branch BSAP strangely was merely a co-ordinating bureau for 
information gathered by CID and general duties police.
409
 The Northern Rhodesia Special 
Branch had an important part in compiling the LIC’s report to London and content of reports 
                                                 
407
 Ibid. Letter J.N.A. Armitage Smith, CO, to J.C. Roper, Cabinet Office, 2 August 1963.  
408
 TNA, DO183/138 Intelligence Reports: Northern Rhodesia, 1962-64. Minute to Mr. Downie, CRO, from 
V.R. Wilson, CRO, 16 March 1964. 
409
 Philip Murphy, Intelligence and Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security 
Bureau 1954-63 Imperial and Commonwealth History 29:2 (2001), 101-130. 
172 
 
from 1962-64 suggests that this caused a concentration on the internal security aspects 
although it is not clear how far this affected policy making. 
 
Before hand over of the intelligence machinery could take place the Northern Rhodesian 
machinery had to be separated from the Federal machinery and then indigenised.  
 
In Northern Rhodesia the LIC was called the Central Intelligence Committee (CIC). There 
were lower level committees at each administrative level on the Malayan model. In 
September 1963 the members of the CIC were European.
410
 The FISB and the Federal Army 
were both represented on the committee. The Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia 
controlled the committee. The first step on breakup of the federation was to remove FISB 
liaison officers from the Northern Rhodesian machinery.  Indigenisation however was slow. 
In January 1964 committee membership was still European but Federal personnel no longer 
had seats.
411
 In February 1964 the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, A.W. 
Gaminara, a European, became a member as a step towards ministerial control.
412
 The SLO 
(Central Africa) was still present. The intelligence co-ordinating machinery was controlled by 
Europeans for as long as possible during the eight months of the handover until October 
1964. Indeed Gaminara remained as an adviser until 1965.
413
 This was particularly important 
because the final stages of British rule and the initial stages of independence were violent and 
confused due to the intransigence of the United National Party (UNP). 
 
Northern Rhodesia also provides information about the indigenisation of the lower levels of 
the co-ordinating machinery which were handed over more quickly but still reluctantly. The 
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organisation of the Northern Rhodesian system with mixed administrative and intelligence 
membership committees at each level had proved successful. In January 1964 however, it 
was feared that during internal self government extremists would be appointed as Provincial 
and District Commissioners.  This raised the potential problem that information from the 




The Governor proposed that the committees should become “Information Committees” 
sharing sanitised material.
415
 The Central Africa Office (CAO) (a short lived department 
answering to the British Home Secretary but employing ex CO personnel) was concerned that 
ending SB participation would make the committees pointless. It is clear from various 
references that precedents used during internal self government in Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika and the Federation of Malaya were examined but the paperwork showing how 
these were used has not survived.
416
  The SIA was asked for advice and recommended that 
the system to be used after independence should be adopted and the “Information 
Committee” idea was dropped.417 The post independence machinery included the LIC/CIC 
and the Special Branch but it is not clear if the lower level committees were continued or not. 
If political appointments were made, the SIA suggested that the permanent civil servant 
should provide advice. It was hoped that new appointments would come from the ranks of 
African civil servants with their bureaucratic loyalties rather than less ‘reliable’ politicians. 
  
It is not possible to break down the contents of the intelligence reports from the LIC into 
material gathered by police and administration in order to see the relative influence of each 
however the content is definitely skewed more towards the security side the closer the colony 
got to independence. It is clear that SB had an important part in compiling them. What is not 
clear however is how important these were to administrators at the time.  
 
These examples show that as early as 1956 the problems of transforming intelligence 
machinery were being addressed and that a ‘handover’ model was being used to plan for 
future problems, within the constraints caused by the structure of administrative systems.  
The Security Service was deeply involved at a number of levels in this process both 
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technically and politically. The importance of the SLO network in successor states was clear. 
The CO and the Security Service were keen that territorial machinery should follow British 
guidelines and structures in order to maintain levels of cooperation and information sharing. 
The CO was working in a more co-ordinated way with other United Kingdom departments in 
the British interest. The material also helps to demonstrate the global concerns with potential 
and actual problems involved in the handover especially the use of the intelligence machinery 
for party political ends. This concern was also addressed in the CO’s recommendation that 
Public Service and Police Committees should be interposed between the local ministers and 
their officials. Such institutions fell from a police perspective, within the remit of the 






Hostile handovers: the complexities of international co-operation in a colonial setting: 
  
The CO had a particularly hard task in British Guiana. It was committed to preparing the 
colony for independence with a functioning and moderate government and working political 
and administrative institutions. The British government had no longer term interests in British 
Guiana after independence. The American government however, was concerned that the 
Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) was a communist organisation and was seeking to work with 
Cuba to make the Caribbean communist. It was felt in Whitehall that it was in the wider 
British interest to allow American intervention in the colony. Interdepartmental conflicts in 
Whitehall which affected such co-operation were directly affecting not only the process of 
decolonisation but also Britain’s international position. The American government already 
actively intervened in British intelligence activity and it was considered necessary for the 
Director General of the Security Service and the Chief of SIS to keep the Americans directly 
informed of a number of aspects of British intelligence activity. By 1963 the American 
government was exerting extreme pressure on the British government as a whole to adapt to 
its requirements over British Guiana. The effect of the international implications was that the 
handover process was complicated by the need to create machinery to co-ordinate the British 
and American intelligence input in the situation and to juggle the interests of at least three 
different levels of policy needs in the colony. 
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Because of the complexity of the situation it is possible to read the paperwork ‘against the 
grain’ to establish a surprising amount of information about: the policies of the CO and other 
Whitehall departments; about the role of the British professional intelligence machinery; and 
about the co-ordinating machinery necessary to ensure international co-ordination with the 
intelligence service of another country. This may be of wider significance than is obvious at 
first because the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was close to SIS and both wanted to 
intervene in colonial affairs against the wishes of the CO. The CIA also wanted to establish a 
presence in number of formal and informal colonies. 
 
Initially the CO’s approach seemed to be an attempt to isolate the PPP and force it into a 
more moderate position between 1953 and 1961, combined with an interest in decolonising as 
quickly as possible without US interference. This changed to an acceptance of a wider British 
need to respond to US demands to remove Jagan, although the CO generally seemed to argue 
Jagan was not a communist and that his government was becoming more moderate. 
 
The US government saw the CO as a hindrance to the implementation of its policies and 
attempted to pressure the FO and the PM to force the CO to alter its policies. SIS also wanted 
to end the ‘Attlee doctrine’ and assist the CIA.  The SIS approach was in stark contrast to the 
Security Service which disapproved of covert action in Commonwealth countries.  These 
differences continued despite the move of Sir Dick White from the Security Service to the 
Secret Intelligence Service in 1956. The Security Service perceived that British Guiana was a 
local problem and thus outside its remit and did not want to engage in covert operations in 
British Guiana.
419
 Their interest may be gauged by the fact that British Guiana was a major 
problem in Anglo-American relations; the SLO was based in Trinidad and only visited 
British Guiana occasionally. SIS by contrast wanted, despite White, to adopt a more 
interventionist and anticommunist approach generally although we have no specific 
information about British Guiana.
420
 American intervention in British Guiana was carried out 
by the CIA which was used to close liaison with the SIS but not the E Branch of Security 
Service. 
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The decolonisation process in British Guiana: 
 
Decolonisation in British Guiana can be divided into a series of phases. Between 1948 and 
1953 there was a gradually worsening security situation leading to a new constitution. The 
1953 elections led to a PPP’s government which was hostile to the British. The British 
declared an Emergency in 1953. There was an attempt to stabilise the situation by splitting 
the anti-colonial parties on ethnic grounds.
421
 The PPP split and many of its members of 
African descent joined the Peoples National Congress (PNC). In 1957 there was a new 
constitution and elections.
422
 Between 1957 and 1961 there was a process of discussion about 
handing over administration, police and security except defence and external affairs. In 1960-
61 the PPP tried to ‘pack’ the membership of such bodies.423  
 
The Americans became involved in supporting the PNC and UF. The British started to 
handover between 1962 and 1964, when the majority of US covert intervention occurred, 
leading to the imposition of a constitution based on proportional representation. These phases 
also affected the development of the intelligence machinery in particular the development of 
machinery for dealing with counter-subversion, the point where it was necessary to deal with 
CIA intervention and the point where it was necessary to split functions between the 
‘heritage’ machinery and the machinery for ongoing British control. The American 
government saw their intervention as ‘counter-subversion’ so it will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
 





 however the administrative element was weak because it was a mixture 
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of elected local councils in some areas and appointed district administration in others. The 
former were not suitable for collecting information. The colony’s administration was 
regarded as weak; consequently the police were the major intelligence gathering organisation.  
Whitehall and the CO needed to continue to control of the important parts of the intelligence 
machinery in the colony and they did this in two ways. They split duties in the Special 
Branch, they tried to keep a core of European officers in important positions using underhand 
means to subsidise their salaries and they created specialist co-ordinating machinery. These 
approaches fitted within the precedents from Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. 
  
The British Guiana government tried to develop alternatives to the PPP using the techniques 
of counter-subversion from 1953. It has been argued that the British government tried to deal 
with anti-colonial activity in British Guiana by isolating it, splitting their opponents on ethnic 
grounds, and finally obtaining a pro-British, or at least neutral government.
426
 The 
intelligence machinery became involved in political surveillance; the penetration of political 
parties; immigration control; and the use of Information Services to put the British line. In 
1956 for example, The Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies in 1956 
recommended using the Trades Union Council (TUC) to support the development of Trades 
Unions.
427
 British intelligence services used ‘tame’ British Trades Unionists to advise and 




The local intelligence machinery, including Special Branch, was indigenised from an early 
stage. Local officers were trained in London and in the West Indies.
429
 The British saw the 
role of the Special Branch and LIC as protecting  state security; not as a mechanism for PPP 
control
430
 consequently they attempted to guarantee police officers political independence 
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through a Police Service Commission.
431
 They also had the effect of leaving personnel 
selected and trained by the British in place after independence which helped to entrench 
British influence.  
 
In 1961 the Guianese Home Affairs minister, was ‘indoctrinated’ when he was informed of 
the existence and role of both the LIC and the SLO.
432
 The police, including Special Branch, 
were placed under ministerial control in 1961 after a handover period under a Police 
Council.
433
 In April- May 1962 J.P. Morton, the SIA, suggested that the Special Branch be 
reformed and strengthened but insufficient funds were available to make all the suggested 
reforms.
434The intelligence machinery was being prepared for ‘heritage’ duties (i.e. 
maintaining security in the new state rather than supplying Britain with information), but the 
service had to continue to respond to local problems in the British interest. The Special 
Branch, however, continued to keep political parties, including government ministers, under 
surveillance. They reported only what was of ‘general interest’ to the PPP ministers. This 
suggests that some kind of internal division had been created in the Special Branch or the co-
ordinating machinery. This raises the question of; ‘How much did the Governor know about 
operations?’ In theory the Security Service had to keep the Governor informed of its 
operations and this is a caveat which would appear to be necessary in the case of the SIS as 
well. Grey had had direct discussion with the US Consulate General over time.  In 1963 Grey 
believed that the Head of Special Branch was not keeping him informed and was uncertain 
whether this was deliberate or due to incompetence.
435
 Cuban stowaways suspected of being 
intelligence officers had been discovered after a ‘tip off’, probably from the CIA. The 
governor had asked for information about the situation and the CIA’s sources of 
information.
436
 The official answer was that the Police Commissioner had received the 
material from the CIA based on information from a single informer, and had waited to pass it 
to the Governor until he had checked it. 
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Parallel intelligence and security machinery: 
 
In 1963-64 matters came to head and in June 1964 another emergency was declared. At the 
same time the Americans pressed for the re-imposition of direct rule by the British. There 
was a general strike and extensive violence which posed problems for the police. Special 
Branch was needed to conduct surveillance and penetrate local political organisations and to 
produce intelligence for the police and the Governor, and consequently for Whitehall, but by 
this stage the police had been officially handed over to ministerial control. The problems 
involved however had been anticipated since 1962. In 1963 a Governor’s Office was set up 
and the Chief Secretary became the Deputy Governor.  An Emergency Intelligence 
Committee (EIC), which had been created in 1953, was still in existence in 1964.
437
 In 1964 
it operated alongside the LIC. There are few clues as to the rationale for this doubling up. It 
may have been a subsection of the LIC streamlined to allow handling of intelligence in times 
of emergency or it could have been a conscious attempt to produce a parallel intelligence 
committee answering only to the Governor.  With the SLO, and senior European members of 
the Special Branch this organisation might have provided machinery for securing British 
interests whilst the PPP government took control over other parts of the government. Military 
Intelligence Officers (MIO) supported Special Branch in areas where army units were 
operating and may have unofficially formed additional reliable European manpower for the 
Special Branch. 
438
 A police ‘Special Force’ was raised for internal security, answerable to 




The SIA had made recommendations about increases in the strength of the police and Special 
Branch which could only partially be implemented due to the lack of funds.
440
 The proposals 
were driven by the need to regain and maintain control and to provide for British interests. 
Piper of the West Indies Department in the CO described Special Branch’s role: 
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‘[..]Morton went on to point out that the British Guiana Special Branch was not 
intended to be more than (in your own words) a good Special Branch from the point of 
view of a reputable Government of British Guiana and to suggest that we look to other 
sources for more delicate intelligence[…]’ 441 
 
It is clear that keeping the British supplied with the information they needed required more 
effective institutions than the ‘residual’ intelligence machinery used in the final stages of 
hand over. Either the Special Branch was acting independently of the PPP government or a 
section of it, probably under the control of expatriate European officers, was dealing with 
matters important to the British government. The LIC and Special Branch continued to write 
reports for the British Government and create other forms of intelligence product. It is clear 
that such measures were being closely monitored and co-ordinated between the Government 
of British Guiana and the various departments in the CO.  
 
The role of SIS: 
 
Piper’s minute suggests that there were ‘other’ intelligence assets operating. It was not 
normal practice for the SLO to run local agents and there is no suggestion in papers in the 
National Archive or in Defence of the Realm that the SLOs were doing any more information 
gathering than discussing matters with local politicians. The minute implies that the SIS was 
operating or assisting the CO. In 1963 an SIS officer, a Mr. Breeze, was appointed to the 
Governor’s staff. 442 His purpose is not clear from the documentation. It is possible that his 
role was to penetrate Venezuela or Brazil. SIS normally operated from a ‘second’ state 
against a ‘third’ and the  normal diplomatic cover did not yet exist because of the lack of a 
High Commission in Georgetown thus the  cover of the station chief could have been a post 
on the Governor’s staff.   It would have been very unusual for SIS to operate against a local 
political party in a British colony. It would have taken time for an SIS station to develop the 
networks of informants to penetrate the PPP, unless there was a hand over of informants 
/agents by the Special Branch direct to SIS. Breeze was accompanied by his family and the 
                                                 
441
 TNA, CO1035/194 Organisation of Intelligence in the Colonies: British Guiana, 1963. Letter R.W. Piper, 
Colonial Office to Sir Ralph Grey, Governor, British Guiana, 4 June 1963. 
442
 Ibid. Folio 54 original head of document withheld. States ‘friends’ should take over Military Intelligence 
Officer Vacancies and that the officer concerned was Mr Breeze a FO official. The army was immune to any 
local pressure being an ‘imperial asset but still had access to operational intelligence being gathered by Special 
Branch. It is interesting that the Metropolitan inspectors were also used under a military cover. ; Ibid.  Draft 
letter from R.W. Piper, CO, to Sir Ralph Grey, Governor, British Guiana, 4 June 1963.   
181 
 
presence of his family could have put him at risk although SIS wives did live in operational 
theatres in the Middle East. The most logical scenario is that he was the Governor’s liaison 
officer with CIA. SIS also assisted the CO and British Guiana governments to transfer funds 
to allow the appointment of expatriate police officers to reinforce the Special Branch British 
Guiana Police. By this stage the local government was responsible for the appointment of 
police officers and one way it achieved control was to limit the salaries to a very low level 
making it difficult to attract British applicants. The Commissioner and the Governor still 
retained a role in selecting suitable personnel. It appears that the CO asked the SIS to provide 
fund through the Secret Vote to top up police salary packages making it possible to appoint a 
British officer.  
 
Local attempts to undermine the local intelligence machinery: 
 
A major difference between the situation in British Guiana and other colonies was the 
existence of a political opposition to British rule which at times held political office thus 
having some capacity to intervene in the intelligence and security machinery. The PPP 
struggled with the governor for control of the control of the Special Branch from 1961 at a 
time when preparations were being undertaken by the governor to re-impose direct rule and 
possibly declare an emergency. In the 1960s the response of Guianese ministers to British 
and American intervention was to limit the number of Europeans in the police, and thus in the 
intelligence services, by opposing the permanent appointment of Europeans and keeping pay 
scales low. Both measures made it difficult to attract effective colonial police officers, 
consequently British funds were channelled through SIS funds to ‘top up’ police salaries in 
British Guiana.
443
 This enabled new expatriate personnel to accept Guianese rates of pay. 
 
The importance of the matter is demonstrated by the CO’s close interest in the administrative 
issues involved. Colonial Police Service officers were a ‘Secretary of State’s service’ but 
were individually employed by colonial governments. In practice this boiled down to the 
IGCP offering posting to individual officers who would then be accepted by the colonial 
government. It was normal practice to allow such posts to be indigenised once self 
government had been granted but the situation in British Guiana meant that the British 
needed ongoing access to and control over Special Branch operations.  In the period 1963-65 
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there was an attempt to replace the Head of Special Branch, A.J.E. Longden with Harvey 
Ryves, who had been a Head of Special Branch in Malaya.
444
  Longden had been replaced by 
a Mr Martin between 1962 and 1963 when Longden took over again.
 445
  Mr Sobers, a 
Guianese, had been selected to replace Martin but the emergency in 1963 led the governor to 
seek ways to appoint another expatriate head. The governor undertook complex manoeuvres 
to ensure that there was no opportunity for the minsters to protest such an appointment. 
  
The Relative Importance of Security v. Administrative intelligence: 
 
Discussions between the Governor Sir Ralph Grey and R.W. Piper at the Colonial Office 
centred on how to use Special Branch to support the United Kingdom’s intelligence needs 
rather than those of the PPP ministers of the British Guiana government.
446
 There appear to 
have been two major problems. The first was the lack of information flowing to the British 
government and the second was the failure of Special Branch to effectively support military 
operations against local terrorists.  In the process, however, the files deal with a series of 
subsidiary issues such as the relationship between the CO and the security intelligence 
services,
447
 other departments and the JIC,
448
 the way in which self government affected the 
powers and needs of the Governor in the final stages of independence and the changing 
nature of the intelligence system itself. British interests were being affected by a lack of 
intelligence on which to base policy. The Head of Special Branch was working for two 
masters and the local ministers were not aware of all of his activities.  
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‘[…] The sad fact is that our apparatus here for getting information needed by H.M.G. 
is just not equal  to our needs ,even in the present circumstances. Unless it were 
strengthened it would be even more inadequate if the results of the decision to be taken 
by Mr Sandys “ not later than October” were to be extremely unpopular to one or the 
other of the major  political parties. I shall try to get both Owen and Martin to see the 
need for more information and the worth of it. Indeed there is a real danger that by 
pressing too hard I may do more harm than good. […]’ 449 
 
‘[…] 2. Even when Sobers (who has been identified as prospective Guianese Head of 
Special Branch) has been trained and returned I do not think he should be asked to do 
H.M.G.’s work as well as his Special Branch work for the British Guiana government. 
Unless there was to be a return to direct rule it is unthinkable we could insert another 
expatriate officer as Head of Special Branch. […]’450 
  
In February 1964 the Head of Special Branch, sought to resign. Janet Jagan, the minister 
dealing with police matters wanted Superintendent P. Britton, a Guianese, to stand in but the 
Governor did not believe he could be relied upon to provide for the intelligence needs of both 
Britain and British Guiana. Jagan did not want to bring in an expatriate. The Governor 
suggested the appointment of a colonial police officer, a military intelligence officer or an 
intelligence officer working under the cover of a military officer to the CO because of the 
possibility of return to direct rule.
451
 Increasing use of the armed forces in internal security 
roles in British Guiana may have allowed the Governor a way of circumventing ministerial 




The context for the particular need for such action may be provided by an American 
perception that the Cuban intelligence services were becoming directly involved in British 
Guiana. The US pressed the UK government to introduce Proportional Representation (PR) 
in 1964 and this led to the victory of the PNC- United Front Coalition supposedly a friendly 
group although the leader of the BGTUC which supported the PNC was Richard Ishmael, 
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described by the British Guiana Police as a terrorist. The PPP however protested and the 
radical part of its leadership, possibly Janet Jagan the General Secretary may have taken over 
control of the party. This may have led to the PPP gaining Cuban Intelligence support to 







The chapter has explored the way in which new factors, namely the need to adapt to changed 
conditions, affected the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. Firstly the 
machinery had to be adapted to administrative changes in the United Kingdom as Whitehall 
departments were amalgamated and processes had to be worked out to handle administrative 
change in the colonial governments. Since these occurred in the context of differing levels of 
resistance and threat the response of the British government, the CO and the CRO had to take 
local problems into account whilst still fulfilling British requirements. The case studies show 
how standardised processes were worked out and promulgated. They show how elements 
within the CO both worked more closely with the British intelligence machinery but how 
others attempted to moderate and direct such influences in ways which reflected long term 
concerns. The process of change was also influenced by the gradual appearance of a younger 
generation of CO officials more concerned with ‘communism’ and prepared to work more 
closely with security intelligence organisations.  In particular the case study of British Guiana 
shows how CO officials felt they had to act covertly and duplicitously because of the wider 
United Kingdom objectives and the nature of their relationship with the local politicians.  
 
The analysis of material about the handover of the intelligence machinery casts light upon the 
activity of the CO. Initially it took time to develop a standardised approach to meet the split 
need to transfer intelligence and security machinery to the new governments and at the same 
time to safeguard long term British intelligence interests but eventually a standardised, 
formal, process was worked out. 
  
Both the geographical departments and the ‘intelligence’ and ‘police’ departments in the CO 
worked much more closely together as time went on to manage the process of handover. The 
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CO worked much more closely with other Whitehall departments (particularly the CRO), the 
Security Service and sometimes the SIS in order to implement handover. The papers suggest 
a much more closely co-ordinated process as time went on. The standard ‘hand over’ model 
had to be adapted to reflect local conditions. This was particularly important in the more 
complex situations caused by the breakup of a federation or the case of direct foreign 
intervention in a colony (admittedly unusual) or where the government taking over was 
essentially hostile to British interests and the British could not get out because of external 
pressure. There is evidence of closer co-operation with the JIC.  Interdepartmental differences 
however did remain and could hinder co-operation in particular colonies. 
  
The normal process of handover consisted of indigenisation programmes- supported by 
training programmes and leaving British ‘contract’ officers behind to ensure that this was a 
pro-British process. The creation of temporary co-ordinating machinery or the splitting of 
existing intelligence machinery to support the Governor during handover became normal. To 
ensure that the British long term interest was maintained in valuable territories SLOs were 
appointed. Records had to be managed by culling and transfer of certain files back to Britain. 
Local assets such as informers had to be either retained or handed over. Sometimes additional 
coordinating machinery was created at various levels to ensure co-operation with foreign 
services such as the CIA. 
 
Indigenisation meant that during the progressive handover of government assets that security 
intelligence became a progressively more important element of British knowledge. 
Indigenisation was intended to ensure that British trained and ‘friendly’ local people were 
appointed and their neutrality in local politics ensured by the existence of Public Service or 
Police Commissions. In the final stages of handover it also meant that there was an order to 
the handover of the intelligence machinery. Administrative collecting elements went first 
then the ordinary police and ‘normal’ co-ordinating machinery of the LIC and its sub 
committees was indigenised whilst British interests were managed by temporary expedients 
such as the Office of the Governor or Deputy Governor. There may also have been European 
section manned by expatriate officers within the Special Branch to ensure that information 
kept on flowing in the final stages. In British Guiana there was greater interference in security 
by a hostile political party in government and this led the CO to protect British interests by 





Unexpected issues associated with the intelligence emphasis during hand over:  
  
The process of phased indigenisation had unexpected effects on the process of decolonisation 
from a British perspective. The police became more and more important in the intelligence 
collection process as self government progressed. This had an important ‘cultural’ effect, 
increasing the emphasis on ‘security’ intelligence during the final phases of handover and 
thus potentially affecting the British government’s perspective of events in the colonies. It is 
not possible to measure this affect precisely but it is possible to make some tentative 
conclusions. The effect was most noticeable in ‘hostile’ de-colonisations such as British 
Guiana where security intelligence was practically the only source of information for the 
Governor and British government. In less hostile 'decolonisations' the affects probably varied. 
In Malaya intelligence was already integrated into government at many levels and the 
machinery and personnel appear to have had a sophisticated understanding of the problems 
and a variety of forms of information were considered. In Gold Coast the importance of such 
information probably increased during the period 194-1951 but after this the Governor’s 
personal relationship and commitment to self government may have made him consciously 
choose not to listen to the intelligence machinery with its rather negative view of the 
situation. In Northern Rhodesia the governor seems to have relied upon the police to a 
considerable extent but administrators and police had liaison machinery at each level so the 
collection process whilst skewed towards security intelligence probably had adequate input 
from elsewhere. 
  
Various subterfuges were used by the British government, through the CO, to protect the flow 
of information to support British interests. Apart from the creation of temporary machinery 
which was not subject to indigenisation expatriate officers were used in sensitive positions. 
Special sections were formed within existing institutions to support British interests. The CO 
was aware of SIS officers operating in the colonies and the CIA intervention in British 
Guiana. The CO kept an eye on CIA activity throughout empire including the movement of 
Americans in Kenya.  Such subterfuges and general co-ordination involved both the 
geographical and intelligence related departments. 
 
The CO and the Security Service were in close contact during the period however officially 
the Security Service preferred to keep itself aloof from clandestine activity preferring liaison 
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with the successor government  rather than becoming involved with covert operations or with 
maintaining local networks but this does not seem to have been an entirely consistent policy. 
The Service seems to have been aware of SIS involvement in British Guiana and to have 



































Counter -subversion and covert operations 1945-1966. 
 
Previous chapters have examined the development of the machinery used to collect and 
assess information and turn it into intelligence products to support the formation of policy. In 
Chapter 4 the thesis examined the process of handover and in the process showed how some 
decolonisation processes, notably that in British Guiana, but also that in Malaya, were shaped 
using the techniques of ‘counter-subversion’.  In this chapter the intention is to examine the 
part played by new elements of the intelligence machinery in implementing British policy. In 
particular it will deal with the part played by the Colonial Office (CO) in the development of 
machinery for carrying out ‘covert operations’ in the empire. The new machinery consisted of 
co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall within the Cabinet Committee system and a variety of 
organisations in Whitehall and the colonies to implement it. 
  
The previous chapters have also shown how elements within the CO acted to resist change 
and to moderate changes they were forced to accept. These forces can also be seen at work in 
relation to the implementation of colonial policy by covert action. The development of new 
intelligence functions however, inevitably meant  major changes to the machinery for 
implementing such operations, firstly in the coordinating machinery at the Whitehall end and 
secondly in the machinery for implementing and coordinating it at the colonial end. These 
developments drew on relevant precedents from the experience of imperial governance which 
posed some of the same problems. The problem was exacerbated by direct United States 
interference which meant external liaison machinery had to be created. Since handover and 
the implementation of covert policy implementation occurred in the same period 
developments discussed in Chapter 4 need to be remembered as the discussion in this chapter 
develops.   
 
At a strategic level covert operations were used in a number of ways, normally in conjunction 
with overt activity. They were used as an integral part of implementing British foreign (and 
later colonial) policy and diplomacy. British ‘foreign’ policy in this period was handled by 
three major departments; the Foreign Office (FO) which dealt with foreign countries, the 
Colonial Office (CO) which dealt with the colonial empire and the Commonwealth  Relations 
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Office (CRO), which dealt with the dominions. Each department had different objectives but 
each used diplomacy and political negotiation, military activity and aid of various kinds, 
political, military, economic, and social to achieve them. Sometimes it can be difficult to 
distinguish between special counter-subversion and ordinary aid programmes. The 
complexity of the different objectives of the various departments dealing with foreign affairs 
could seriously affect the development of the programme of covert operations. Covert 
operations came in different forms including one off operations and longer term counter-
subversion programmes.  
 
The counter-subversion programme grew out political warfare in the Second World War but 
also out of long experience of dealing with communist and anti-colonial subversion and 
espionage in Britain and the empire. There was precedent for centrally co-ordinated counter-
subversion and subversion activities, mostly in war time. In 1917-20, for example, British 
intelligence was involved in military intervention in Russia after the revolution. Strategic 
military intervention was carried out to ensure the continued flow of information.
454
 During 
the Second World War the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE) carried out such activities through Europe. These precedents affected the 
development of a new Cold War counter-subversion programme in the colonies s and fed 
back into policy and decision making in Whitehall. Counter-Subversion developed into a 
centrally co-ordinated global programme however as a result of the specific threats of the 
Cold War. During the Cold War senior personnel became deeply impressed by their 
perception of the success of Soviet subversion. 
 
Covert operations fell into a number of classifications during the Cold War: paramilitary 
support of resistance movements in the Soviet Bloc; subversion in communist occupied and 
other hostile territories; counter-subversion to prevent the spread of communist subversion in 
friendly countries and colonies, and covert activity associated with counter-insurgency 
campaigns. These forms overlapped considerably. Counter-Subversion consisted of both 
covert and overt activity and covered a range of activities from police and military action to 
political negotiation, propaganda, educational programmes, economic aid, training courses, 
and the provision of technical expertise. Counter-insurgency can be seen as an extreme form 
of counter-subversion involving the addition of military action on a large scale in the face of 
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large scale violence. Counter-subversion was undertaken by a variety of individual British 
departments of state but these programmes were increasingly co-ordinated in Britain by 
Cabinet Committees of various levels (although some departmental committees such as the 
Russia Committee also had an important role) and implemented by the Whitehall departments 
and the intelligence services with the support of a variety of other organisations including 
political parties and the Trades Union Congress. 
 
Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who was involved in the central intelligence 
machinery, defined counter-subversion as: 
 
[…] clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against 
communism or, in the Colonies, subversive forms of nationalism […]455 
 
Powerful figures involved in Whitehall and the intelligence machinery including Sir Gerald 
Templer, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, and Sir Patrick Dean advocated the use of subversion and 
counter-subversion.
456
 This inner group of senior civil servants and British military officers 
came to the conclusion that subversion could be turned against the Soviet Union. They also 
believed that a study of communist subversion would identify the methods for defeating it. 
The idea was aggressive without running a large risk of generating open war. There is 
evidence that they set out to implement counter-subversion in the friendly states and 
subversion in unfriendly ones.  
  
The British government also encouraged counter-subversion activity by other states in the 
Commonwealth. The Australian government’s concept of counter-subversion was based upon 
British precedents and is worth quoting in full as a clear description of what was involved. 
457
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‘In early 1955 the Menzies government gave Casey [Australian Minister of External 
Affairs] the responsibility for organising the non-military response of Australia to the 
cold war in Asia. The Cabinet declared that the response of Australia to communist 
subversion in Asia was a matter of the utmost importance and it made five specific 
decisions. First, it decided to give Casey responsibility for ministerial coordination of 
cold war planning. Second, it called for plans to be drawn up for expanding the 
activities and technical facilities of Radio Australia. Third, cabinet agreed that Australia 
would be prepared to exchange with other South East Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) members’ information on communist activities and on the means needed to 
counter communist subversion. The specific measures of counter subversion included 
assistance in the training of member countries’ security forces, a contribution to 
propaganda and other information activities designed to combat communism, and 
assistance in eliminating communist influence and promoting democratic and pro-
western influences in schools, trade unions and youth organisations in the region. 
Fourth, it requested that proposals be drawn up to expand the teaching of Indonesian, 
Malay and other Asian languages in Australia. Fifth, cabinet asked Casey to arrange for 
officials “to look into the question of combating subversive communist propaganda 
domestically...” 
 
These documents show that Communist ‘Subversion’, i.e. the indoctrination of ‘states’ 
outside Soviet control with Marxist ideas was considered a particular issue in the Cold War. 
Subversion was achieved by the USSR and its intelligence agencies: by providing support for 
local communist parties; involvement in the activities of left wing organisations like trades 
unions, youth organisations and the labour movement; through propaganda, both overt and 
covert; through espionage; the penetration of foreign governments; and through left wing 
journalists and media.  
 
Subversion led to the development of counter-subversion. The British intelligence services 
had a role in the process; however their resources were very limited. The Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS) had the para-military capability to conduct ‘special operations’, controlled radio 
                                                                                                                                                        





stations and had the capacity to conduct ‘black’ propaganda operations, predominantly in the 
Middle East, but it also used colonial territory to broadcast into target countries. Increasingly 
the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) undertook the paramilitary operations on behalf of 
the intelligence services. The Security Service only provided advice and liaison to local 
security forces in most colonies; indeed in some it did not even have a permanent 
representative. In the Middle East however it had more resources. It was operationally 
involved in Palestine and its liaison officers were appointed to the police and military forces 
of independent governments in the region. 
  
Counter-subversionary measures also had to be implemented at local level. Some colonial 
governments set up formal ‘counter-subversion’ organisations of their own, notably 
Singapore and Malaya,
458
 but most used their police Special Branches and administrative 
resources to apply the ideas and resources generated in Britain and locally. These included 
the activity of the Post and Telegraphs, Customs, Public Works Department, Education 
Department, and Native Affairs Departments. Organisations such as local trades unions, local 
employer organisations, local political parties, educational trusts and British bodies such as 
the British Council were all utilised.  
  
There has been little scholarship on the co-ordination of counter-subversion, as opposed to 
counter-insurgency in the empire. Philip Murphy suggested, in passing, that the negotiations 
in Whitehall, which accompanied the formation of the Official Committee on Counter-
Subversion, were connected with the start of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) operations in 
areas which were normally considered the preserve of the Security Service.
459
 Chikara 
Hashimoto has written about the role of the Security Service in counter-subversion operations 
in the informal empire in the Middle East, suggesting that the main interest of British and 
regional intelligence bodies was communism and that local matters were best left to local 
authorities.
460
 There is also some material on attempts to ‘export’ counter-subversion through 
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 South Arabia has received considerable attention.
462
 Rory Cormac 
examined the development of co-ordinating machinery to manage counter subversion in 
Whitehall as a result of experience in South Arabia in the early 1960s.
463
 His analysis 
provides the interesting point that in order to take ‘active measures’ as opposed to using 
propaganda, a new organisation, the Joint Action Committee (JAC), had to be set up which 
suggests that the Counter Subversion Committee was predominantly concerned with co-
ordinating propaganda programmes which were created by IRD and seeking financial 
resources to carry them out rather than co-ordinating covert paramilitary activity. The 
weakness of his analysis, as in his analysis of the Templer Report, is that he doesn’t explore 
the co-ordinating machinery before the early 1960s. Whilst  the amount of information about 
the co-ordinating structure is limited this thesis argues it may be possible to discern 
continuity in  the counter-subversion co-ordinating machinery from 1948 through to the 
1960s in various shapes and forms and suggest that the machinery discussed by Cormac had 




In order to understand the active element of counter-subversion it is necessary to understand 
the terminology used by the intelligence services relating to covert actions. Using British SIS 
terminology, covert operations at operational level may be divided into two forms. ‘Special 
Operations’, (SO) were essentially paramilitary operations, normally in support of foreign 
resistance groups. The other form of covert activity was ‘Special Political Action’, (SPA) 
which was mainly concerned with political manipulation through propaganda and the 
manipulation of people.  ‘Special Operations’ and ‘Special Political Action’ were not strictly 
intelligence gathering operations but rather means of implementing foreign policy.
464
 The 
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collection and assessment of information though the intelligence machinery guided policy 
making. The nature of the machinery also made it a useful tool for secret diplomacy and 
implementing policy.
465
 Counter-subversion mainly used SPA to achieve its ends. 
 
This chapter will firstly seek to examine the development of co-ordinating machinery for 
counter-subversionary activities in Whitehall and the relationship between the machinery and 
the CO. As in the previous chapter it will become apparent that there is a fundamental 
uncertainty about the CO’s attitude to communism or subversion. On the one hand there is 
evidence of both the CO and the colonial governments taking an authoritarian stance, but on 
the other there is also evidence of libertarian tendencies which led the CO to resist police and 
security initiatives.
466
  The chapter will argue that there was a direct connection and some 
degree of continuity of approach between the initial co-ordinating machinery for operations 
the Committee on Communism Overseas AC (O) set up in December 1949, the later Official 
Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies and its twin the Foreign Office’s Counter 
Subversion Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee set up in 1963. It will also 
suggest that the concept of a Joint Action Group (JAC) identified by Clive Jones, Rory 
Cormac, and P.H.J. Davies was conceptually a development of the operational co-ordinating 
machinery in the AC (O) even though it fell outside the British intelligence hierarchy. It will 
show how the development process demonstrated some of the major inter-departmental 
differences between the CO and other Whitehall departments and confirms the differences 
between departments suggested by Cormac in relation to the role of the JIC. This will 
demonstrate some of the major differences between the CO and other departments about the 
efficacy of covert action. The chapter will also consider the question of how far the CO lost 
authority over colonial affairs to other departments as a result centrally co-ordinated counter 
subversion activity. Finally the chapter will make reference to some aspects of counter-
subversion in the colonies and the importance of American intervention. The chapter will 
examine the development of central machinery for undertaking covert action especially 
counter subversion and then examine how the machinery developed in the imperial setting. 
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The development of the Whitehall machinery for co-ordinating counter-subversion and 
other covert activity to 1956:  
 
The machinery used by Whitehall to conduct counter-subversion during the Cold War and 
decolonisation may be divided into two parts: the ‘co-ordinating’ and the ‘implementing’ 
elements. These were further subdivided into the machinery for carrying out two different 
functions ‘coercive’ and ‘supportive’. Supportive activity included information and 
propaganda, economic development education and welfare and coercive activity included 
investigation raiding and internment the suppression of seditious literature.    
 
The co-ordinating machinery in Whitehall developed over time. The central machinery 
consisted of a mixture of cabinet, official, interdepartmental and departmental committees 
each of which handled an aspect of counter-subversion as discussed in the development of the 
Cabinet Office machinery in Chapter 4.
467
 The Cabinet Defence, Colonial Policy, and 
Overseas Policy committees all had general interests in the subject matter. In 1948 the most 
important however were the Committee on Communism AC (M) and its official committees, 
the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) and (Home) (1948-1956)
468
 which 
managed anti communist activity both at home and overseas. In 1956 the AC (O) was 
abolished and the Colonial Policy Committee (1955-1956) and its Official Committee on 
Counter Subversion in the Colonies (and its twin the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee) 
took over both anticommunist and anti-colonial activity. In 1963 a special operational co-
ordinating body, the JAC was created within the policy implementation structures of the 
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Some commentators suggest that the JAC was a new development; however there was earlier 
precedent for covert action and consequently a system of management would have been 
required. During the early 1950s covert action had already become an important strand in 
British activity, notably in Iraq, and the Middle East.
470
 From 1945 to 1956 there was a series 
of offensives by Whitehall involving propaganda,
471
 security measures, and covert operations 
against communist occupied territories.
472
 Various committees and departments in Whitehall 
including the IRD of the FO had a hand in the development of covert action which mixed 
propaganda and covert warfare. Some of this activity was co-ordinated and financed through 
the Official Committee for Countering Communism (Overseas) AC (O), which was formed 
in 1948/49 
473
and AC (H) its equivalent which operated in Britain.
474
 AC (O)’s membership 
included representatives of the FO, COS and the head of the SIS.
475
 It was set up at the 
suggestion of Ernest Bevin and COS for the co-ordination and initial of anti-communist 
measures including propaganda by IRD and covert paramilitary operations by SIS. Members 
included the Chairman of the JIC, Chief of SIS, representatives from the MOD and the COS 
chaired initially by Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the Permanent Under Secretary’s Department 
(PUSD) of the FO. It was under the supervision of the Ministerial Committee on 
Communism AC (M) and paired with another official committee AC (H).
476
 These two 
committees answered to the Ministerial Committee on Communism AC (M).
477
 The intention 
seems to have been a way to limit the influence of COS and their push for the adoption of 
more aggressive policies in the Cold War and developing ideas about clandestine operations 
                                                 
470
 Stephen Blackwell, ‘Saving the King: Anglo American Strategy and British Counter Subversion Operations 
in Libya 1953-1959’ Middle Eastern Studies 39:1 (2003) 1-18; J Vaughan, ‘Cloak Without Dagger: How the 
Information Research Department Fought Britain’s Cold War in the Middle East 1948-56’ Cold War History 
4:3 2004) 56-84; L.Y. Fong, ‘The Impact of the Cold War on the Development of Trades Unionism in Malaya’ 
Journal of South East Asian Studies 23:1(1992) 60-73. 
471
 Andrew Defty, Britain America and Anti Communist Propaganda 1945-53, Chapter 2 launching the new 
propaganda policy, 1948.  Chapter 3, 'Building a concerted counter offensive: cooperation with other powers, 
1948-50', and Chapter 5, 'A global propaganda offensive Churchill and the revival of political warfare'.  
472
 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, He identifies these trends in Chapters 4 MI5: Defectors, spy trials and 
Subversion, Chapter 5, the counter offensive: from CRD to IRD and Chapter 6, The Fifth Column of Freedom: 
Britain embraces Liberation, Chapter 7 Liberation or Provocation? Special Operations in the Eastern Bloc. 
473
 TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute, Alan Lennox Boyd, Colonial Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden , Prime Minister, 
15 November 1955, para.8; Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 
2003), p. 20. quotes TNA, PREM 8/1365 Proposed Activities Behind the Iron Curtain’, Brook to Attlee, 30 
November 1950, and TNA, PREM 11/174 Request by Prime Minister for List of All Committees in Whitehall’, 
Brook to Churchill 20 November 1951. Both quote committees called Communism (Home) and Communism 
(Overseas) 
474
 J.M. Lee, ‘Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom’, pp. 12-15. 
475
 TNA, PREM11/1582, Minute Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary, to Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, 
21 October 1955,  para.7-8.  
476
 Chikara Hashimoto, ‘British Security Liaison in the Middle East’, pp. 851-2. 
477
 Ibid. (p. 851). 
197 
 
against ‘communism’.478 The key thing was that the AC (O) seems to have actively co-
ordinated and resourced operations. Hashimoto suggests that it co-ordinated propaganda 
warfare from IRD in the FO and the paramilitary activity of the SIS.
479
 Maguire demonstrated 
that it was a planning and co-ordinating body pointing out that the AC (O) had an ‘Overseas 
Planning Section’.480 Its membership included the intelligence service, the Chiefs of Staff 
(COS) and MOD which suggests AC (O) was a committee for co-ordinating ‘SPA’.481 The 
duties of AC (O) seem to foreshadow the development of the JAC in 1963 in a number of 
ways. In terms of operational practice the committee appears to have operated in a similar 
way to the later Counter-Subversion committees i.e. the committee obtained studies of 
particular problems and geographical areas from the relevant departments and then allocated 
resources to each.
482
Action was presumably carried out by the intelligence services. AC (O) 
was also involved in a whole range of activities designed to retain friends, build British 
prestige, destroy enemies and convert neutrals.  
 
AC (O)  was disbanded in 1955-56 on the recommendation of Sir Norman Brook who noted 
that it gave the COS too much power to follow aggressive  policies  and that its terms of 
reference  were too narrow and consequently that it was unable to move to problems beyond 
Communism i.e. anti-colonial nationalism  and subversion. Strictly speaking AC(O)’s remit 
had not included the empire and the CO was not a charter member, however AC(O) was 
interested in the Middle East as a key British interest and this particular theatre overlapped 
with British interests in East Africa the Mediterranean, and  the Horn of Africa. The COS’ 
representatives on the committee were aggressive and the committee offered a forum in 
which the COS could press for covert action which could affect CO interests. The perception 
in the mid nineteen fifties that Communist subversion was a growing threat in both formal 
and informal empires, a view point held by the FO as well as the COS, meant that the AC (O) 
had a legitimate cause for expanding its remit. Certainly when the impact of the Templer 
report was being assimilated the connections between the AC (O) and the Official Committee 
on Counter Subversion in the Colonies were recognised and its activities provide insight into 
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the practice of counter-subversion, which also offer insight into activity in the colonial 
empire. 
 
 There were also cabinet and interdepartmental committees which dealt with the ‘soft’ aspects 
of counter-subversion. The Cabinet Economic Policy Committee for example had a general 
role in producing economic conditions to improve living standards in both British and 
colonies which was regarded as a key element in limiting the appeal of communism both 
internally and externally. More specifically there was a CO committee on the Welfare of 
Colonial Students formed in 1947.
483
 As a result of the administrative complexity it is 
difficult to follow the chains of command and the channels through which information 
flowed and consequently to perceive all of the aspects of the policy of counter-subversion and 
its implementation. 
  
The management of Counter-Subversion in the empire was the responsibility of the CO and 
the colonial governments. Initially the CO’s geographical departments had a role in working 
with the colonial governments to counter the spread of communism but the local authorities 
actually carried it out. 
  
Counter subversion and the mechanics of colonial rule had many similarities since both were 
concerned with the control of anti British and anti colonial activity. As communism and other 
political ideologies became threatening in the interwar period action was taken against them.  
Inherent in counter-subversion, colonial rule, and later counter insurgency was the concept of 
both the ‘carrot and the stick’. The carrot included allowing some local elites special 
privileges providing they supported British rule. The process in Nigeria is probably typical of 
that across empire in the period.
484
 The colonial government had allowed moderate 
nationalism to develop within certain bounds and sought to conciliate moderate nationalists. 
The Nigerian government had kept communism under surveillance throughout the interwar 
years. Colonial governments also undertook their own counter-subversion campaigns. They 
issued propaganda, seized seditious literature, controlled education, and improved labour 
conditions, wages, and opportunities. Most surveillance of nationalist agitators took place 
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within the colonies but the Security Service and Special Branch undertook surveillance of 
students and travellers in Britain.  
 
The development however of ideologies with international implications in the interwar period 
meant that the British government feared global communism, fascism, and Islamism which 
meant that it undertook international surveillance of the movements.  As we have seen in 
Chapter 1 the creation of global ideologies led to the creation of interdepartmental 
committees in Whitehall, notably the Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Unrest, to co-
ordinate the activity of the CO and other departments. The Security Service undertook an 
imperial role in this wider activity.  It kept records, undertook the surveillance of colonial 
subjects in Britain and provided advice and liaison to colonial police and governments. 
During the Second World War this assistance was expanded by the creation of the Security 
Service’s DSO network throughout the world. 
 
During the Second World War surveillance, propaganda, and the improvement of political 
economic and social conditions were used to try to keep the colonial subjects loyal. Nigeria 
provides a useful case study of this process although as always it is necessary to be tentative 
about arguing that experience in West Africa was similar to that in other regions.
485
 The 
techniques and activity were further increased in the face of the communist threat posed by 
the Cold War, which led to the redevelopment of ‘imperial machinery’ to supervise and 
encourage anti communist activity in the colonies.
486
 The simultaneous advent of the Cold 
War and colonial disturbances however caused anti colonial activity to be conflated with 
communism and thus a national as well as an imperial threat which blurred the edges between 
the three activities.  
 
Cold War counter-subversion activities in the empire were co-ordinated in Whitehall through 
the CO.  The geographical departments, the Defence Department and the Information 
Services machinery worked together to achieve this.  The trajectory of the development of the 
counter-subversion machinery was to follow a similar pattern to the CO’s intelligence 
machinery with increasing attempts to centralise and co-ordinate it with the British 
machinery. The CO implemented counter subversion in the colonial empire through its own 
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machinery in the same way that it headed its own intelligence hierarchy, although in 1948/49 
it started to use propaganda material provided by the Central Information Office and the IRD 
in the FO. In late 1947 the CO and the FO started to look at propaganda but in late 1948 there 
was still no formal interdepartmental machinery for co-ordinating activity.
487
 The CO 
encouraged colonial governments to develop their intelligence machinery and it used its 
central and regional information departments to start a propaganda campaign against 
communism.
488
 Colonial information campaigns and activity were carried on through the 
early 1950s. In some colonies conditions became so bad that counter-insurgency was 
necessary. It was early recognised that suppressive action on its own was insufficient and so 
more positive aspects which came to be called hearts and minds were also tried although the 
effectiveness has been challenged in recent literature. 
 
The implementation of counter-subversion programmes: 
 
Counter-subversion programmes consisted of a number of activities carried out by specific 
elements of the intelligence machinery; information services, political action and propaganda 
and military and covert activity.  
 
The ‘carrot’ was very important. Propaganda and information services were an intrinsic part 
of counter-subversion and a very important part of the conduct of ‘political warfare’ during 
the Cold War. Information services dealt with overt activity essentially providing a positive 
view of Britain and the West. Propaganda and political warfare had played an important part 
in the Second World War.
489
 Government recognised the benefits of maintaining the system 
after the war.
490
 Some scholars have argued that as a result of the disbandment of the 
Ministry of Information that Britain did not have central propaganda machinery, however 
L’Etang has demonstrated that new management was integral to British government policy 
implementation both at home and overseas.
491
 After the war there was a series of 
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investigations into Information Services. 
492
 Implementation of the propaganda /information 
campaigns of the British government, after the demise of the Ministry of Information was 
carried out by the Information Services within each Whitehall department assisted by the 
Central Information Office. During the Cold War the Central Information Office concentrated 
on maintaining British prestige by emphasising British political freedom and economic 
success.
493
 The CO and the CRO both had Information Services as did the individual colonial 
governments. 
  
In addition to overt information campaigns the British government also used propaganda 
which was created and disseminated covertly. Much of this covert anti communist material 
was created centrally in the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department or the SIS.    
The FO co-ordinated liaison with the SIS through its Permanent Under Secretary’s 
Department (PUSD).  The FO’s Information Policy Department oversaw the Information 
Research Department (IRD) and the Cultural Research Department (CRD).
494
 These 
organisations worked in co-operation with the FO’s geographical departments. SIS handled 
‘black’ propaganda whilst IRD dealt with both ‘white’ and ‘grey’ propaganda.495 The process 
was supported by the IRD of the FO for white and grey propaganda but black un-attributable 
propaganda remained the role of the SIS. Black propaganda included the use of inserted 
articles, which could be misleading for political purpose and the ownership of radio stations 
and newspapers and news agencies which could be used to put out a particular line without it 
being clear it was generated by the British intelligence services.
496
 Implementation of the 
propaganda policies and materials used in counter -subversion generally lay with departments 
responsible so in the colonial empire the CO disseminated IRD material. 
 
Whilst counter subversion campaigns offered carrots they also relied upon the use of the 
stick. The development of British propaganda and cultural campaigns in the Cold War was 
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complemented by special operations. ‘Special Operations’ (SO) were paramilitary operations 
supporting local resistance movements from Soviet Occupied territories or émigré groups 
wishing to return to occupied countries. Special Operations involved military training and the 
supply of arms and communications equipment to guerrillas with the aim of destabilising 
foreign governments. These were often run by the SIS’s Directorate of Warfare.497  At the 
same time the British became concerned that operations might lead to the to break out of a 
third world war and so they decided to concentrate on  using  propaganda  demonstrating the 
advantages of the British way of life.
498
 The way in which the counter-subversion ‘stick was 
applied in foreign territories can be seen in the Middle East and in this area there were 
similarities with the way in which it was used in the colonial empire.  
 
The approach taken by the FO and COS to the problem of security against communist 
subversion in Arab states is illuminated by the appointment of security and police advisers to 
the Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan in the period 1950-1958. The Security Service, for example, 
through SIME, was involved in supporting counter subversion through the appointment of 
security advisers to governments and police forces. These approaches had considerable 
similarities to those used in the colonial empire. The focus of the counter-subversion 
programme was on human intelligence. Personal contacts were vital; in Iraq for example, the 
Defence Security Officer (DSO) worked very closely with the Director General of the Iraq 
Police and the Director of the CID.  In Lebanon the Chef du Sûreté Générale was provided 
with security adviser initially an ex chief of the Sudan Police, at British expense. The Chef du 
Sûreté Générale later liaised with the Security Service Security Liaison Officer (SLO) for 
Lebanon and Syria. In Jordan British influence over the Arab Legion was assisted by the fact 
that it was commanded by a British officer, Glubb Pasha until 1956. Coghill the Director 
General of Intelligence, Arab Legion which undertook security work for the whole of Iraq 
was also British and brought together Lebanese, Iraqi, and Jordanian intelligence in a way 
which prefigured the Bagdad Pact/CENTO arrangements. The CO played a role in this 
foreign activity despite its distrust of the concentration on communism in Whitehall. It helped 
to find personnel with colonial experience for Security Adviser jobs. It found for example, an 
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The Middle Eastern evidence also offers insight into some of the precedents that shaped the 
Security Service’s approach to the colonies after independence. Security Intelligence Middle 
East (SIME) assisted the Lebanese and Iraqi governments through their networks of SLOs 
and DSOs. The Joint Intelligence Committee Middle East (JIC (ME)) felt, for example, that 
the Iraq CID was the best source of knowledge about what was happening in Iraq for British 
needs. The British Defence Co-ordinating Council Middle East (BDCC (ME)) tasked the 
Security Service DSO to collaborate directly with the Director of the Iraq CID on security 
planning for war.
500
  Similar activity was carried out through SIFE in the Far East the SLOs 
appointed to some colonies also reported to regional British intelligence machinery although 
SIME was more interested in preparation for war than the Security Service in Britain.   
 
Despite the fact that the AC (O) had no colonial responsibility, the basic features of the 
developing model of  colonial counter-subversion and the response to colonial emergencies 
showed similar characteristics to AC(O)’s overall approach. In the colonial empire the CO 
co-ordinated counter subversion activity using its own resources. It passed on external 
propaganda resources received from other departments. It could provide specialist personnel 
with security and propaganda experience.  Like the Middle Eastern client states the colonial 
governments were expected to maintain their own security. The colonial governments used 
their own police and information services to manage the local situation but could expect 
advice and liaison from the Security Service and Whitehall.  SLOs in some colonies, such as 
Kenya and Aden, like the Security Advisers in the Middle and Far East also reported to the 
regional security intelligence machinery. SLOs focussed on the defence of the whole realm 
rather than specific individual colonial security situations which were carried out by local 
police. Personal contacts remained the ‘bread and butter ‘activity of SLOs in colonies and 
former colonies and allowed them to have more influence and access to information than the 
formal arrangements warranted. The British regional machinery also had a role in formal 
colonies, so it is possible to argue that there was a common approach. The SLOs in the 
Middle East also worked with local police forces some of which, like Jordan and Iraq had 
long term colonial police connections and administrative connections as well which included 
Indian input to the structure and training. The FO relied at least partially on personnel with 
colonial experience to act as advisers. 





Counter Subversion, Colonial Rule and Counter-Insurgency and the Colonial Office:  
   
It is now necessary to examine the detail of the ways in which the CO managed counter-
subversion programmes and to compare them with the management of counter-insurgency 
and other emergencies and the normal process of colonial rule.   
 
The global programme of counter-subversion was seen as necessary by the majority of other 
departments in Whitehall in particular the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence (MOD), and 
FO. Generally however, the CO did not accept the centrality of the communist threat in the 
empire and consequently its personnel had their own perception of the nature and value of the 
counter-subversion programmes in the empire. As discussed in the previous chapter, the CO 
possessed a group of technical departments which included Defence and General (later Police 
and Intelligence and Security departments were created after 1955 outside Defence). This 
group also included the CO’s Information Services. Geographical departments had the 
predominant responsibility but were expected to work in harmony with the technical 
departments. The CO also had international relations and economics departments which 
handled softer aspects of British counter-subversion policy and liaised with the governments 
of the colonies of foreign powers. The CRO dealt with aspects of counter subversion in the 
dominions and self governing colonies it tended to accept the importance of the communist 
threat. The CRO by contrast with the FO and CO, was organised on a functional basis and 
counter-subversion fell within the remit of a number of departments including Defence, 
Labour Relations, and Trades Unionism. Communism was dealt with by the Communications 
department. 
 
 A number of the activities which comprised counter-subversion were also used in other 
activities such as counter-insurgency and colonial rule. This makes analysis of counter 
subversion very complex because it can be difficult to establish whether a particular activity 
was intended to support one activity or a number of the three simultaneously. The techniques 
of colonial rule were akin to counter-subversion. The ‘carrot’ of reforms and benefits were 
used to develop support from particular groups seen as allies and the ‘stick’ of force was used 
against others who were not. Whilst there was no need to hide such action in the colonies 
themselves it was often politically convenient to undermine the anti-colonial nationalists and 
other political opposition by using underhand methods. The degree of autonomy afforded 
colonial governments meant that such activity might be conceived and carried out by colonial 
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governments, their security apparatus, and information services and merely reported back to 
Whitehall.  
 
The Cold War and the emphasis on global subversion by a foreign power rather than local 
actors meant that counter-subversion activities in the empire were initiated from Whitehall as 
part of a British policy although they often overlapped with local initiatives. The British 
government provided support to develop the ‘stick’ of the security and intelligence 
machinery, it also provided the ‘carrot’ of propaganda and information and pressured colonial 
governments to develop economic and labour measures to improve the lot of local people.    
Special organisations were set up in some colonial governments notably Malaya and 
Singapore to co-ordinate such activities.
501
 Finally when affairs were left to develop too far 
the same mix of activities with a marked increase in the security and military activity were 




Managing Counter-Subversion from 1956:  
 
In late 1955 the Prime Minister [Eden] suggested the creation of a new ‘ad hoc’ official 
committee to deal with counter subversion.
502
 Finlayson shows that in 1955 a number of 
departments were concerned about lack of information from the CO about colonial 
developments. The result was that Brook suggested that formation of the Colonial Policy 
Committee (CPC) was formed to deal with this problem although the Official Committee met 
only ten times between 1956 and 1962.
503
 Simultaneously the Ministerial Committee on 
Security in the Colonies commissioned General Templer to report on the colonial security 
situation both military and intelligence. This Committee on Security in the Colonies lasted 
from 1955 and 1958 and has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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In 1955 the COS and the Ministry of Defence carried out a study of threats posed by the 
Soviet Union noting that the threat of thermo-nuclear war had dropped but that the 
government of the Soviet Union was taking the opportunity to spread its ideas by 
subversion.
504
 The study saw different threats in different areas and advocated co-ordinated 
secret counter-subversion measures. Simultaneously the SIS was developing it ideas on how 
to develop ‘SPA’.505 ‘Counter subversion’ was seen by the armed forces as a new form of 
warfare to deal with changed nature of the threat.  The COS wanted to manage counter-
subversion throughout the world through the AC (O) Committee.
506
 Defence and the COS 
working in concert with the FO had already managed to force the CO to make reforms as a 
result of Templer Report.
507
 Then they sought to co-ordinate the CO’s activity through the 
JIC. 
 
The rationale for the appointment of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the 
Colonies appears to have been complex. The COS had become interested in the success of 
communist subversion and the possibilities of subversion and counter-subversion as tactics in 
the Cold War and were pressing the Prime Minister to implement these ideas. AC (O) was an 
official committee of an interdepartmental nature which dated from the period of labour 
government and dealing with these kinds of issues although its terms of reference did not 
permit it operate in empire. It answered to the Cabinet Committee on Security. The COS had 
considerable influence on the AC (O) indeed it had been partially created to neutralise them 
by providing an alternative forum to that in which decisions were made by the FO.  
It is also necessary to consider the administrative context.
508
 The Cabinet Secretary, Brook, 
took an important role inconsideration of the idea of the Official Committee on Counter 
Subversion in the colonies. He was interested in both the management of the cabinet 
machinery and colonial affairs. It appears that Eden was having a general clear out of old 
committees. Brook felt that AC (O) was too aggressive and anti-communist and  recognised 
that the Committee also gave too much power to the COS. Brook wanted to balance the 
principle of ministerial responsibility and the efficiencies of the Cabinet Committee structure 
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and also balance the influence of the civil against the military departments.  His solution was 
to officially affirm ministerial responsibility the FO was allowed to form its own 
departmental Committee on Counter Subversion and to control the activity of the SIS in this 
role. The colonial situation was more complex. Other departments were unsatisfied with the 
CO’s input on a number of fronts including constitutional development. The result was that 
whilst Brooke affirmed the official responsibility of the Colonial Secretary in fact, unlike the 
FO’s committee, the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies was a 





The Official Committee contained representatives of the CRO, FO, COS, Security Service 
and SIS. This meant that the CO had to take account of the views of other departments and 
may be seen in this way as part of the process of ‘taming ‘ or lessening the authority of the 
CO over colonial affairs and centralising management. It was limited however by being an 
‘ad hoc’ committee and had a limited number of meetings between 1955 and early 1958.510 
This suggests that like AC (O) the committee identified strategic priorities and then allocated 
limited financial resources (it appears that 25,000 pounds were available), to colonial 
governments and the intelligence services to carry them out. This suggests that it was 
different to the later Joint Action Committee which may have undertaken direct management 
of covert action however there is no doubt that such activity continued and there may be 
connections between this committee and the later counter subversion committee. 
   
The history of the development of the committees provides evidence of the interdepartmental 
conflicts within Whitehall over intelligence. The creation of the Official Committee on 
Counter Subversion in the Colonies generated a commentary on events by Sir Norman Brook, 
the Cabinet Secretary, for the Prime Minister which makes the disputes between the FO and 
CO clear. The decision to form the committees was, in part, a response to both the need to 
widen the scope of the anti- communist campaign carried out by AC (O) to include anti-
colonial nationalism, but also to lessen the COS influence on this committee.  Both the FO 
and the CO were in favour of limiting the influence of the COS, however they fought 
between themselves over the chairmanship of the committee. Brook had hoped, for example, 
that Sir Patrick Dean from the FO, who also chaired the JIC, might chair the Official 
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Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies but the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
did not want the additional influence to go to the FO. In the end Brook chaired the committee 
himself a decision which potentially made the committee very powerful. His personal interest 
in intelligence meant that he took more than an academic interest in the committee’s 
activities.
511
 There is no doubt that the end result was negative from a CO perspective 
although the Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies answered to the Colonial 
Policy Committee and the Secretary of State for the Colonies because the CO was forced to 
act in concert with a number of other departments.  The committee had representatives from 
the CRO, FO, Security Service, and SIS. By contrast the FO’s Counter Subversion 
Committee only had representatives from the FO and the SIS. The result was that FO and 
CRO influence over imperial affairs was increased. 
 
The CO’s other problem was the COS. The COS’s desire to undertake aggressive covert 
action worried the ‘civil’ departments which felt that counter-subversion was part of the 
normal policy-making process not a form of warfare and consequently not the sole preserve 
of the COS.
512
 Brook was concerned that the COS also wanted to control the SIS and its 
covert action programme.
513
 The FO had supported the COS in forcing reforms on the CO for 
its own ends
514
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The origins of the Official Committee on Counter Subversion: 
 
PREM 11/1582 contains a detailed discussion between the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
Secretary and in order to understand the forces shaping the creation of the Official Committee 
on counter Subversion in the Colonies and its terms of reference it is necessary to follow the 
argument in the file in detail in order to understand the process. Macmillan, then Foreign 
Secretary, started the administrative action which led to the committee when he wrote a 
memorandum on counter-subversion.
516
 This seems to have picked up on the points made in 
an existing COS paper although Brook described Macmillan’s memo as more nuanced.517  
The input of the COS and senior military figures was. The COS and Templer aggressively 
advocated their ideas about covert action through Macmillan to the FO and then to the Prime 
Minister. The personnel of the CO felt this was likely to undermine their position and 
undertook research into the source of the ideas in Macmillan’s memorandum. C.Y. Carstairs, 
a senior official in the CO and the Assistant Under Secretary responsible for the ‘defence 
group’ in the CO and the CO’s representative on the JIC, reported to the Permanent 




‘[…] I learn (from the W.O.) that the actual occasion for the Foreign Secretary’s minute 
was an after dinner discussion between Sir I. Kirkpatrick,
519
 Sir H. Parker,
520
 Sir G. 
Turner
521
 and the CIGS- the general subject having shortly before been discussed by the 
C.O.S. Ctee whose report was not, however, sent to the Minister. It is of interest that Sir 
G. Templer was, I am informed, head of S.O.E. at the time of the transaction referred to 
in the first part of para. 3 of my memorandum […]’ 
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The whole process illuminated the ongoing interdepartmental tensions over intelligence. C.Y. 
Carstairs of the Colonial Office noted that Sir Dick White, then Director General Security 
Service and within the year to become ‘C’, Head of the SIS, had opposed the creation of the 
committee.
522
 The opposition to the committees revealed schisms within the SIS. 
The Prime Minister, Eden, sought the advice of the Colonial Secretary on Macmillan’s 
proposal. Sir Norman Brook subsequently managed the negotiations between the FO and CO 
‘playing off’ the two secretaries of state against each other and providing his own 
commentary on the situation for the Prime Minister.
523
 Brook sought to control the 
development of the counter-subversion machinery. He wanted to limit the influence of the 
COS and to ensure that ‘counter-subversion' remained under the control of ministers.  
Brook intended to achieve his goals in a number of ways. Firstly he argued that it was 
necessary to abolish the AC (O) committee which covered the same area but on which the 
COS had influence.
524
  The next method was to try to ensure that the committee was chaired 
by Patrick Dean (FO) which would have tied it into the United Kingdom’s civil intelligence 
machinery because of Dean’s role in the JIC.525 Brook, however, recognised that Dean’s 
history of placing pressure onto the CO from his position in the JIC might mean it was too 
much to expect the Colonial Secretary to accept Dean as Chairman.
526
 This evidence supports 
Cormac’s arguments about the CO’s attack on the JIC and the JIO.527 In the end Brook 
himself became chairman, a move which tended to weaken the COS’s position and 
strengthened that of the Cabinet Office. 
 
Then Brook advised the Prime Minister to make  ‘C’s’ organisation, the SIS,  responsible for  
the active element  of counter-subversion because the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister 
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controlled the organisation, consequently control of the SIS could be kept out of the hands of 
the armed forces. The decision to use SIS strengthened the position of the FO within 
Whitehall.
528
 This reform was also important because it was the first formal redefinition of 
the geographical division of responsibilities between the Security Service and the SIS since 
the Attlee agreement, and the point where the SIS started to operate within empire. 
Because the independence of many colonies was imminent the CRO needed to be represented 
on the committee and the FO and the SIS also needed to have seats.
529
 As colonies became 
independent the CRO became a more important ‘player’ in Whitehall. As we have seen the 
CRO had gained a seat on the JIC in 1956. The allocation of a seat on the Official Committee 
on Counter Subversion allowed it to influence activity in what was otherwise the CO’s 
jurisdiction.
530
 The CRO also gained influence over the CO because the CO needed its 
assistance to restrain the FO’s attempts to gain control of all of the counter-subversion 
machinery and to support the civil departments’ attempts to control the COS.531  
 
Brook supported the view that responsibility needed to remain with the respective Secretaries 
of State in order to maintain civil control and that the committees should not have executive 
powers and consequently argued for two separate committees.
532
 In foreign areas whether 
‘free’, or under the control of communists, the FO was the appropriate organisation to 
administer counter-subversion. The FO could continue to use its own resources (presumably 
including the Information Research Department and the SIS) without reference to other 
departments in ‘foreign’ countries.533 Brook’s approach is interesting.   It has been argued 
that Brook did not like regional ‘professional’ intelligence organisations like SIME in which 
the COS had an important role in consequence Brook preferred an organisation answering to 
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 The empire had specific problems so it was appropriate that the CO 
held official responsibility. 
  
The Prime Minister, after pressure from COS and the FO, accepted the idea and decided it 
was necessary to coordinate ‘counter-subversion’ from Whitehall in the ‘United Kingdom’ 
interest.
535
 The purpose of the committee was to co-ordinate United Kingdom and imperial 
resources for ‘counter subversion’.  Because of this role the committee provides an example 
of how British and imperial intelligence was co-ordinated, demonstrated aspects of the 
developing professional agenda 
536





The negotiations over the composition of the counter-subversion committee also provide 
evidence of the development of the professional agenda in intelligence. Templer had sought 
to place the CO firmly into the British JIO. He tried to link the CO more closely to other 
intelligence machinery by creating an intelligence department within it to liaise with the 
Security Service, JIC, and SIS. He also sought to ensure that the professional agenda of the 
JIC and the Security Service found its way down to the territories.
538
 The development of the 
Official Committee on Counter Subversion continued that process. Whilst the responsibility 
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was acknowledged, the CO was forced to accept 
representatives of other departments in the planning process.  By contrast the FO was allowed 
to control its own counter-subversion activity without having representatives of other 
departments. This meant that SIS became responsible for a FO led programme of counter 
subversion. Interestingly the SIS carried out a programme of visits and assessments of 
colonial territories in 1956 but concluded that it would wait until the colonies became 
independent to intervene.
539
 This suggests that the jurisdictional boundaries were being 
eroded and the British professional intelligence machinery was becoming more influential. 
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All of these reforms were designed to improve technical efficiency, and make it easier to 
manage colonial threats centrally. 
  
The implementation of counter-subversion from Whitehall and the CO: 
 
How was counter-subversion implemented? Evidence about the activities of the machinery 
derives from three major sources: there are the minutes of the Cabinet Committee on Counter 
Subversion in the Colonies 1956; a series of files from the CO about the studies involved; 
540
 
and there are files about the counter subversionary activities of the FO.
541
 The FO’s ‘counter 
subversion’ activity seems to have continued into the 1970s in the Middle East, South 
America and South East Asia. 
 
In 1956 the Official Committee on Counter Subversion called for papers to identify areas in 
which covert activity might be useful.
542
 The first areas examined were Nigeria, the Gold 
Coast, the Caribbean and the Central African Federation.
543
 The first study for the committee 
was on the situation in the West Indies.
544
 The CO’s West Indies Department argued that the 
first targets should be the leadership of the Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) in British 
Guiana.  
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The situation revealed cultural fault lines within the CO and the Colonial Service. There was 
a traditional dislike of spying and espionage. There was also a feeling amongst some 
personnel that covert operations could be counterproductive.  Furedi argues that colonial 
service personnel were less concerned with the threat than personnel in the CO. He argues 
that the CO was concentrating on repressive action but that it realised that this could have a 
political approach rather than a purely military one and that Renison was appointed to 
implement this approach.
545
  Philip Rogers in the West Indies Department was an advocate, 









 ‘[…] I sincerely trust that your counter subversives (or whatever they are called) are 
not allowed to interest themselves in the [indecipherable] of open constitutional 
opposition to government which Mr Barton describes […] Cox had noted earlier ‘[…] 
the role of the Brook Committee to argue against counter subversion as well as for it 
[…]’548  
 
 The context of this document needs to be considered however.  Renison had recent 
experience in British Honduras of dealing with a radical political party and seems to have 
attributed some of his success to constitutional behaviour. 
549
 Furedi argues that in 1956/57 
Renison  had developed a constitutional model which was involved in capturing the PPP and 
forcing it to work within guidelines acceptable to the British 
550
 At the same time Renison’s 
initial experience had been gained in Ceylon where there was a considerable degree of self 
government  . Seen in this context covert action could have undermined the progress made to 
date in British Guiana. At the same time these arrangements were not complete so 
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information which would enable a deal to be forced upon the leadership of the PPP would 
have been useful. 
  
The West Indies department also wanted the committee to investigate the situation in 
Trinidad where there were labour problems. The West Indies Department recommended 
assistance from British Trade’s Union officials and Labour politicians in the formation of 
political parties.
551
 In this case we can see that covert operations were an extension of normal 
political practice. Given that the British Trades Unions were prepared to work with the 
government it was only necessary to use covert operations to give the Trades Unionists 
greater credibility with indigenous labour movements and people and by providing an outlet 
for discontent to reduce radicalism. This evidence shows that firstly that there was a concern 
in the CO to use political methods where possible and only use covert methods where 
necessary.  
   
The CO attempted to keep control over the process of counter-subversion even after the 
Committee was in operation. The CO, for example, laid down the process of writing papers 
for the committee in strict terms specifying who was to see material and in which order 





 ‘[…] Geographical Departments to prepare a first draft on the political situation in the 
territory, and for this draft to be passed through Mr Barton for his annotations on the 
security aspect, to me for writing up for the Committee.[…]’553 
 
The ‘Brook Committee’s’ activities raise a number of issues. What action resulted after the 
formation of the committee and who carried it out? Did it become a permanent way of co-
ordinating covert action as an ongoing policy?  Was the application of counter-subversion a 
policy, in itself, designed to achieve UK interests in the longer term or was it merely part of 
the machinery of civil policy making? The records of the Committee do not show what action 
resulted from the country studies.  
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The most important point is that the SIS seems to have become more involved in covert 
action in the empire in a reversal of the usual practice.
554
 There are a number of letters from 
SIS (Gold Coast) (Central Africa) which suggests that SIS had conducted reconnaissance of 
the territories concerned and that they had appointed an officer to ‘cover’ Africa. In a letter 
on a file on the Gold Coast SIS decided that action in 1956 was not necessary but wanted to 
take action to prepare for the time at changeover when defence internal security and external 







Counter- subversion after 1956: 
 
It appears that the counter-subversion machinery continued to develop. The original Official 
Committee on Counter Subversion apparently existed from early 1956 until early 1957.
556
 
‘Counter subversion’, however, definitely continued after that date. A counter-subversion 
committee reappears on the record in 1962-1963.
557
 Hence whilst the  documentary record is 
sparse  it is likely that the FO’s  Counter Subversion Committee created in 1956 continued to 
operate until at some point prior to, or in the year 1963,
558
 when its status was changed to 
reflect the changing responsibilities of the Whitehall departments involved in foreign affairs.  
In 1964 the Counter Subversion Committee became an Official Cabinet Committee chaired 
by the Foreign Office with representation from the CRO, CO, Defence and the two 
intelligence services. In March 1965 the membership of the committee was specifically 
amended to allow the Information Research (IRD), Economic Relations, and Permanent 
Under-Secretary’s (PUSD) Departments, of the FO to be represented.559 The Counter 
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Subversion Committee answered to the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee. 
The relationship between this Committee and ‘DOPC/OPD (O) Joint Action Committee’ 




The Counter Subversion Committee reforms in 1965 are better documented than the 1956 
reforms. The committee’s purpose was now: 
 
 ‘To keep under review threats and potential threats, by subversion, to British interests 
overseas, and, where necessary, to recommend and co-ordinate action to combat such 
threats (SV (64)1)’.561 
  
This is interesting because no distinction was now being made between the empire and 
external countries so far as counter subversion was concerned. The composition and role of 
the Counter Subversion Committee had changed: 
 
 ‘It has also helped to promote closer coordination between Whitehall Departments 
particularly where the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), the Foreign Office 
(FO) and the Colonial Office (CO) have interlocking interests’.562  
 
In 1958 there were still an FO and an official cabinet committee handling counter -
subversion. By 1965 a single committee had this role. This leaves open the question of how 
the coordination of counter subversion was handled in the empire between 1958 and 1963. It 
may simply have been handled internally by the CO using the geographical departments and 
ISD to manage the necessary relationships with the British professional intelligence 
machinery and the colonial governments.  
 
The Counter Subversion Committee in the early 1960s considered general counter subversion 
policy. The Committee made recommendations to the responsible departments such as the 
FO, CO, and CRO, and assisted in the co-ordination of action between departments but 
responsibility for policy and executive action rested with the ‘political departments’. The 
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Committee advised the Interdepartmental Review Committee, which was responsible for 
resourcing activity, annually on the quantity of unattributable and covert propaganda needed 
in the following year. The main committee met quarterly. It supervised a series working 
groups and collated and supported their recommendations. The committee also considered 





The detailed work of planning counter subversion was carried out by Working Groups 




‘ The major instruments of counter measures form the subject of recommendations by 
Working Groups, include economic and technical aid and technical assistance , military 
and security advice , information and cultural activities including sponsored visits , 
administrative and educational as well as other activities of an unattributable and covert 
nature.’ 565 
 
The close relationship of the Committee to the covert operations element of the FO is 
noticeable. Material created by working groups was sent for approval to the agencies which 
carried them out. 
 
‘Departmental drafts of Country Studies should be sent to the friends, the Secret 
Service [sic] (Security Service/SIS?) and Foreign Office IRD for clearance rather than 
through working groups or the main committee […]’566 
 
The significance of the direct connection between the counter-subversion machinery and the 
executive agencies demonstrates how counter-subversion was probably being planned 
centrally and carried out using British rather than colonial assets. There is evidence about 
some specific examples of counter subversion activities managed directly by British assets.  
The evidence includes, ‘A study of the development of Sino-Soviet Influence in Black 
Africa’ and the ‘Reports on the Activities of Working Groups and ad hoc meetings’ presented 
to each quarterly meeting of the main committee. The materials are fairly explicit about the 
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nature of counter-subversion measures.
567
 They included economic and technical aid, 
technical assistance, military and security advice, information and cultural activities 
administrative and educational advice and assistance and covert activity. Trades unions were 
an important element in counter-subversion activity. It was believed that diverting labour 
activity into trade unionist activity through British influenced unions and the provision of 
government labour officers was a good way of defusing labour conflict and preventing 
communist infiltration.
568
 The provision of defence attaches,
569
 advice on police matters, 
570
 




It is impossible within the ambit of this thesis to consider all of the activities used in counter 
subversion. Some aspects of covert activity however, can be discerned. One of the most 
important covert measures in counter-subversion was the provision of ‘unattributable 
propaganda’. In the mid 1960s unattributable propaganda was intended to directly influence 
opinion in target groups in order encourage them to undertake specific actions. It was closely 
associated with more general ‘messages’ comparing the democratic British way of life with 
repression in communist societies and similar ideas were used openly by British agencies. 
The messages were carried overseas in BBC broadcasts on radio and television;
572
 and by 
setting up of television networks in developing countries.
573
 In the early 1960s the IRD and 




The key point about unattributable or black propaganda was the necessity to give it the gloss 
of ‘respectability’ consequently it had to be accepted by ‘independent’ media without them 
questioning the source of the material.  This could be particularly difficult in some territories 
and the SIS set up its own outlets. SIS ‘[…] controlled news agencies and commercial 
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publishers continue to be effective media of covert and unattributable propaganda which 
could profit us […]’ 575  
 
Covert activity to support specific, individual, British operations was undertaken in addition 
to propaganda campaigns. This included bribing individual politicians. It may be assumed 
that other pressures, including blackmail over sexual peccadilloes and the threat of violence, 
may also have been used but there is no evidence to prove this. The existence of bribery is 
explicitly revealed in a 1965 document written by the FO about Soviet and Chinese 
penetration of Africa. 
 
‘18 In a continent where political influence depends more perhaps than anything else on 
personalities, we should not overlook the possibility of a concentration of financial and 
other support on particular individuals. Bribery is still an accepted and ‘respectable’ 
practice in Africa. African leaders are often ready to be rewarded by those who wish to 
be their friends. We could do ourselves more harm than good if we imitated the cruder 
efforts of the Chinese and others to ‘buy’ individuals with outright offers of money for 
their personnel use; whatever they may say Africans expects different standards from 
the West. But we might , on occasion, achieve much the same objectives by the more 
material forms of flattery, involving coveted prestige gifts , specially lavish hospitality 
and other tokens of personal attention, all inexpensive to ourselves, but of 
disproportionate value to the recipient. At the same time we must remember the 
personal factor in Africa works both ways; there is no continent which better repays 
Western care in selecting diplomatic and other representatives who can make their 
impact because of the force of their characters and to just because of the importance of 
their principals.’ 576  
 
Paragraph 20 of the same note also states that up and coming politicians should be identified 
and that the British must not be trapped into supporting the ‘status quo’.  This may reflect 
experience in the Middle East where the US supported new movements whilst the British 
supported established regimes which worked to British disadvantage. 
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It is now necessary to turn to the development of the methods of coordinating and 
implementing counter-subversion have to be seen in the context of British administrative and 
intelligence developments during the period 1956-1966. The JIC, for example, developed 
until it had outgrown its original purpose as a military committee and the structure of the 
Cabinet Office had to be developed to absorb it. The Cabinet Office machinery also acquired 
‘Joint Action Committees’ and later an Intelligence Coordinator. In the CRO various aspects 
of security information were handled by the Communications, Political Affairs and Defence 
departments. These departments within the CRO liaised with the new governments but shared 
the Security Intelligence Advisers (SIA) and Inspector General Colonial Police (IGCP) with 
the CO which provided continuity. The SIAs were abolished in 1965 however the same 
personnel continued in the same role in the Security Service. The IGCP became the Overseas 
Police Adviser and ended up in the FCO. The FCO and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 
became responsible for all overseas intelligence activity except security intelligence training. 
The growth of SIS responsibilities was a victory for the FO and the SIS over the Security 
Service and was due in part to financial stringencies. British High Commissions and SIS staff 
then took over intelligence liaison.
577




The modification of the imperial intelligence machinery in Singapore and British 
Guiana to facilitate American intervention: 
 
It is now necessary to place the British counter –subversion programme into the context of 
the American counter-subversion programme. It is important to do this because the two 
programmes overlapped and because the development of the American programme caused 
changes to the British machinery as the Americans intervened in a number of colonies 
directly to achieve their own objectives. The American government had pressed the British 
government to allow the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate in British colonies but 
generally this had been resisted by the CO and CRO which wished to keep the ‘status quo’. 
SIS however seems to have become progressively more integrated with the CIA which does 
not seem to have hesitated to have pressured the government and the SIS to co-operate as 
Britain’s power waned. There seems to have been a determined effort to intervene in the early 
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1960s in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and later in Southern Rhodesia) in 
Singapore and in British Guiana. 
  
It has been argued that the Cold War was driven by two ideologies. The United States’ vision 
was a world shaped on American ideas with free markets and a capitalist ideology.
578
 These 
ideas emerged in the course of nineteenth century and helped to shape American intervention 
in the world in the post world period.
579
 This did not initially involve supporting American 
business directly.
580
 Russian ‘communist’ ideology was in conflict with the capitalist 
ideology of the United States. Americans conflict with Russian ideas helped to convince the 
Americans to move away from isolationism to intervention.
581
 This brought the United States 
directly into conflict with the colonial powers after the Second World War. It believed that 
the way to achieve stability was to reform ex colonies on American lines. Americans divided 
the colonial powers into two groups. The British who were prepared to decolonise quickly 
and used localised institutional structures and the French, Dutch, and Portuguese who wished 
to hold onto their empire in the longer term and like the Americans preferred assimilation.
582
 
In the process the Americans created the idea of the Third World. Ideology helps to explain 
the ambivalent American view towards Britain and the British Empire. In the post war world 
Britain was seen as colonial power were prepared to meet American needs by decolonising 




American ideas were modified in the early 1950s by the reality of the Cold War.
584
 America 
became expansionist and interventionist. The Americans wanted to Americanise regimes but 
in the context of the perceived ‘left wing ‘ nature of many local political movements and the 
perception that such regimes were either supported by  or would seek the support of the 
Soviet Union they were prepared to intervene. The situation and strategic concerns associated 
with the policy of containment  resulted in the Americans frequently encouraging reliable non 
ideological military regimes and allowing the British a certain amount of manoeuvre room 
over matters of empire. 
585
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It is important to take this background into consideration when considering the development 
of ‘counter-subversion’ policies. The British and the Americanisms were both involved in 
counter-subversion but with different long term intentions. Both governments wanted to limit 
the spread of Soviet influence and create stable states. Fundamentally however there were 
major differences in the ideological rationale for such a process the British wanted to hold 
onto as much power and prestige as they could  and were not interested in the ‘American 
mission of recreating American  society internationally. The British had already involved 
spread a version of their society and ideas through a number of mechanisms in colonial 
territories. 
 
Methods were required to achieve these objectives. The British had experience of colonial 
rule which at a local level required techniques of both reward and coercion, sought to identify 
local allies, and to manipulate local conflicts to the colonial power’s advantage. The 
Americans had to develop such a process. They had experience of colonial rule in the 
Philippines 
586
and of influencing states in South America and the Caribbean.  Despite these 
fundamental differences of intention and understanding the outlines of counter-subversion 
process were remarkably similar. 
 
The development of counter-subversion in the colonies was part of a wider global trend 
caused by the Cold War consequently it is necessary to see the development of the machinery 
for carrying colonial counter-subversion out in that context. Singapore was an interesting 
case because it was both a colonial possession and a strategic base for the projection of 
British power which the British wished to retain. The American government was worried 
about communist subversion in the colony and the region and had its own ideas about 
counter-subversion. The case of Singapore reveals some of the tensions and differences 
between the two allies.  Singapore also has to be seen in the wider context of regional 
development particularly the development of SEATO. Singapore was undergoing 
decolonisation contemporaneously with the development of the British counter-subversion 
machinery and may have played a part in causing the British machinery to develop.  
Singapore underwent relatively ‘hostile’ decolonisation in which the British lost control of 
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the process of handover once Marshall had been elected premier in April 1955.  Marshall was 
weak politically, but sought to speed up decolonisation.   
 
This section will deal with American intervention in British counter -subversion operations. 
The way in which the Americans intervened in Singapore may provide insight into their 
approach in British Guiana. In order to do this it will examine: the US ability to use the 
interdepartmental rivalries and British national priorities to achieve its own national ends; the 
machinery created to allow US/UK co-operation in the empire; the American perception of 
counter-subversion which overlapped with but also differed from British concepts; the way in 
which the US government carried out counter-subversion covertly in British colonies.  
  
As previously discussed the British government reformed its counter-subversion programme 
in 1955 and 1956 by creating co-ordinating committees. Counter -subversion was becoming 
increasingly important element of British policy implementation. South East Asia was a vital 
area of interest for the British government. There was greater co-operation between Whitehall 
departments than was normal in imperial matters in Asia. Counter-Subversion in South East 
Asia was also a priority for the United States government making its implementation 
important in maintaining the alliance.  The UK and the US were co-operating on counter-
subversion operations in South East Asia through South East Asia Treaty Organisation from 
1955 after the French lost Indochina and the Bandung Conference led to some states 
becoming non-aligned. Co-operation revealed differences in approach to counter-subversion 




The US government recognised British interests in theory, but in practice regularly interfered 
in Singapore and Malaya, and possibly elsewhere as well, in its own interests. 
588
 It is clear 
from the titles of some withheld files from the CO1035 file series that the CO was aware of 
United States National Intelligence estimates and of the presence of the CIA in various 
colonial settings.
589
 P.H. Dean, the Chairman of the JIC, the Governor of Singapore and the 
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The US government had the following resources in Singapore and possibly in other British 
colonies, such as Jamaica, which could be used independently of British control. In British 
colonies the US government was represented by a Consul General who reported to the State 
Department. In Singapore the US had a CIA station co-located with British Intelligence (JIC 
FE and SIFE) in the Commissioner General’s regional headquarters at Phoenix Park. They 
also had a US Information Service office in the city. Official liaison was carried out between 
the Consul General and the Governor and also directly at an official level but the Americans 
did not disclose everything they were doing to the Governor and the colonial government. 
 
In addition to working with official organisations the US government worked with the 
International Confederation of Free Trades Unions which had split from the World 
Federation of Trades Unions (WFTU) in 1949 to implement it counter-subversion 
programme. In Singapore, for example, there was an American labour organiser from the 
American Federation of Labour-Central Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) who was 
working to develop the Singapore Trades Union Council (one of a number of unions in the 




The Americans became seriously alarmed about communist subversion in Singapore 
following the election of Marshall in April 1955. The US believed in direct action against 
communist activity. It wanted new states to ‘sign up’ with the West but its actions were 
influenced by an underlying anti-colonial ideology. The Americans sold their conception of 
culture and democracy as the alternative to communism. The US modified its anti-colonial 
message in return for bases and resources in the Cold War. By contrast the British wanted to 
maintain as much power as they could, and incorporate as many ex colonies as possible into a 
Commonwealth structure. They were prepared to accept neutrality, ideally pro Western 
                                                 
590
 CO1035/123 Organisation for Counter Subversion in Singapore 1954-56. Note on Counter Subversive 
Organisation in Singapore February 1956 para. 1-5; Top Secret Record of a Meeting  on Counter Subversion at 
Government House Singapore 2 February 1956  Present: Governor Sir Robert Black,  Mr P.H. Dean, Chairman 
of the JIC,  Mr Goode, the Counter Subversion Officer and also Secretary of the Defence  and Internal Security 
Committee. Mr Broome Deputy Counter Subversion Officer and  Assistant Secretary of Defence and Internal 
Security   Committee and Assistant Counter Subversion Officer  
591
 S.R. Long, ‘Mixed up in power politics and the Cold War: The Americans, the ICTFU and Singapore’s 
labour movement (1955-1966)’  Journal of Southeast Asian Studies  40:02 (2009) 323-351; S.J. Long ‘Winning 
hearts and minds: US Psychological Operations in Singapore 1955-61’ Diplomatic History 32:5 (2008) 899-937. 
226 
 
neutrality, on the part of new states. There were however splits amongst different British 
departments over the exact way in which this process should be handled and what the most 
important aspects were.   
 
The local representative of the State Department, the Consul General for Singapore sent a 
series of alarmist reports to Washington.
592
 As a result of these fears the organisation for co-
ordinating US covert operations, especially psychological operations, the Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB) became involved. Its working committee consisted of 
representatives of  the State Department, CIA, US Information Agency (USIA),  International 
Development Administration, Defense, and a number of presidential special advisers They 
recognised two American interests one was about preventing subversion and the  other was 
avoiding in being seen as supporting colonialism but despite USIA opposition counter-
subversion action was considered more important. 
    
The State Department sought to pressure the British into action through personal contact, 
through official level contact in London and through local pressure in Singapore. The State 
Department recognised the CO’s opposition to American intervention and pressured the 
Foreign Secretary and the FO to control/influence the CO. The British were split internally 
over what approach to take. The security and intelligence aspects were considered in 
discussions in 1956-57 which makes the major divisions of opinion on this matter clear.
593
 
Some thought that ongoing constitutional development was the way forward. They were 
opposed to covert intervention; this group appears to have included the Governor and some 
officials in the CO. The FO and COS were concerned about the security of the base as a base 
for projecting British power in the region. The FO recognised the need to respond to 
American concerns even where they did not share them. The Americans had identified a 
group of officials in Whitehall who wanted to hold Singapore. This group were prepared to 
use the threat of communist subversion in the colonies to justify repression.
594
 The US 
Department of State however thought that the British did not have sufficient forces to hold 
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the colony and that time was running out to use long term counter-subversion techniques. The 
perspective demonstrates the different motivations of counter-subversion policy. 
    
It is probable that it was American pressure that caused P.H. Dean, the Chairman of the JIC, 
to travel to Singapore to discuss counter-subversion with the Government of Singapore 
including co-operation and liaison with the Americans.
595
 Dean started by outlining the 
London position on using counter-subversion and ‘the increasing importance which was 
attributed to such means in order to implement the wider policy of Her Majesty’s 
Government’.  In discussion the FO recognised the importance of responding to American 
pressure but was annoyed at the interference.
596
 The Governor Sir Robert Black argued 
against covert action because Marshall was not a communist, and if covert activity was 
discovered, particularly if it was seen to be carried out by UK forces for UK benefit, it would 
undermine the authority of the Singapore government amongst the general population.
597
 The 
Governor’s view represented that of some officials in the CO but not all. 
 
The organisation for carrying out counter-subversion in Singapore was secret. It consisted of 
two co-ordinators, both members of the Defence and Internal Security Committee, 
theoretically answerable to the Council of Ministers through a working committee but in 
practice under the oversight of the Governor whose responsibility was to ensure that they met 
both Singapore and UK needs.
598
 The committee was undertaking three kinds of activity:   
‘[...] i counter propaganda; ii positive and productive work by Government departments; iii 
unattributable clandestine activities [...]’.599 The note made it clear clandestine activity was 
considered extremely important because time in the local situation did not allow for the 
success of longer term measures dealing with trades unions and education.  
 
There was however general agreement between the British and Americans about technical 
aspects of counter-subversion. The State Department raised four heads: Labour; Education; 
Press/ Propaganda; and General points in a circular to be discussed with the British. Both 
repressive and positive approaches were recommended to achieve each objective.  Labour 
should be protected by better work legislation and free trades unions should be encouraged. 
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Western employers, like Canadian Ford in Singapore, should be pressured to deal with 
problems. The ICFTU should be encouraged but left wing unions should be forced to re-
register on an annual basis. Educational provision at all levels should be improved. 
Educational provision emphasising Chinese culture and technology should be encouraged 
however  schools should be reorganised to weaken the ‘communist’ management structure 
and teacher's curriculum and text books should be controlled. (The British were actually 
doing this). A ‘free’ Chinese vernacular press should be encouraged but Communist left wing 
papers ought to be controlled by using building regulations to shut down presses and denying 
the publishers news print. Generally repressive power should be used to protect anti-
communist forces and crush communist organisations.
600
 These objectives changed slightly 
over the next couple of years however they do give a sense of what the Americans wanted.  
 
Whilst the US was seeking to pressure the British there are some indicators that there was co-
operation at a working level. The State Department’s ideas were partly based on 
correspondence with the US Consul General who communicated with colonial officials. The 
British were already intervening in the supply of school textbooks. The British Counter 
Subversion Officer had denied foreign currency to a newspaper proprietor to induce him to 
change his policy. The Americans also seem to have been aware of the covert duties of the 
Counter Subversion Officer. 
  
Whilst it is clear is that a substantial element of the pressure for intelligence reform in the CO 
and the colonies was the result of interdepartmental pressure from other departments in 
Whitehall. It is also clear that from late 1955 there was substantial American pressure on the 
British government and the CO about counter-subversion operations in Singapore and the 
Federation of Malaya.
601
 The pressure started in December 1955 when the State Department, 
after receiving an assessment on problems in Singapore and Malaya by the Consul General, 
Eric Koch, decided to   place pressure of the British government to take action against 
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 The OCB (a committee of the National Security Council) directed 
the State Department and other agencies to work out a detailed plan for intervention.
603
 The 
US proposals included the operation of US resources inside Singapore and Malaya and 
support for the development of British information campaigns. The only dissenting voice was 
that of the United States Information Service (USIS) which argued that it did not want be 





The US government placed pressure at three levels. It used personal contact between Dulles 
the Secretary for State and the British Foreign Secretary. It used the US Embassy to place 
pressure on UK ministers and directly onto UK departments, predominantly the FO at an 
official level. It also used the US Consul Generals in the various colonies involved to place 
pressure directly on the Governor and British officials in the colonies concerned. The OCB 
and State Department came up with a nine point detailed plan
605
 and the State Department 
promulgated this as a very detailed five phase plan covering a mixture of both carrots and 
sticks under the major headings: Labor, Educational Institutions, Press, Propaganda, and 
General which covered a detailed expensive and intrusive set of points to be carried out by 
the British.
606
 The issue of counter-subversion was raised on Eden’s visit to Washington in 
January 1956   but the Americans faced opposition. The British Ambassador, Sir Herbert 
Graves, and Archibald Campbell the Colonial Attaché were co-operative but reserved. At this 
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point the local authorities in Singapore approached the US Consul General asking what his 
reaction would be to the re-imposition of direct rule. The State Department agreed to 
American support subject to the British considering other action implementing counter-
subversion programmes and seeking the support of friendly Asian nations.
607
 Whilst Sir 
Hubert Graves and the Colonial Attaché were soon discussing practical issues with the State 
Department including the detail of liaison with various levels of government.
608
  Soon 
however it became apparent that there was considerable resistance at each level of British 
government to the American intervention. 
  
The CO resisted American pressure in a number of ways. It promised action and then 
deliberately prevaricated to waste time before failing to make good on its promises. The 
Governor and British colonial officials also failed to act.
609
 The State Department responded 
by placing pressure of the FO to make the CO comply. Talks were conducted in detail, for 
example at one set of discussions in Singapore the Governor and a representative of the JIC 
(FE) met with the US Consul General, Durbrow, to discuss intelligence related material.
610
 
The US Consul General argued that the dominant faction in the British government and 
colonial authorities did not want to implement counter-subversion because they felt they 
could rely on armed force and the greater the threat of subversion the more excuse they had 




This series of documents provide a great deal of useful information about the relationship 
between British colonial and American intelligence machinery, which it might be argued, is 
useful for understanding not only the situation in Singapore and Malaya but also offers 
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insight into the later situation in British Guiana. The Americans were clearly used to 
intervening directly at a number of levels in colonial situations utilising a multi- level 
diplomacy to push their ideas on the British.  
 
The documents also provide a great deal of information about the American concept of 
counter-subversion activity. These points can be compared with those considered by the 
British in the discussion of their counter subversion departments in both Singapore and 
Malaya.
612
 The Americans went on to operate in Singapore until the early 1960s without 
keeping the British fully informed. The experience in Singapore demonstrates how the 
Americans used internal divisions in Whitehall and the British need for American support to 
pressure the British and colonial governments on internal affairs. It also shows how closely 
the British and American intelligence machinery co-operated. There were direct contacts at 
working level in London and the colonies. Undoubtedly when time came to manage covert 




The co-ordination of British, American, and imperial intelligence structures in Britain, 
Malta, and British Guiana: 
 
The Americans were used to working with the FO, SIS, and the Security Service on Cold 
War problems but not with the CO and Security Service on imperial issues.
 613
 The Security 
Service, for example, had been held directly to account by the American government on a 
number of occasions. Sir Dick White, for example, was summoned to FBI headquarters to 
explain British security breaches.
614
 SIS had also been subject to direct interference. 
 
 Co-ordination took place at different levels: inter-ministerial; at official level with the US 
embassy in London; (a process made easier by the presence of CIA officers working closely 
with SIS in London) and locally in British Guiana. There was also contact between officials 
of the British Guiana government and the United States Consul General. US Consulates 
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General were bases for the United States Information Service (USIS). The FBI worked 




There is evidence from Malta which provides a snapshot of some of the liaison arrangements 
between the British and Americans which provide additional insight.
616
  The UK High 
Commissioner in Malta worked closely with the US Consul General but it was decided that 
the Defence Security Officer (Malta)’s sources should not be revealed to the US Consul 
General, only to Washington. 
617
 The provision of information about specific intelligence 
assets indicates a very intimate level of co-operation. The Security Service kept the CIA 
London Station directly informed of events in Malta, although CO officials pointed out that 
keeping the Americans informed was not strictly an intelligence matter but one for the CO 
and FO.  There was regular liaison between the CO’s Mediterranean Department and the US 
Embassy in London.  The Secretary of the JIC suggested to the CO that it should let the 
British Embassy in Washington know what was being discussed. The fascinating thing about 
this source is that the CIA and American Embassy seem to have had intimate access to 
British and colonial governments at an official level in a way analogous to that enjoyed by 
Commonwealth High Commissioners and did not hesitate to criticise and pressure British 
officials.  
 
The Americans also intervened in the colonies by using the CIA. From the mid 1950s, for 
example, the CIA had kept the situation in British Guiana under surveillance,
618
 but 
American intervention in Guianese politics from late 1961 changed the nature of intelligence 
co-operation and the role of its various participants.
619
 In August 1961 the UK and US 
governments signed a formal intelligence agreement to allow the CIA to operate in British 
Guiana. The agreement was expanded on 28 April 1962.
620
 In 1961-62 the Colonial Secretary 
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participated in the process which led to permission being given by the British government for 
the CIA to operate in British Guiana. It is clear that the US government found the CO 
difficult so they placed pressure on the FO with the aim of getting the Prime Minister (PM) to 
overrule the CO by arguing that British Guiana was a significant threat to Anglo-American 
relations.
621
 The Colonial Secretaries Ian Macleod and later Reginald Maudling were 
certainly aware of the negotiations with the United States government but there was CO 
resistance nonetheless. Some personnel in the CO, probably the SIA who was a Security 
Service officer, the Defence, Intelligence and Police Department who liaised with the British 
professional intelligence machinery and senior personnel in geographical departments might 
also have known of CIA intervention. These groups knew about the SLO and the system of 
security intelligence liaison and increasingly provided liaison between the CO and the SIS. 
 
CIA Intervention in British Guiana: 
 
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated clandestinely in British Guiana as they 
had in Singapore, through the Central Industrial Organisation (CIO), an American trade union 
organisation.
622
 Financed by the CIA the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and the CIO 
advised and supported the British Guiana Trades Union Council (BGTUC) and its unions and 
the PNC with funds, propaganda, and liaison officers.
623
 When the Jagan government sought 
to control the CIA’s union, the Guiana Workers Industrial Union (GWIU), it resulted in a 
major strike and riots in 1963. The CIA may have provided weapons and explosives. The 
most intense period of American pressure was between 1962 and 1964. In 1963 the 
Americans pressured the British to take direct control of the colony again but the British 
resisted. This led to preparation in the CO and in British Guiana in case the Colonial 
Secretary agreed to this. The CIA tried to influence Guianese voters using radio broadcasts 
and ‘false stories inserted in local newspapers. This suggests the collusion of newspaper 
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owners, editors, and journalists or at least their ‘unwitting’ use of ‘black 
‘propaganda.624Again this had similarities with American intervention in Singapore. 
 
A liaison system between local British and American intelligence agencies in British Guiana 
was necessary but the details surviving are sketchy. There were already a number of existing 
mechanisms elsewhere for liaison between the Security Service, FBI, SIS and the CIA.
625
 
Various sources suggest that both the Governor and the SLO knew of CIA intervention. 
Intelligence liaison in British Guiana may have been through David Rose in the Deputy 
Governor’s Office.626 At a practical/professional level it seems likely that the Commissioner 
and Head of Special Branch would need to know about CIA operations if only to prevent 
local police interfering with them accidentally. 
  
At a local level there was diplomatic contact between the US Consul General, the Governor 
and the government of British Guiana, and local politicians. In addition officers from the 
Department of State visited the Governor.
627
 The CIA and AFL/CIO operated in the colony.    
The British SLO based in Trinidad knew of CIA intervention as did the Governor and senior 
officers in the colonial government such as the Chief Secretary and the Head of Special 
Branch, however clearly the PPP Ministers could not be trusted with information about US 
involvement. This meant that British intelligence activity had to be split into two parts. The 
ongoing preparation for handover and the security needs of the new government and the 
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The chapter has demonstrated that when it became important to add covert policy 
implementation to the list of the duties of the intelligence machinery, that the same long term 
factors which affected the development of the information collecting machinery remained 
important. The new machinery drew on old imperial and later Second World War precedents. 
It reflected the much greater centralisation of colonial policy making under the control of the 
Cabinet and its machinery and the wider needs of British national policy. These needs 
resulted in important modifications to the intelligence coordinating machinery in Whitehall 
and the creation of some specialised machinery in the colonies. A surprising aspect of the 
development of the machinery was the need to modify it to liaise directly with American 
organisations which were directly interfering in a number of colonies and the way in which 
the Americans used interdepartmental conflicts within Whitehall for their own purposes. This 
appears to have been necessary because of resistance by the CO and officials from other 
departments who resented American interference. 
     
The experience of ‘political warfare’ during the Second World War and the fear of 
Communist subversion during the Cold War raised the importance of covert action, in the 
form of propaganda, economic aid and secret military activity, as a means of ‘fighting’ which 
were less likely to cause the outbreak of a nuclear holocaust.  In Britain such action had been 
carried out by a separate covert machinery during the war but whilst the FO, the sponsor of 
the Political Warfare Executive continued to operate. The Ministry of Economic Warfare and 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) had been amalgamated into the SIS after the war 
consequently the British information collecting/ intelligence machinery incorporated the 
covert policy implementation machinery. Covert action became progressively more important 
over time. It consisted of a mixture of propaganda and repressive activity / covert military 
operations carried out in the context of overt activity. As the programme became more 
important it needed co-ordination at higher levels. Whilst the counter-subversion was useful 
in an ideological conflict like the Cold War it also had uses in imperial interventions. Covert 
action reduced damage to British global prestige and allowed the Americans to provide 
support without losing their anti-colonial reputation.  
 
Internally these developments weakened the CO’s autonomous role in the intelligence 
machinery. Not only did British departments, like the COS and FO, push for their own 
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interests, they also wanted to protect the American alliance which gave them greater leverage 
in reducing the CO’s freedom of action. The Americans were aware of the internal divisions 
in Whitehall and used them to achieve their own objectives. 
  
As a ‘national’ programme counter-subversion was co-ordinated at the highest levels and the 
intelligence machinery had to be adapted to achieve this as well. This facilitated the growth 
of Cabinet Office influence and the centralisation process in Whitehall’s intelligence 
machinery. AC (O) and later the Official Committee on Counter Subversion in the Colonies 
and the FO’s Counter Subversion Committee were created to co-ordinate such activity and 
appear to have been later amalgamated. This machinery developed a role in empire as well as 
in Europe. The CO generally stood out against covert action preferring overt activity where 
possible but its resistance to such activity seems to have been worn down over time as it was 
more deeply incorporated into the Whitehall centralised machinery. The CO's freedom of 
action was further curtailed and it was forced to co-operate in such activity despite internal 
divisions about its effectiveness and its objectives. 
 
The development of counter- subversion machinery also had the surprising effect of 
appearing to be a mechanism by which United State's pressure could be applied directly to 
the British and imperial intelligence machinery  and to allow the US government to intervene 
directly in imperial issues. The British intelligence machinery was forced to develop liaison 
mechanisms to allow direct American intervention in some colonies at a working level. In the 
CO the senior officers and the ISD (and its successor departments) were aware of the 
pressure and kept records on American activity. It is not absolutely clear whether the ISD 
officials directly liaised with the Americans but it seems likely.  This affected the intelligence 
practices in these colonies as officials worked directly with American consular and 













The conclusion seeks to assess the case for determining the most important influences on the 
development of the imperial intelligence machinery. It evaluates the importance of 
administrative development and precedents, constitutional role, interdepartmental conflict 
historical context, and institutional culture, and in shaping the development of the imperial 
intelligence machinery. 
 
The thesis has demonstrated that the concept of an ‘imperial intelligence machinery’ and a 
wider definition of the intelligence machinery, is a valid conceptual frame work to explore 
the development of the imperial intelligence machinery. It is a useful concept which helps to 
explain the development of machinery which was initially a combination of organisations, 
but was centralised over time to gather and assess information about the empire. 
  
Initially it appeared that historical events were the most important influence on development. 
Cold War and colonial crises placed pressure on the British government. In turn government 
placed pressure on the Colonial Office and other departments to develop intelligence 
machinery to provide forewarning of potential trouble. The intention was to minimise the 
pressure on military resources needed for the Cold War and to keep the United States 
government on side. A neat series of administrative circulars chronicled how machinery was 
set up in the CO and colonial governments in response to pressure from the rest of Whitehall. 
 Closer examination however revealed a much more complex story. If the definition of 
intelligence is expanded beyond the purely ‘secret’ machinery it is possible to see how the 
intelligence machinery was an extension of the administrative machinery. 
 
 It is clear that the long term development of the administrative, military, and police 
machinery in Britain and the colonies provided an important input to the development of the 
imperial intelligence machinery. The development of a professional bureaucracy in Whitehall 
from the end of the 18
th
 century, based on models of central and local administration which 
emerged during the Tudor period, and their associated professional agenda, provided ongoing 
inputs to the development of the intelligence machinery. The administrative basis of the 
intelligence machinery, for example, helps to explain, why there were periods when there did 
not appear to be ‘formal’ intelligence machinery in Britain or the colonies.  The 
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administrative machinery gathered the necessary information and processed it into 
intelligence. The administration formed more specialised organisations when faced with 
information crises and got rid of them when their activity was no longer necessary.  
 
Police forces also originated in the judicial and administrative machinery. Political deviance 
fell under the jurisdiction of the police. Police forces developed their own sense of 
professional identity which resulted in professional agenda which included ideas about 
political policing. The police agenda differed from that emerging in the administrative 
structure. This had a fundamental effect on the way in which security information was 
collected and the machinery developed to perform these functions in the colonies. Police 
forces increasing provided the professional intelligence machinery in the colonies.  This 
development tended to emphasise that intelligence was a separate specific professional 
activity rather than an administrative concern.  
 
The process of intelligence development was complicated by constitutional practices and 
structures. The constitutional structures of the empire duplicated English institutions. Local 
contexts affected how these developed. Constitutional structures dictated administrative 
structures and the shape of the intelligence machinery. Ireland, for example, showed how 
English administrative and intelligence institutions were adapted to local conditions and in 
the process developed a different trajectory of development. In India, the Government of 
India had its own intelligence structures which were directly linked to the India Office. A 
similar process can be seen in the colonies. The relationship between the local government 
and its intelligence machinery in Ireland and India was direct.   
 
The CO by contrast had no constitutional responsibility to directly control colonial 
governments. It was a secretariat for the Secretary of State. This unusual role had 
implications for the intelligence machinery. The CO formed an intermediate level between 
Whitehall and the colonial governments which separated security and political intelligence 
gathering. Security intelligence machinery was a colonial responsibility. The CO by contrast 
was only structured to deal with political intelligence. The location of security intelligence 
gathering in the colonial police and administration, however, meant that it was a local 
responsibility except where a case needed to be made to obtain more security resources from 
the British government. This in turn isolated security intelligence from the administrators at 
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all levels. The lack of an imperial intelligence organisation undertaking operations directly 
for the CO limited the CO’s commitment to and understanding of, security intelligence. 
 
The creation of the British professional intelligence machinery in 1909 did not affect the 
CO’s fundamental intelligence role either. The British interdepartmental intelligence 
machinery had split into functional areas soon after 1909. Both foreign and counter-
espionage services quickly developed corporate cultures and practices and their own 
professional agenda. The Security Service, whilst responsible to the Secretary of State for 
Colonies from 1931, only provided advice, liaison, and centralised records to colonial 
governments and watched colonial subjects in London. It relied upon input from its 
correspondents into colonial governments and police forces to obtain information. The 
Security Service only operated in a few colonies with military bases and through a network of 
Defence Security Officers DSOs from the late 1930s. It also had responsibilities to other 
departments notably the Home Office which took operational priority.  The foreign 
intelligence service, SIS, quickly became responsible to the Foreign Office and was largely 
excluded from involvement in empire. These developments meant that the CO’s concept of 
intelligence and role in the intelligence machinery largely went unchallenged until the mid 
1940s and consequently the CO intelligence machinery did not develop in the same way as 
that in other parts of Whitehall. It did not develop the kind of machinery that would be 
needed, in the different conditions after the Second World War, to keep the rest of Whitehall 
informed. 
 
Administrative precedent made certain kinds of developments easier to implement. It shaped 
the way in which reforms were undertaken and assimilated in the intelligence machinery. The 
appointment of advisers, rather than directors, within the CO, for example, to oversee 
intelligence  development was due to long term constitutional ideas and the precedents which 
had emerged during the 1930s when the first advisers were being appointed in other areas. In 
1948-1949 external pressure led to the appointment of the police adviser, the system of 
biennial inspection and the greater development of special branches even though the political 
intelligence section was not adopted. Events in the early 1950s in the colonies led to the 
appointment of a Security Intelligence Adviser in 1954. Dissatisfaction with the CO’s 
performance led in part of the Templer Report in 1954-1955 which in turn led to major 
changes in the CO’s organisation which would otherwise have taken much longer to achieve, 
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even though many of its recommendations in fact were a codification of the reforms which 
had been working their way up from below. 
 
 This haphazard process of development made the machinery prone to a number of other 
features. It was vulnerable to interdepartmental conflicts and the existence of different 
institutional cultures in other Whitehall departments. In particular rivalries existed between 
the CO and the FO, on the civil side, (later rivalry was to develop with the CRO) and with the 
Service departments and the COS, on the military side. The FO needed information to 
manage the American relationship and the COS needed warning of crises which would affect 
their extremely tight military resources. Neither received information of the kind they needed 
and consequently they tried to pressure the CO into reform. 
  
There were interdepartmental rivalries within the CO. The CO underwent a process of 
administrative development in which it changed from a geographically organised department 
to include specialist technical departments with global rather than regional functions. The 
divisions were not strong enough to produce outright conflict but encouraged the 
development of different administrative and security world views internally. Each of these 
internal departments had differing objectives and the situation was complicated by the 
existence in the CO security departments of professional police and intelligence officers who 
brought with them the professional agenda which existed in their parent services. 
 
Finally the administrative structure of Whitehall dictated the routes through which 
information flowed, the places in which it was assessed, and how it was consumed. As the 
administrative structures changed after the Second World War the Cabinet Office became 
more important the JIC developed an important role and the responsibility for colonial affairs 
changed gradually from the CO to the CRO (and other departments) the machinery to serve 
the needs of these departments also change. In the process new personnel became involved 
and the professional intelligence personnel and the CRO's intelligence personnel took an ever 
greater role. 
 
It is clear than that administrative structure and its long term development lay at the heart of 
the shape and practice of the imperial intelligence machinery but historical events also played 
a part in causing administrative and intelligence development. Historical events were 
important both from the point of view of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ influences on the 
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development of the imperial intelligence machinery.  The Second World War, and later the 
Cold War, caused centralisation of policy making under the Cabinet Office in Whitehall. As 
government dealt with the problems posed by warfare there was a need for central 
management information to inform cabinet on policy making. This process also applied to 
colonial policy making and the CO lost much of its autonomy. The process we advanced and 
retarded by information crises in 1948, and throughout the early 1950s which seriously 
affected the ability of COS to fight the Cold War. 
   
Centralisation of government during periods of war also affected the British intelligence 
machinery. The JIC the British professional intelligence coordinating machinery had evolved 
from military machinery and its areas of interest were quite different to those of the CO. The 
coordinating machinery was focussed on security intelligence. It is not clear why the Security 
Service did not bridge the gap between the CO and the JIC as the service extended its activity 
into the empire. Probably it did not have sufficient manpower to undertake its own 
intelligence gathering. It relied on colonial governments and the CO for information and 
these had predominantly administrative cultures.  The process of imperial intelligence 
development was further complicated because the British professional intelligence machinery 
upon which the imperial machinery relied for professional advice was undergoing 
development and centralisation; particularly its coordinating machinery. It also had to 
undertake simultaneous, ongoing, operations against the main enemy, the Soviet Union. 
These developments meant that the transfer of professional ideas and models was complex 
and difficult to the CO and the colonies, and there was no part of the machinery which was 
not in a state of flux.     
 
Throughout this period the CO undertook a sophisticated campaign of resistance against 
administrative and intelligence developments in the rest of Whitehall until its intelligence 
machinery was fully connected to the British intelligence machinery in 1956-7. Even after 
this however, the CO could prove recalcitrant, but the trend was towards a higher degree of 
cooperation with the rest of Whitehall. There is no doubt that the process of resistance 
definitely slowed down the implementation of centralised machinery dealing with imperial 
matters and acted to limit and deflect it from the line of development advocated by the British 




The CO also had to deal with a number of colonial emergencies from the late 1940s which 
caused developments from the ‘bottom up’. Each emergency provided practical problems 
which caused the modification of the colonial and CO machinery. The emergencies also gave 
ammunition to other departments in Whitehall which blamed them on ‘communism’ rather 
than on the variety of local factors identified by the CO itself and caused them to press for the 
machinery to have a foci which accepted their vision of the threat. The change of focus was 
important in shaping the form and focus of the imperial intelligence machinery.  
 
 Developments in the empire led to a colonial intelligence model emerging over time, which 
was closely associated with the development of police models. The model drew on a number 
of administrative, police, and intelligence precedents. This model was unsophisticated, 
essentially a template which contained a preferred organisational structure of coordinating 
committees, a central intelligence committee, a director of intelligence,  and a special branch 
although it also included more sophisticated ideas about the penetration and manipulation of 
target organisations. The model was recommended by the CO in various circulars and 
enforced by the process of police and intelligence inspections which grew up by the advisers 
after 1948. The template drew on long term precedents before the Malayan experience but 
reached its final form between 1948 and 1952 as a result of experience there. The model thus 
became the ‘preferred solution’ of the technical personnel in the CO and the JIO. In this sense 
it does not matter that the CO did not carry out a full study of the various colonial disasters to 
create a fully developed system of dealing with these emergencies or that it was not 
necessarily the most effective system. As the system was transferred to other colonies by 
inspection, recommendation, the transfer of personnel and through the training programmes 
of the Security Service, it arrived at different times. The forms current in Malaya at the time 
of transfer was adopted but modified to fit local constitutional and structures and cultural 
forms. Sometimes a process of regional development was set off. This process was notable in 
East Africa and in Central Africa, West Africa developed in slightly different way. The 
development of the colonial machinery showed how historical events, administrative and 
intelligence reforms and cultures interacted to cause a process of development to occur. 
 
The process of handover during decolonisation was an event which was important in causing 
developments to the imperial intelligence machinery both in terms of producing short term 
reforms to operate during the handover itself and in terms of altering the machinery to 
provide for British needs in the longer term. Eventually in the period 1966-1968 the imperial 
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intelligence machinery was absorbed back into the British professional intelligence 
machinery and accepted its interests and priorities becoming merely an aspect of Britain’s 
foreign intelligence collection effort. 
 
An extremely important external pressure on the development of the imperial intelligence 
machinery was the emergence of a new role, i.e. that of the covert implementation of policy. 
Imperial and Second World War precedents shaped covert policy implementation and 
directly caused the development of new machinery to implement it. The development of 
British covert action machinery was closely associated with the development of US covert 
action programmes. The US alliance was considered so important that the PM and Cabinet 
pressured the CO, and the British intelligence machinery, to develop liaison mechanisms to 
allow the US intelligence services to operate in certain colonies despite the obvious loss of 
sovereignty involved. 
 
The thesis has not attempted to quantify the relative importance of each of these influences 
however from a qualitative perspective the constant references to administrative precedent 
suggest that it was extremely important. Administrative practices also drove the development 
of institutional culture and vice versa. Institutional culture played a part in shaping the way 
contemporary administrators thought about and conceived ‘intelligence’ and thus played an 
important role in causing the CO to resist other departments. If the CO’s personnel had 
accepted the importance of timely intelligence of the kind required by the COS and the FO 
needed to manage their functions, there would probably have been far less pressure upon 
their other activities from the rest of Whitehall. Intelligence could have been shared relatively 
easily by creating an external facing PIS or even wholeheartedly cooperating with the aims of 
the JIC. It was the CO’s culture that also caused it to think that the emphasis on communism 
in the rest of Whitehall was wrong when explaining trouble in the empire and tended to drive 
the two sides further apart.  Institutional culture played an important role in driving 
interdepartmental rivalry although the particular problems posed by the Cold War made these 
conflicts more important than they might have been otherwise. 
 
Institutional culture also affected the development of long term professional administrative 
and intelligence agenda. These had an extremely important effect on the imperial machinery. 
The process of administrative influence on the colonial police agenda of development and 
professionalization has already been described but the development of a professional 
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institutional culture played back into the process. In Britain Special Branch and the Security 
Service worked closely so there was precedent cooperation between colonial police and 
Security Service.  External lines of communication between the two could bypass the colonial 
government which was dominated by administrators. Professional advisers in the CO from 
the colonial police and the Security Service fitted into this wider security culture and 
provided means by which the advisers officially without the power to direct could influence 
development. In this the control of the IGCP over police appointments at gazetted level was 
particularly important. The way in which the Security Service promulgated its vision of the 
appropriate intelligence machinery through training courses, advice, liaison, and the 
provision of directors of intelligence ensured that the process worked. Culturally social 
differences between police officers and administrator in colonial governments probably 
played reinforced the importance of a professional culture in shaping the intelligence 
machinery. 
 
Overall the weight of evidence suggests that the long term influences were the most 
important in shaping the machinery and its practices and probably militated against its 
effectiveness and ability to adapt. Nonetheless the impetus to change did come from a series 
of short term crises which demonstrated that more information was needed to support the 
centralised control of colonial policy needed in the specific context of the Cold War.     
 
Implications for understanding the management of decolonisation:  
 
Because the machinery was developed away from the administrative towards the security 
intelligence side in order to benefit the COS and MOD and the FO’s attempts to maintain 
British alliances and prestige the ‘cultural spectacles’ of the imperial intelligence machinery 
became more and more focussed on security intelligence. By the early 1960s the machinery 
was focused on the ‘communist’ threat and its suppression. The security perspective could 
blind government to the realities of colonial situations. In both Singapore and British Guiana 
the problems faced by the British were less about Soviet subversion and more about 
legitimate local needs. The picture being created probably made it more difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate and proportionate needs for reform and revolution. This may 
have contributed to the tendency of the British to concentrate on backing conservative 
elements which did not retain power in the longer term. 
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The thesis assists in understanding the way in which the process of decolonisation was 
managed. Overall it suggests that information gathering and covert policy implementation 
played a more extensive part in decolonisation across the empire than previously realised. 
Firstly as the intelligence machinery became increasingly important in providing Whitehall 
with the information it used to understand what was happening in the colonies and this 
became more and more interested in security rather than political information the ‘cultural 
spectacles’ became more confining  and more focus appears to have been placed on internal 
security which affected the management process. The imperial machinery also provided the 
British with specific information relating to the internal political positions of anti colonial 
groups engaged in negotiating independence, so it may have acted to make the negotiations 
easier with a clearer sense of what was acceptable. 
  
The thesis confirms that covert policy implementation was an important element of British 
activity. There was a clear attempt to achieve means of control which meant that the British 
government could prevent or control communist activity in the post independence estates and 
consequently maintain longer term British influence and prestige. Indeed for number of years 
the level of intelligence involvement in some ex colonies was so intimate that for many 
purposes it was if the British were still in occupation although involvement declined rapidly 
after 1966 with the withdrawal of the SLOs.  
 
The thesis provides insights into the way in which the intelligence machinery was structured 
and how it operated, which opens the possibility of reassessing the information contained in 
intelligence reports and thus the understanding of events more effectively. Because the 
British perception of what was happening was more important in terms of British action, than 
what was actually going on, it may lead to a better understanding of British action during the 
period. 
 
Additional areas of research: 
 
The study has identified a number of additional areas for historical investigation. There is 
obviously a need to reassess the content of the many intelligence reports which are available 
with a clearer understanding do the process involved in making them and thus assist in 




There remains the need to examine other elements in the imperial intelligence machinery and 
link them into the developing picture. To understand the longer term development of the 
imperial intelligence machinery it is necessary to link its development to that of the Irish and 
Indian administration and intelligence machinery. This is a difficult task because of the 
archival separation of Indian from colonial archives. There has been some work on the effect 
of Indian intelligence in India and the Far East but its influence on the colonial machinery 
though the transfer of experience to the Security Service and to colonial machinery through 
the transfer of personnel would make the relative influence of influence on the imperial 
machinery clearer. The intelligence machinery in the India Office and the Indian intelligence 
machinery also need to be examined in more detail and their activities linked to intelligence 
activity in the informal empire in the Middle East and the formal activity in the colonial 
empire. The importance of Indian precedents, despite the administrative separation of India 
from the colonial empire, seems very important not only in the post 1900 period but also in 
the period immediately after the granting of Indian independence when the nature of the 
impact of Indian experience on other colonial situations changed. The way in which the 
Indian intelligence machinery was absorbed into the Security Service and the India Office 
was absorbed into the CRO would benefit from scholarly attention. 
 
It is also necessary to research the intelligence machinery in the CRO and the Commonwealth 
Office in the context of the information about the British professional intelligence machinery 
and the CO revealed by this thesis. The increasing role of the CRO and the Commonwealth 
Office in the final stages of decolonisation and its direct control over the High Commission 
territories and the consequent intelligence arrangements need to be integrated into the study 
of the imperial intelligence machinery as a whole. The role of the CRO also needs to be 
examined in relation to the intelligence relationships with the self governing dominions, in 
the context of the parallel JIC system, and the relative importance of the two intelligence 
hierarchies properly assessed.  The research then needs to be set into the context of the 
development of the British intelligence machinery in order to fully understand both systems. 
  
Finally there is also a need to further examine the direct intervention of the US intelligence 
machinery in the empire, the machinery needed to facilitate this and its relationship with the 
imperial intelligence machinery.  The extent to which the US agencies operated in British 
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Appendix H: Organisation of Intelligence in Palestine  
Figure 1 from Steven Wagner 
Wagner Steven (2008) 'British Intelligence and the Jewish Resistance Movement in the 
Palestine 





















Appendix I: Organisation of Intelligence in the Far East 1948-49 
Top Secret Intelligence Organisation in the Far East 1948 on CO537/4321 Intelligence 
Organisation in the Far East (1948) 
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Notes on Intelligence Organisation in the Far East 
1.Service Commanders have Intelligence Staffs who are represented at their respective levels 
on the Joint Intelligence Committee Far East and on the Local Joint Intelligence Committee 
where established. 
2. The Agencies responsible for the collection of information are: 
1 Special Branch 
2 SIFE 




















































































Appendix K: List of Colonial Office Circulars on Intelligence Machinery 
 
Mr Creech Jones, Secret Circular Despatch of 5.8.48 
 
Mr Creech Jones, Secret and Personal Letter of 20.8.48 
 
Mr James Griffiths, Top Secret Circular Despatch of 11.7.50 
 
Circular Saving Telegram of 16.10.52 
 
Sir Thomas Lloyds, Top Secret and Personal Letter of 29.4.53 (Unable to locate) 
 
Secretary of States, Top Secret Circular 458/56 28.4.56 
 
Circular 1135/59 (Unable to locate) 
 
ISD 55/010 Circular 64/60 Periodical Reviews of State of Local Intelligence, 22 January 
1960 
In 1963 the JIC adopted this procedure and requested that other departments contribute 
JIC (63)63 (Revised Terms of Reference) 19 July 1963 
 
Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee, The State of Our intelligence Note by the Secretary 
 
Circular 980/61 (Unable to locate) 
 
Circular 60/65 Referred to the need for a review at twelve monthly intervals of the local state 
of intelligence coverage. 
 
Circular 169/65 Periodical Reviews of the State of Local Intelligence, 14 April 1965. 
Periodical Review of State of Local Intelligence 
 
Circular 248/65 15th June 1965 
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